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WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1508

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PCI'S PAJETTA ON ARMS REDUCTION, EUROPEAN ROLE, DETENTE

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 19 Oct 79 pp 3-4

[Interview with Gian Carlo Pajetta by Massimo Loche, Rome, date not given]

[Text] Bargaining to halt the rearmament spiral. Trend toward contemplating the gravity of the situation and practical proposals for halting the deterioration of the detente process. Balance of forces necessary, but must be based on cutbacks in armaments rather than their increase. Brezhnev's proposals, now formally addressed to governments, call for responses far different from those hitherto forthcoming. The Pershing 2, SS-20, and the numbers dance on strategic balance. Positions stated by governments, parties, and political groups in Europe and in Italy. Creating a climate of inquiry and confidence with different forces behind a policy of peace and of effective struggle against hunger and underdevelopment.

[Question] As we look at an international situation dominated by argument and tensions stemming from the arms issue, we should like to talk with you about the initiatives our Party plans to take to get Italy behind a policy of peace and detente.

[Answer] We must set in motion a broad movement of serious thinking and debate on the gravity of the situation and on the issues at stake. We must join with all responsible forces concerned with peace to seek measures that might be taken to put a timely halt to the threat of an extremely dangerous rearmament spiral. There can be no doubt that today the process of detente, which some may overoptimistically have thought was irreversible, has gravely deteriorated to a point where it

is not merely slowing down, but may actually be in danger of reversal. Hence our first concern must be to reject any sort of attempt to use the situation or to oversimplify it. We are in a situation in which no one dare offer or accept a pig in a poke.

Nothing could be more fraught with peril today than minimizing the danger, making light of it, or simply surrendering to fatalism. According to some observers, the situation looks more dangerous than it is because it is directly governed or linked to election time (the American presidential elections) or to the temptation to use it for propaganda purposes here in Italy under the tattered standard of anticommunism. In this country, for example, there is a blatant attempt to prevent adoption of a national unity policy or to interrupt the encouraging process which had rallied all the democratic forces in support of a unified foreign policy. That situation itself, however, presents a specific danger: for what will not be a brief period we shall be exposed to the grave danger that false propaganda, maneuvers, or outright rascality may cloak the facts or even win out over those who believe they are using such means for less tragic ends.

If this analysis is correct, the only way out is negotiation among the political forces in this country as well as at the international level to eliminate imbalances wherever they may be, or at least to get rid of the critical danger points by means of limitation and reduction of armaments.

When we speak of balance of forces we take a stand against those who would interpret it as possible only through an endless race to rearmament. Hence the goal is to seek equilibrium, as the expression goes, at a lower level, establishing a new climate in international relations, and strengthening the bulwarks of peace and the spirit of collaboration.

[Question] What is your opinion of this rearmament race?

[Answer] There are facts that may well trigger a qualitative change in international relations and a perilous imbalance of forces. Consider the production of new weapons (such as the cruise missile) whose technical nature alone would not only endanger SALT II, but would render it meaningless and even snuff out any lingering hopes of SALT III's representing further progress. This would give rise to a practically insurmountable obstacle which would set the situation back by many years. All this means that the interested parties must get back to negotiations and that the political parties and the people must be aware of the terrifying problems and perils facing them.

[Question] How, then, do you explain the reaction of much of the Italian press and of the political parties to the proposals Brezhnev made in his Berlin speech, where he outlined practical means for reducing troop levels and weapons?

[Answer] The negative reaction from some parties and from a part of the press was so instantaneously shut and clumsy that it cannot even be styled subterfuge. Such an attitude calls for serious inquiry into the reasons behind it. I think that the primary purpose was to use the drastic and peremptory rejection, bereft of any serious analysis, to obscure the real value and meaning of those proposals. Otherwise they would have behaved differently: they would have gone into the merits, they might have raised objections, asked for explanations, or perhaps even asked for more, but actually they did not even try to get further clarification or concessions. They did not even use the normal diplomatic channels to obtain more detailed clarification.

[Question] There is one piece of news just off the wires. Brezhnev has formalized his proposals in letters sent to the European heads of government, including the Italian prime minister.

[Answer] This is even more meaningful and more important than the offers made in Berlin. Of course it does not rule out serious thinking, questioning, and discussion; it does, however, call for answers quite different from those given thus far.

[Question] There has been a lot of talk of numbers: how many tanks on this side and on that, or how many missiles each side has in readiness. Don't you think that the issue of strategic balance is more complicated than it has been made out to be?

[Answer] We have been watching a numbers dance, and nobody knew where the figures had come from; in any case, they conflicted with those published in the Italian press which, for prudence' sake, had quoted those given by British or Swedish institutes specializing in strategic research, when they did not actually quote the statements of American military spokesmen.

Given this, the question, as I have already said, cannot be boiled down to one of pure military balance out of the context of the general situations and the factors which cannot be reduced to purely quantitative comparisons.

I have already referred to the strategic upheaval that deployment of the cruise missile would precipitate, and to the need for careful scrutiny of the possible significance, even within the scope of the NATO nations, of a different deployment of weapons. To take one example: as of now, Norway has no nuclear arms on its soil. What would be the consequences if that nation

were to take the opposite course, and were to cherish ideas of reprisal or of nuclear aggression?

Italy now has no weapons capable of directly hitting a target on Russian soil. But were our country to get such a weapon, which would turn it into a front-line target for the presumed enemy, what would the consequences be?

We are interested in discussing and investigating the problems linked with the new technologies, but we believe that we must also take into consideration the individual zones and the possibility, at some time in the future, of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean, for example, where today there are nuclear submarines (among others, there is a base at Isola Maddalena, Sardinia, for what are called "auxiliary" submarines in case of a nuclear war). This is why we are asking for a meeting as soon as possible, which might have some chance of producing positive results. The necessary premise for this is a freeze on the arms race for a length of time adequate to the process of calm and clear-headed debate. And if somebody says that we must deploy missiles because if we don't the Soviets have or would have the edge on us, adding that the balance of power would be reversed only in 1982, that means that we assume that the USSR will not take advantage of its superiority prior to that date. But if this is so, why should we create conditions that would push the USSR, during that same period, to increase its arsenal? Why should we offer it the temptation to exploit this period of superiority over the West? This is why we should give the closest possible attention to every proposal that may be put forward.

[Question] What are these positions? How are they expressed?

[Answer] One initial position is linked with a rejection of detente. This is the position of those who want to prevent ratification of SALT II. Obviously these people do not want parity, but look upon nuclear superiority as a tool for blackmail. Opposing them are the American groups which might deem European nuclear rearmament adventurous. This is the most dangerous position, and it is the easiest to single out and denounce.

There is a second position which approves of SALT II, but at the same time feels it necessary to deploy new missiles so as to negotiate from a position of strength. In reality, it is a way of getting around or gutting SALT II, both by the nature of the weapons to be deployed, and because it is foolish to believe that in the face of deployment of new weapons, the other side would be willing to hold still on its present level. Hence it would, as I have pointed out, trigger a dangerous and unstoppable spiral. This is the position of the British government,

of some of the German Christian Democrats, and of some people here at home. The Hon Mr Piccoli's statements have been so immediate and so purposely simplistic as to indicate that he has already taken sides and that his motivation stems from interests not solely confined to military alignments. Then finally we have the position of those who are politically willing to accept the deployment of Pershing 2s within 2 years and meanwhile to continue the negotiations with a low bargaining power. There are clear hints in this direction in the position of the GFR government and in that of Italian Christian Democrats. This position, too, is hard to accept. Within 2 years, once the military had these weapons available, Italy would find itself in a far worse position, and one fraught, furthermore, with far more perilous consequences, than the one prevailing at the time when Alcide de Gasperi, having agreed only to the Atlantic Pact, told the people that there would be no military bases in Italy. I do not believe, even though many of those who advance this argument do so in all good faith, that the new missiles may be tossed into the ocean deeps within 2 years, or that policy decisions once taken can readily be overturned. As a consequence, our position is that we must give priority to negotiations and that only in the wake of such negotiations can decisions be taken. We are not talking here about negotiations as to the amount by or the rate at which armaments may be increased, but we do think that it is possible, even indispensable, in a situation that may well become extremely grave, to undertake negotiations which would guarantee gradual disarmament, real controls and true security. This will take hard searching for an agreement that will permit verification of the real situation if necessary, and reestablishing parities at lower levels.

[Question] Do you really believe that the situation today is indeed this grave, that it does in fact contain the seeds of conflict?

[Answer] As of today, there are 50 nations which could, within a few years, make their own nuclear weapons, and a dozen nations which already have them, or will shortly have them. Should negotiations for updating the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, scheduled to begin shortly, open in a climate determined not only by the great-power rearmament race, it would be difficult indeed to prevent the further multiplication of countries possessing their own nuclear weapons -- a proliferation which would of itself make the situation even less controllable. And then there are some military people even now who argue that in theory an eventual "limited" nuclear war would not necessarily lead to a general conflagration. Others of their number think they could unleash a quick conflict, taking advantage of what they assume to be their temporary superiority. Let's not forget,

though, that wars have often been started by people who believed, as they do, that they could win them quickly, but who wound up losing them.

[Question] How does the PCI plan to get into discussion of this issue with the other political parties, and thereby contribute to Italy's taking a position of peace?

[Answer] Rather than a propaganda campaign that would inflame our political opponents or accuse those who hold positions different from our own of bad faith, and quite removed from a policy favoring one military bloc over the other, we believe we must create a climate conducive to serious dialogue in this country. We hope that the Socialists and the Catholics who say they have harkened to Pope John Paul II's words on disarmament will make a commitment to seek for an Italian policy which, even within the structure of present alliances, can provide stronger guarantees of peace. We must create a climate of questioning and of confidence that will demonstrate the possibility and the utility of detente. Peace cannot be built on the unstable balance of terror which, in the last analysis, is not a real equilibrium, but merely a cloak over a determination to guarantee one's own superiority over the other side's. The issue of a balance between military forces is certainly an important one and must be negotiated in talks ranging from those in Vienna, which can be opened again on the basis of the latest Soviet proposals, to SALT II which must be ratified immediately and followed by SALT III, to a possible meeting between the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance. All of these are important steps, but still merely interlocutory. Once the principles of non-interference and sovereignty have been established, we must create the possibility for the detente process not only to get a new start, but to lead to a new situation in the world, the one for which we have fought and for which other parties -- Socialists, Catholics, the non-aligned -- can fight: general disarmament. There you have a prospect that would allow the only war that should ever be fought in our time -- the war against hunger and against underdevelopment, the twin causes of the general crisis for which the world is already paying, and which may well bring it down around our ears.

6182

CS0: 3104

PAPERS COMMENT ON ABSENCE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN PAHR, CSSR DISSIDENTS

AU191757 [Editorial Report AU] From 17-19 November 1979 several Vienna German language papers carry varying reports on contacts, or the absence of contacts, between Austrian Foreign Minister Pahr and CSSR dissidents during his visit to Prague on 15-16 November.

KRONEN-ZEITUNG on 18 November says that "No meeting between Pahr and dissidents" has materialized in the CSSR--be it for lack of time, or out of concern over the success of Pahr's visit--although such a meeting had originally been planned on the "neutral ground" of the Austrian Embassy. According to the paper, Charter 77 spokesman Hajek called off a meeting with Pahr "out of consideration for Austrian-Czechoslovak relations," while "civil rights fighter Battek" came to a prearranged meeting at the Austrian Embassy--despite a massive police guard outside the building--where he was received by "a high-ranking official of Pahr's entourage."

KURIER on 18 November states that "a civil rights righter" wanted to inform Minister Pahr of the aims of the Czechoslovak civil rights movement, "but Pahr let himself be harnessed by his hosts into a program of political visits and thus had no time in the morning." While KURIER also reports that former foreign minister Hajek himself abandoned his plan to see Pahr "out of his sense of responsibility," ARBEITER-ZEITUNG on 18 November writes: "As has been learned from dissident circles, former foreign minister Jiri Hajek attempted to get into the Austrian Embassy, but was prevented from doing so by police." In its 19 November issue KURIER frontpages a report by its special correspondent Wolfgang Broe, headlined "CSSR opposition feels slighted by Pahr, claiming civil rights fighter Battek as saying that a meeting with Pahr had been prearranged well in advance Saturday morning, but that Pahr failed to comply with this arrangement "and did not do anything on his part to actually bring about the meeting."

DIE PRESSE on 17-18 November reports that the three members of an Austrian television service team accompanying Foreign Minister Pahr on his trip to the CSSR were temporarily arrested by Prague security police when they were leaving a dissident's apartment and taken to a police station, but were released from custody an hour later.

KURIER on 18 November quotes a "high-ranking CSSR Foreign Ministry official" as having declared in comment on Pahr's visit: "Your minister has outlined his views very firmly, but elegantly and without insulting us."

KRONEN-ZEITUNG on 18 November cites leading CSSR representatives as having declared that "Prague is at present carefully studying Hungary's experiences in the first year of visa-less tourist travel, in talks with Hungarian experts." According to the paper, these representatives said that "a change of the current CSSR visa regulations vis-a-vis Austria was quite conceivable and there might also be fundamental changes in the "nature of the CSSR border (barbed wire, mines)." KRONEN-ZEITUNG quotes the same source as adding: "During the cold war we believed we needed that. Later, it turns out that it is no longer necessary. Only, despite many discussions, we have not yet made up our mind to remove [word indistinct] as was done by the Hungarians."

The communist VOLKSTIMME on 18 November frontpages a statement by party chairman Franz Muhri hailing the "positive results" of Pahr's CSSR visit as a confirmation of the Austrian Communists' contention that it would have been wrong to cancel the visit and that it is "not in Austria's interests to let our country be used as basis for the West propaganda centers against the CSSR and for interference in the internal affairs of our neighbor country."

CSO: 3103

'RENEWABLE' FEDERALISM SUGGESTED AS REFERENDUM OPTION

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 24 Sep 79 p A2

[Article by Louis Falardeau: "The Other Option Could Be 'Renewable' Federalism"]

[Text] Quebec--All the polls asking Quebecers to choose among various constitutional statuses reveal that renewed federalism is by far the most popular. This option is still ahead by several points of the PQ [Quebecois Party] thesis of sovereignty-association, which is far ahead in second place of independence pure and simple and the status quo.

It is therefore not surprising that those who wish that Quebec continue to be a member of the Canadian federation should have tried to act in such a way that Quebecers may be able to choose between sovereignty-association and renewed federalism rather than between the pequiste thesis and the status quo at the time of the referendum.

But recent events demonstrate to us that they have failed and that if they can offer more than the status quo it will not be renewed federalism but "renewable" federalism at most.

After the advent of the PQ to power in November 1976, under the pressure of English Canada and the federalists of Quebec Pierre Trudeau had tried in his way to renew Canadian federalism. He believed himself to be in a position to make important changes before the holding of the referendum. He even went to the point of making certain overtures in terms of sharing powers.

If the exercise had succeeded it would not truly have renewed federalism before the referendum deadline. But it could perhaps have convinced Quebecers that such renewal was possible and already well on the way.

Pierre Trudeau's electoral defeat has consummated the setback of his attempt. But already his intransigence, the divergent interests of the provinces, and the fact that Quebec especially did not wish it to succeed were as many signs which allowed one to believe that it was going to fail.

Trudeau's successor, Joe Clark, had announced that flexibility was going to enable him to transform Canadian federalism so as to satisfy Quebecers. Sure of himself, he asserted in the course of his electoral campaign that even if the referendum were held in early autumn he would still have found the time to first call a federal-provincial conference on the constitution whose results would prove to Quebecers that their future is in Canada.

Clark Gives Up

Now, even though he has a year before the holding of the referendum, Joe Clark renounced his project to slightly amend the constitution before that deadline. His minister of state for federal-provincial relations, Williams Jarvis, confirmed this week that there will be no constitutional conference. Ottawa did not renounce for all that to try to demonstrate the virtues of the flexibility but it plans to do so by striving to settle some problems which oppose it to Quebec and by obviating new quarrels. But whatever the successes of Joe Clark in this undertaking, renewed federalism will certainly not emerge from it. The most that it could demonstrate is that federalism is flexible and therefore renewable.

Claude Ryan, in contrast to the Ottawa government, does not have the power to renew federalism before the referendum. But he could--and he had announced his intention of doing so immediately after his accession to the leadership of the Liberal Party--propose to Quebecers a plan of renewed federalism. At the time of the referendum he could have opposed it to the sovereignty-association plan and tried to convince Quebecers that his was better and more easy to implement than that of the Pequistes.

The Liberals have resolutely put themselves to the task and their new constitutional program will be adopted at their congress next spring, a few months before the holding of the referendum

Unchallengeable Chief

But Claude Ryan is not only the head of the Liberal Party. Law 92 also makes of him the unquestioned chief of the federalist troops, of the partisans of the "no" vote at the referendum. The law gives him the power to direct at will the committee of the "no" and to put his conditions to those who would like to be involved in it.

He could thus have made of the Liberal Party's constitutional program the program of the committee of the "no" votes. He could also have waged his entire referendum campaign by presenting the "no" vote as a positive choice: To vote "no" would have meant to vote in favor of his plan for a new Canada.

Claude Ryan confirmed 2 weeks ago that he had renounced this idea because he wishes that all Quebecers opposed to sovereignty-association be represented in the committee of the "no" votes. He must make it as attractive as possible to the federalists of all persuasions.

The Liberal chief is well aware that he could not have succeeded in rallying to his party's program the Liberals and federal Conservatives, the National Union and the neo-democrats. And if he had wanted to impose it on the committee of the "no" votes, the federalist front would have very rapidly splintered and the Quebecois Party would not have failed to benefit from it.

The program of the "no" votes will thus be reduced to a very small common denominator: One should vote "no" because sovereignty-association is equivalent to independence, because federalism constitutes the best political system, and because it is flexible and perfectible.

Naturally, the constitutional program of the Liberals will be known at the time of the referendum campaign and Claude Ryan said that he would not refuse to speak of it. But it will not be offered as counterweight to the Pequistes thesis by those who will wage the campaign of the "no" votes.

One can expect that the PQ will try to profit from this decision by pointing out that those who will not vote "yes" at the referendum opt for the status quo. They will demonstrate to what point the federalists are divided and will ask how Claude Ryan will be able to have his reform plan accepted in English Canada when he has not even dared to try to rally to it the federalist parties active in Quebec.

But the position of the Liberal Party leader would have been, too, at least as vulnerable if he had chosen the other alternative. The division of the federalists would have been much more evident. And his message can be much more simple and clearer than if he had had to defend too specific a plan. The Pequistes know this well, incidentally--they who will have to explain and defend point by point a new and extremely detailed plan and who will have to convince Quebecers that it can be carried out.

2662

CSO: 3100

QUEBECERS SAID TO STILL FAVOR FEDERAL SYSTEM

Poll Taken

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 29 Sep 79 p A4

[Editorial by Marcel Adam: "Quebec Continues to be Attached to Canada"]

[Text] The results of the poll ordered and made public on Thursday [27 September 1979] by the Levesque government are not of a nature to have the Pequistes exult since they reveal that Quebecers continue to be very attached to Canada and the federal system, one which has permitted and will still enable Quebec to develop according to its aspirations and which is susceptible to be renewed to its satisfaction.

This poll is the most elaborate and the most thorough ever to have been taken among Quebecers on the subject of the constitutional problem. Individual interviews were conducted among 1,000 respondents from whom some 180 pieces of information were tabulated on the basis of many questions often of very subtle wording.

Quebecers appear in the majority to have made up their minds on the major constitutional stakes, but they do not seem to have had a very clear idea of the sense and scope of the options on the basis of a large number of sovereignty-association questions which, for many Quebecers, would not prevent the province's belonging to Canada or the election of Quebec deputies to the Chamber of Commons.

One of two things is possible: Either a discussion which has continued unwearily for the past 10 years or so has lacked clarity and rigor or else a defect in communication has prevented a large part of the population from participating in it, from taking an interest in it, or from understanding its essential elements.

When one considers that so much confusion exists among the population which is at the origin and at the heart of a constitutional discussion that has constantly occupied the minds since the beginning of the 1960's, why should one be surprised that outside of Quebec and particularly in the outlying regions of the country people have difficulty understanding what agitates Quebec?

Quebecers have for the most part formed an opinion to the best of their knowledge but they hope to still have a little time to think about it. They confirmed that Claude Ryan was right when he said recently that Quebecers were not ready to pronounce themselves knowledgeably on their future. But it should also be said that the very vast majority consider that it is high time that Quebec's future should be decided.

This allows one to suppose that during the 7 or 8 months which separate us from the referendum the holders of opposite options could bend public opinion somewhat if the discussion, rather than exciting people, prompts them to reflection.

This poll gives several indications on the political orientation of Quebecers by revealing that they have resisted not only the most seductive arguments of the Quebecois Party for the past 12 years or so but also those of the federalist nationalists.

For example, they evidence themselves to be more concerned by the size of the country than by the notions of majority and minority--they who prefer to be a minority in a large country than a majority in a small one. Just like some great political philosophers, they instinctively believe that it is good to deal with two levels of government. They assign as much to politicians as to the Canadian system principal responsibility for the problems of Quebec vis-a-vis Ottawa. Knowing that the Canadian federation has often been pitted against Quebec, they do not for all that tend to believe that the federal government favors the rest of Canada to the detriment of Quebec. They favor less an increase in the powers of Quebec or a particular statute that the negotiation of a new understanding with the rest of Canada.

The Pequiste government will however find consolation in the fact that the majority of Quebecers may give a mandate to the government to negotiate sovereignty-association and that an overwhelming majority of them believe that Quebec should deal with the rest of Canada as an equal.

But they wish to see a change inside the federal system. This makes one believe that a possible mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association would have little credibility among the Anglo-Canadians. As for the formula of equal, it lends itself to so many distinctions that it has primarily propaganda value in the discussion under way. Everybody adheres to it as a principle relating to the equality of individuals but this postulate does not necessarily call for independence.

The poll calls for a thorough and prudent study, for it is difficult to analyze and interpret. The one who undertook it, Edouard Cloutier, warns us against the temptation to draw hasty and decisive conclusions from it regarding the state of Quebec public opinion on the issues involved.

At first sight this poll distinctly discloses at least one thing: Quebecers appear much less pessimistic than their elites on the subject of the present crisis and believe the risks of the Canadian experiment to be much less than their Pequiste leaders.

Editorial Corrected

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 2 Oct 79 p A4

[Correction to article by Marcel Adam in LA PRESSE of 29 Sep 79 p A4]

[Text] In my editorial of Saturday, 29 September 1979, a technical error completely distorted a paragraph which should have read as follows:

"The majority of Quebecers appear to have formed their opinion on the major constitutional issues, but they do not seem to have a very clear idea of the meaning and scope of the options involved--notably, in connection with the sovereignty-association alternative which, as a very large number of Quebecers see it, would not bar Quebec's membership in the Canadian federation and the election of its deputies to the [Canadian] House of Commons."

2662

CSO: 3100

NEW PORT FOR PAPHOS PLANNED

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 12-18 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] The government says Paphos will have both a new port and an airport-- but the local people are sceptical. As one Paphian said: "We have had so many unfilled promises in the past that we no longer believe in words, we want to see some deeds."

The Ministry of Communications and Works said 'there is no change in the government's decision to build a port at Paphos.' It said the necessary preparatory work has been completed 'and tenders will be invited soon for the construction plans.'

It also said all preparatory work had been completed in connection with the planned Paphos airport. The relevant study is to be submitted soon to the Council of Ministers for a final decision, it added.

The the President of the Paphos Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Loizos Havouzaris, told the Cyprus Weekly, 'I still don't believe anything will be done. I have been hearing these promises since 1946, and I still think the government is dragging its feet on these projects.'

Struggle Committee

Mr. Havouzaris announced that a 'struggle committee,' drawn from all Paphos organisations, would be formed to exert pressure on the government to force it to take some action.

A new Paphos port would cost anything between L12-20 million. The late President Makarios and President Kyprianou reaffirmed the government's determination to go ahead with the project, and a site has been finally selected.

But probable economic difficulties are causing a delay, and meanwhile the construction costs are going up and up.

Earlier in the week, in his report to the annual general meeting of the Paphos Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Havouzaris said: 'We are tired of raising the question of these two projects time after time. Because every year we get promises which are then put into a fridge!'

Imperative

He declared: 'The construction of a sea port and an airport at Paphos is imperative both for economic and national reasons.

The Chamber president also called for the improvement of trunk roads in the Paphos district. He said any delay would have adverse effects on the commercial, agricultural, industrial and tourist sectors.

Improving rural roads would also encourage people, especially the youth, to stay in villages, instead of fleeing to the towns, he added.

Mr. Havouzaris said Paphos needed 30,000 more people in order to help in the full development of the district, especially in the area of the Paphos irrigation scheme.

Dealing with tourism, he said new hotel units should be constructed to cope with the tourist influx. There was also an urgent need for a public beach, while the small harbour should be repaired and developed to take in yachts and other pleasure boats.

Loans

The Chamber of Commerce wanted a better bus service for Paphos town, he said.

He also said the Paphos municipal council needed loans to enable it to build a new municipal market, a slaughter house and parking place.

Mr Havouzaris suggested there should be strict controls on the price and quality of foodstuffs, so that visitors could find the cost of staying reasonably low.

He complained about the new electricity rates and said a number of local businessmen were finding it difficult to get new telephones installed at their premises.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

WORLD BANK DELEGATION--The prime minister, Mr Cagatay, today received a delegation from the World Bank. The delegation discussed with the prime minister a loan requested from the bank for financing a project for expanding the electricity network in Cyprus and the way of putting into effect part of the project to be carried out in the federated state. According to a press statement issued from the prime minister's office after the meeting which lasted nearly 1 hour, Mr Cagatay said that the delegation had been informed that the World Bank must conclude a separate agreement with the federated state concerning that part of the project to be undertaken in the north. The prime minister said that he had told the delegation that he was ready to discuss the project with the Greek Cypriot administration in the presence of World Bank officials. Technical experts of both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot administrations could hold preliminary discussions before representatives from the two sides reached a final decision on the matter. Mr Cagatay said that he had stressed at the meeting that the federated state also had plans which had economic importance and overriding priority for the Turkish Cypriots, plans which could be taken up for discussion with the electricity project. [Text] [TA091818 Bayrak Radio (Clandestine) in English 50 Cyprus 1730 GMT 9 Nov 79 TA]

CS0: 4920

ACTIONS OF BERLIN GREEN REPRESENTATIVES DESCRIBED

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 1 Nov 79 p 6

[Article by Hans Gaeng: "Green hedgehogs and Old Hares"]

[Text] The "established" parties in Bremen are taking up the challenge of the four Green representatives in the provincial assembly; the "establishment" in Berlin has already done so: For the past 6 months 10 representatives of the "Alternative List" have occupied seats in 4 city district assemblies and are trying to practice alternative parliamentarianism.

The success achieved by the Greens in Bremen exceeds that of the hedgehog, the mascot of the AL [Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Control] at the Berlin elections of 18 March last. The AL obtained 3.7 percent of the vote, and while this was not enough to give them any representatives in the provincial assembly, the party managed to get 10 seats in the city district assemblies. It scored not only in the Tiergarten, Schoeneberg and Kreuzberg districts which are beset by urban problems and where the alternative lifestylers feel quite at home; even prosperous middle class Wilmersdorf voters sent two AL representatives to the district assembly.

Only 6 months later the green hedgehog seems to have achieved a firm place in the consciousness of the Berlin public; it represents a new and fourth factor of municipal politics. In 4 of the 12 Berlin district assemblies AL representatives have opened the doors to the wind of change.

To begin with, it is true, that wind tended to blow back at them. The Alternatives, new to parliamentary procedure, had some difficulty in getting going. Their representatives complain bitterly that assembly members from the "established parties" had at times banded together simply to vote down the AL. Such naivete is rather surprising: After all, even before the election AL activists spoke of the "CDUSPDFFDP"--if at all possible in one breath and without hyphens--thereby expressing their own opposition to all the others simultaneously and without distinction.

The AL also had a lot of trouble with the niceties of parliamentary protocol. None of them had any political experience of handling agendas. The other parties exploited this fact in the rash hope of checking the AL: Parliamentary questions by the AL people could be abruptly rejected because, for example, they got document numbers mixed up or failed to submit a question on the due date.

Slowly, though, the hedgehog is catching up with the old hands of the other parties and getting to know political tricks. At the same time, however, the AL is plagued by new troubles--with their own rank and file who often tend to misunderstand the nuts and bolts of alternative parliamentarianism. Dirk Schneider is an AL representative in the Kreuzberg district assembly. He wrote in the Green newspaper STACHEL [Sting]: "The straitjacket of regulations in conjunction with our inability to hack a way through the undergrowth means that many people, from sheer frustration, come to agree with the radical cry that 'the whole mess should simply be blown away.'"

Recent parliamentarian Schneider uses the full weight of AL consciousness to oppose the emerging attitude "that district assemblies are to be considered irrelevant." According to him AL followers must take into account "that the majority of people are still firmly committed to the framework of formal democracy, and that we must not leave the field to the obsolete established parties."

At the same time, though, the AL already stated in its election plank that it did not intend to engage in "professional politics." To implement this ambitious claim seems to be rather difficult. It presents a challenge in particular to AL district assembly representatives, especially when it is a matter of allocating time: In Tiergarten district, for example, the two Alternatives are members of nine committees each, must attend each plenary meeting and, to keep touch with their voters, be present at the various meetings of the district AL and the citizen initiatives. Alternative local politician--a full-time job after all and for professionals only?

The AL is trying hard to cope with the burden. For the moment less important committees are neglected. If committee meetings are open to the public, the AL brings along its rank and file. It endeavors to obtain for the citizen initiatives the right to speak at plenary meetings. "Nothing can be done without extra work," Dirk Schneider wrote. He wished for more "lively interchange with extraparlimentary bodies."

Despite the citizens forum which the AL and some initiatives have organized to discuss various groups of problems, rank and file information is not much better than among the other parties. Many decisions by Green representatives--Dirk Schneider complains--are "backed far too little by collective efforts of the rank and file."

How do the other parties get on with the obstinate AL? The CDU seems less upset about the Alternatives than either the Social Democrats or the Liberals.

The fact that AL and CDU occasionally team up in opposition to the SPD tends to be an AL problem rather than a Christian Democrat problem. The group of the Alternatives seems to have hoped for rather greater sympathy from the FDP who have hardly more members in the four districts. But even in Berlin the Liberals must strain to clearly define their own image.

The SPD is the AL's real opponent. Very noticeable is the bitterness of disappointed expectations AL followers feel toward the SPD. So far the Social Democrats have failed to adopt a uniform approach to the AL in the districts. Gradations exist not only regarding the respective left-right tendencies of the Berlin SPD; they depend even more on the SPD's strength as the "government party" in the various district agencies.

In Tiergarten the SPD is engaged in a harder struggle with the Alternatives than in Schoeneberg. Attempts to deal with the AL by parliamentary and procedural means have more or less failed. More and more often the AL defends itself by temporary restraining orders and appeals to the administrative courts. SPD officials express their misgivings about representatives who, by excessive legalism, provide publicity for the Alternative List, thereby helping to consolidate the latter's image.

Nor does there seem to be much political prospect for the attempt to describe the AL as "rightist," because other district politicians utter dire warnings about the KPD communists in the AL. Wolfgang Bertsch, SPD assembly group leader in Schoeneberg, assesses the AL success quite differently: "We would do well to learn from them. We will have to be far more sensitive to many issues."

At least in Schoeneberg and Kreuzberg the SPD wants to improve its contacts with the citizens and initiatives in the district. The AL has already registered that fact, and somewhat jealously. It suspects that the SPD has, for "transparent reasons of redefinition" vis-a-vis the AL, embarked on "explorations of the social field."

Some AL members also note with dismay another direct effect on the SPD of AL successes: The wider scope allowed the Jusos [Young Socialists] by the parent party at least insofar as propaganda work among school students is concerned. At the same time the establishment of an independent "Socialist School Student Union" has met with strong disapproval by the Juso federal executive. The AL suspects that these and other local actions by the Jusos are hiding a devious dual strategy of the SPD leadership. Karl Ultsch, Schoeneberg AL representative: "When the Jusos are supposed to vote on our motions, they prefer to absent themselves."

On the Schoeneberg committees the AL is rarely able to vote against the SPD. Admittedly, though, in the plenary meetings severe AL attacks replace the easy familiarity prevailing at Schoeneberg committee meetings, and these attacks are directed at SPD policies in general. "The AL's rhetoric sounds

somewhat artificial," comments Wolfgang Bertsch (SPD). As the Berlin district assemblies are no more than supervisory organs for the work of the district authorities, they are not really a suitable forum for the discussion of nuclear power and professional bans. Still, Bertsch fears that even good local policies may not lure back young voters to the SPD: "They will stay with the AL because that party is considered at the opposite pole to the traditional Land or federal party."

The AL itself is quite aware of the limits of its operations in the districts and therefore intends to use the districts as platforms for a far ranging mobilization against the SPD. The current prime topic for the AL is the 1980 Bundestag election. The AL claims federation-wide strength for its model of all-embracing alliances of Greens, Multicoloreds and Reds. The hedgehog is ready to migrate to Bonn.

11698
CS0: 3103

AIMS OF GREEN MOVEMENT EXAMINED AFTER OFFENBACH MEET

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial by Friedrich Karl Fromme: "What We May Learn From the 'Greens'"]

[Text] "Wear green, that helps raise your stature." That old saw comes to mind when we note the reaction of the "established" parties to the competition apparently arising. A little more environmentalism is displayed (it is in any case appropriately taken care of), and additional reassurances are given with regard to nuclear energy, to the effect that safety has absolute priority (which is a matter of course) and that nuclear power plants should be constructed only to meet a "residual demand (though such expensive plants are certainly not to be considered toys and the "residual demand" must be met before it is clearly demonstrated in the form of a supply gap). Wearing slightly green make-up the parties are more or less content, avow that Bremen--where the "Greens" made their way into the provincial assembly --is a special case, speak condescendingly of the "nudges" provided by the "Greens" and quite sincerely believe that the Green voters should now return home to the old parties. Is this expectation realistic? The answer to that question assumes the exploration of the substance of these "Greens."

It is easier to say what they are not. As the weekend in Offenbach clearly demonstrated they are not just an anti-nuclear union, nor even just an environmentalist party. For many "Greens" fear of the atom was the final straw which provided the impetus for separating them from the traditional political parties. "Nuclear foes" pure and simple are joined by older and staid middle class people who fear the incomprehensibility of this technology and consequently act as auxiliaries and provide a reservoir. Environmentalism is an expansion of the topic; it serves as a defense against the accusation that they are a "one issue party" and equally suitable for enlisting auxiliaries including those who are totally preoccupied with environmental concerns affecting themselves and would like to leave the infliction of environmental damage to others; unfortunately--although this should really not be mentioned at this point--there are environmentalist-citizen initiatives which aim at precisely this but nevertheless share the renown widespread especially among intellectuals that all these struggles

embody the true kind of democracy neglected by the parties and their power mad and selfish preoccupation with organization.

Still, this argument does approach the heart of the matter. The serious "Greens" are a protest movement. They gaily use the term "movement" because, due to their youth, they tend to be unaware that the Hitler aberration also called itself a "movement." The longing for the warmth of the "communion," the dislike of "society's" selfish coldness--these give the "Greens" their impetus. They display a quite bourgeois need for harmony as well as the characteristic German inclination to "inwardness." They are more than ready to devote themselves exclusively to the wish for peace--as if no more were needed for the establishment of a secure peace. That is why the "Greens" are impervious to the reproach that they have nothing to contribute to foreign policy let alone defense policy; all they need to say is "peace," and that is good enough for them. The longing for peace extends (though largely unfulfilled) to their own organizations. The efforts of the "Greens" to keep free of hierarchic structures is linked with their difficulties in defending their flanks against infiltration by extremists. Both circumstances help the parties, because the majority of the "Greens" are thus afflicted by embarrassment and helplessness. True, usually they do not want to have anything to do with the communists, but formal demarcation from them is the topic of a dispute which has never ceased among the "Greens": Can one afford this--in fact does one not really need the communists as allies? Still, the parties should not rely on these weaknesses of the "Greens."

The "Greens" are not exhaustively described by the term protest movement. By their diffuse and only occasionally unambiguous goals (rejection of nuclear energy) they supply the answer to the absence of meaning to life felt by quite a large section of the public. After 1945 our target was reconstruction, in all other aspects the watchword was "count me out." Then came prosperity, later dislike of values unless they were tangible. Cast aside were goals, even if they consisted only in the assertion of an attitude to life--duty and helpfulness. They were replaced by emancipation and "self-realization." "Fatherland" was relegated to the attic of dusty concepts. Should one live only for prosperity which may be achieved by progressively less effort? How are we to find a meaning in our lives if already at school the unending game of "relevancy" produces the feeling that there is no such sense? In the Federal Republic nearly everybody is able to satisfy all sensible (and even some silly) needs of daily life. But obviously there is a need for something more, a need which not even long neglect could eradicate.

The "green" phenomenon may be briefly explained as follows: Brecht was not right for all times with his phrase: "First comes a full stomach, then morality." However questionable the "moral claims" of the "Greens" may be--their very existence goes to show that it is not enough to reduce politics to a dispute among interest groups (called "pluralism" by those who cherish high-sounding phrases), to a struggle for the largest slice of the prosperity cake accompanied by sonorous Sunday speeches devoted to everything else. Here the parties will have to make up lost ground, here they should accept the challenge of the "Greens" however absurd the latter may appear.

COMMISSION URGES CUT IN BUNDESWEHR PAPER WORK

Bonn DIE WELT in German 1 Nov 79 p 2

[Report by Ruediger Moniac: "Armed Forces To Straighten Front in Paper War"]

[Text] A commission chaired by former Inspector General Ulrich de Maiziere has challenged the growing bureaucracy and flood of paper work in the Bundeswehr. In its report drawn up on behalf of the Minister of Defense and published yesterday the commission arrives at the conclusion that the mountain of instructions, directives and orders is "stifling" the armed forces. Soldiers must be given the opportunity to exercise greater responsibility in their day-to-day operations.

The commission maintains that the volume of regulations in the armed forces exceeds "requirements." Moreover the armed forces are given so many assignments that they will have to select for implementation only those which are most important to them. As a consequence they will be forced into a "selective obedience." The principle of command and obedience is thereby undermined and the meaning of assignment tactics turned around.

The commission emphasizes: The armed forces have too few men properly to carry out all assignments. As the "simplest solution" of this problem the commission calls for an increase in the Bundeswehr's manpower "while assignments and the organizational dimension are to remain at their present level." If that cannot be done, we "should review whether and how the 495,000 men may be allocated to the various branches--in quantity and quality--so as better to respond to the demands of military presence and training." The report emphasizes that in present circumstances the Bundeswehr is only able to carry out many of its assignments "at the expense of quality, by neglecting other assignments and unduly burdening personnel."

'The Climate Has Cooled'

In the commission's view leadership problems nowadays do not really involve the conscientious observance of the law and the formally correct treatment of subordinates. At stake is the personal contact between superiors and

subordinates and the empathetic involvement of the individual in his military environment. To be conveyed is the feeling that the individual, his concerns and joys are acknowledged and respected even in the strict hierarchy of command and obedience. According to the commission the review had conveyed the impression that the Bundeswehr does "operate with functional and technical efficiency, but that the human climate in the armed forces has cooled if not become downright icy."

Yet wartime experience has taught us that the human factor is far more important for the fighting strength of the armed forces than mere technical perfection.

The commission offers many suggestions which are suitable on the whole to encourage the men's "individual initiative, responsibility, the scope of appreciation and the willingness to take decisions." It is said to be the goal of all these efforts to strengthen "leadership ability in the meaning of assignment tactics" in the Bundeswehr.

The report continues with a summary of the most important recommendations to the Minister of Defense: Units up to divisional level should be given greater scope and authority. The "higher leadership echelons" should concentrate on long range issues and planning. In this meaning superior authorities should have greater confidence in the subordinate units of the Bundeswehr and, to help stem the flood of paper work, ask for fewer written reports. At the same time officers in responsible jobs should be encouraged "to exploit their freedom of movement." They should not ask for "recipes" from above. In particular such officers should be encouraged, who can handle men and their training. The commission would like commanders to have greater influence on personnel selection in their units and on promotions for their noncommissioned officers.

Systematically to Weed Out Orders

The commission also proposes that instructions, directives and orders should be systematically weeded out by the criterion of their current value to the organization and the individual member of the armed forces. It considers it quite untenable, for example, that the noncommissioned officer in charge of supplies for an independent unit is asked to be familiar with 1,600 DIN [German industrial standard] A4 pages. In many fields it would also be possible largely to decentralize procurement for the Bundeswehr. The commission records the following as a prime example of unnecessary detail in the "central chain of supply of the armed forces": "In 1980 the Bundeswehr will need 60 drinking glasses at 40 pfennig each."

11698
CSO: 3103

FDP LEADERSHIP DECIDES TO CONCENTRATE FIGHT AGAINST STRAUSS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Nov 79 p 3

[Text] Last Monday the FDP federal executive met for many hours to deal with the preparations for the Bundestag election campaign. Also present at the meeting (described by participants as extremely lively) was FDP honorary chairman and former Federal President Scheel. The basis of the discussion was a position paper by FDP general secretary Verheugen which recommends the FDP to embark on an aggressive campaign emphasizing the person of party chairman Genscher and seek direct confrontation with the top candidate of the Union parties, Strauss. We understand that the federal executive approved this general outline. At the same time, though, the members were obviously intent that the FDP should not react only to persons and programs in the course of the political debate. Instead they want the party to seek a productive concept which will characterize it as a "force for renewal" in politics. According to the discussion this concept is to transcend earlier programs with respect to, for example, tax and pension policies and various other issues. The FDP leaders are mindful in particular of the various aspects of environmental control such as noise abatement, the pollution of nature, and also of energy issues. The FDP will also try to give a kind of new issue-related impetus to East-West relations, thinking here in the main of the equal reduction of weapons and men in Europe. In the course of the meeting the Rhineland-Palatinate FDP Land chairman was subjected to strong criticism by many members of the executive. Scholl had lately published a newspaper article accusing the FDP Bundestag group of, among others, leaning to the left and hinting that this was happening with the tacit approval of party chairman Genscher and Bundestag group chairman Mischnick.

11698
CS0: 3103

BRIEFS

NEO-NAZI NUMBERS INCREASE--The Defense of the Constitution department at the Baden-Wuerttemberg Land Criminal Office (LKA) records increasing activities by right extremists. The LKA reports from Stuttgart that, in view of documents seized, we must assume that more than 100 people are already active members of the banned NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers Party]. Following recent searches of various homes five persons were arrested in Baden-Wuerttemberg alone; an unreported quantity of weapons was seized. [Text] [Bonn DIE WELT in German 1 Nov 79 p 2] 11698

PLO MEMBER'S FILE--Bonn--On Monday the PLO handed to the foreign office in Bonn a dossier on the circumstances attending the death of PLO member Mohammad Yussuf who, according to the PLO, had been persuaded by the Israeli secret service in a Bavarian prison to attempt to assassinate Palestinian leader Abu Iyad. The dossier, which consists of a report by a PLO investigation commission, the autopsy report of the Palestine Gaza hospital and the Lebanese Berbir Hospital in Beirut, and letters by Yussuf, makes it clear, according to the PLO, that Mohammad Yussuf committed suicide in Beirut on 18 October with his kalashnikov. Prior to this he had revealed his assassination contract. There has been speculation in the FRG that Yussuf was "executed" by the PLO because he had been "turned around" by the Israeli secret service while in prison in Bavaria. [LD191843 Hamburg DPA in German 1550 GMT 19 Nov 79 LD]

CSO: 3103

KOIVISTO'S 'AFTENPOSTEN' INTERVIEW AWAKENS REACTION

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 6 Oct 79 pp 1, 6

[Article by Seppo Hyrkas: "Koivisto's Statement on Finlandization Discussion 'A Disservice to Finland'"]

[Text] Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto has, apparently, done a disservice to Finland's reputation in the Federal Republic of Germany by criticizing the plans of countries belonging to NATO to increase their defense budgets in the Norwegian newspaper AFTENPOSTEN.

It is predicted that Koivisto's statement will lead to a new "Finlandization Discussion" in West Germany just when it was on the wane in that country -- thanks to the positive publicity coming from President Kekkonen's visit to West Germany.

The headline of an article published on Friday in the prestigious FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE: "Koivisto Praises the Soviet Union", is only a foretaste of the attention caused by Koivisto's statement. A subtitle in the three-column article read as follows: "Finland's Severe Criticism of West's Defense Expenditures".

The writer of the article is FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE's Nordic Area Correspondent Werner Adam, who is known for his impartial views.

According to the correspondent, for the first time since taking office Koivisto has publicly commented on timely foreign policy problems and his views are reminiscent of the Soviet Union's positions in a manner arousing attention. The newspaper gave one to understand that the statements are a result of Koivisto's desire to become Finland's next president.

In the interview Koivisto had according to the newspaper stated that in the West there are forces which want to force the Soviet Union into an arms race thereby causing a reduction in the standard of living there and this the Prime Minister considered to be against the resolutions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

According to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE Koivisto described the Soviet Union as a country interested in general detente while, on the other hand, in the West the desire to promote detente is lacking.

Koivisto's statements come at a time when the Soviet Union has initiated a rather extensive campaign against the aspirations of the North Atlantic Alliance to strengthen its defenses. Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev will also apparently be using some tough language about this matter in East Berlin when the German Democratic Republic celebrates its 30th anniversary. For this reason in the Federal Republic of Germany Finland is once again being called a mouthpiece of the Soviet Union.

Missiles, the Subject of Heated Debate

Already on Thursday the West German news agency, DPA, quoted party leader Kalevi Sorsa's statements at a meeting of the Socialist International's disarmament group in Moscow, at which he announced that he had received "some extremely beneficial information". The statement was placed next to a statement by Alfons Pawelczyk, the social democratic disarmament expert in the FRG, who indicated that there was nothing new in the discussions in Moscow. However, Pawelczyk welcomed Soviet promises to include medium-range missiles in the disarmament discussions.

The discussion on strengthening the defense of European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and on the procurement of their own medium-range missiles has been especially heated in West Germany and even of a hysterical nature, which has prompted the country's press to pay even more attention to comments by foreigners.

NATO's foreign and defense ministers will be making a decision on the procurement of medium-range missiles at their December meeting in Brussels. According to unconfirmed information the goal is the procurement of 600 Pershing-2 missiles and Cruise missiles over a period of 3 years unless an agreement can be reached with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has the SS-20 multi-warhead missiles, which can threaten Western Europe and to which the West does not have a counterpart. These missiles, which can be launched from Soviet territory, have not been included in the current disarmament discussion.

A Problem for Finland

The Cruise missiles, which fly so low that they can be interpreted to be in violation of our air space on the basis of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Agreement if, for example, they are launched from Norway or the Arctic Sea toward the Soviet Union, represent a great problem for Finland. The range of the extremely accurate Cruise missile is approximately 2,400 kilometers. The range of the Pershing-1 missile is only a couple thousand kilometers.

However, the Federal Republic of Germany has throughout the whole missile discussion emphasized that an attempt should be made to negotiate with the Soviet Union before accepting the new missiles. Only if the negotiations fail, will the missiles be situated in Western Europe. In spite of over-zealous statements by NATO strategists, there is apparently a sufficient equilibrium between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the area of missiles, but also several impartial experts consider that the West will fall behind in the next decade unless a decision is made to increase the number of missiles already in Germany.

10576

CSO: 3107

SORSA REMAINS OPTIMISTIC AFTER SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL MOSCOW MEET

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 12 Oct 79 pp 28-34

[Article by Juhani Aromaki: "Fourth Performance of Chairman Kalevi Sorsa's World Trip: Visit in the Kremlin"]

[Text] On 1 October 1979 the disarmament work group of the Socialist International, led by Chairman Kalevi Sorsa, entered the Soviet Union's political shrine, the Kremlin in Moscow.

"The trip could be considered historic although I would be a little more cautious in saying this," stated Kalevi Sorsa on the return trip from Moscow.

TASS stated in its official statement: CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev met with the disarmament working group of the Socialist International. Boris Ponomarev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and candidate member of the CPSU Politburo also participated in the discussions.

The political symbol of the Soviet Union is the Kremlin, on whose highest tower there is a red star which shines day and night. The highest leadership of the Soviet Union led by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev works daily within the walls of the Kremlin. When black limousines and invited guests slip in through the portals of the Kremlin, this means that issues are being discussed at the highest level of the Soviet hierarchy.

The disarmament work group of the Socialist International led by Kalevi Sorsa visited the political holy of holies of the Soviet Union on 1 October 1979.

This was the third visit for Kalevi Sorsa, now as chairman of the international work group. Earlier he had visited the Kremlin along with President Urho Kekkonen while he was the foreign minister.

A Soviet colonel directs Chairman Kalevi Sorsa through the hallways of the Kremlin to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. And since the highest Soviet leader receives Sorsa's group, much attention was given to the visit in the Soviet Union.

On the following day PRAVDA published a six-column article with pictures on the front page. Television news showed a minute-by-minute account of the events occurring at the Kremlin.

"Gentlemen, to the table..." Representatives from the workers' parties of Austria, France, Holland, Senegal, Spain, and Venezuela came to the Kremlin. Also included in the group were the well-known disarmament expert Alfons Pawelczyk from West Germany and the Swedish secretary of the Socialist International, Berndt Carlson.

The CPSU brought out its best people: in addition to Leonid Brezhnev and Boris Ponomarev, V. V. Zagladin, G. A. Arbatov, N. N. Inozemtsev, L. N. Tolkunov, V. M. Falin, and V. S. Shaposhnikov, among others, took part in the negotiations.

Leonid Brezhnev and Boris Ponomarev lead Kalevi Sorsa, chairman of the disarmament work group, to the negotiating table in the Kremlin.

The General Secretary's closest aids, A. M. Aleksandrov and Boris Ponomarev, behind them a large vase inscribed with a picture of Leonid Brezhnev, in the Kremlin's negotiation hall.

Ponomarev has already spoken in Helsinki about the "legend called the Soviet threat", which he has seen as a defense for the arms race for a period of 30 years already. He also noted:

"In defending itself and the whole world against the assault of Hitler's fascism in a war the Soviet people lost 20 million lives. We do not want any new sacrifices.

"For this reason the Soviet Union has powerful weapons -- but let me assure you yet one more time: our military forces -- air, land, and sea -- are intended only for defense needs".

"It Is a Question of Whether We Have Political Will"

Not just the guests but also the hosts used the expression "historic". What was meant by this was that this was the first time that the Socialist International, a loose discussion forum of social democratic parties in Western countries, has sent official representatives to Moscow as guests of the CPSU.

The current dialogue is still rather new since it is only a year and a half ago that a high-level delegation of the CPSU led by Boris Ponomarev attended a disarmament meeting of the Socialist International for the first time in Helsinki.

When one recalls past years, speeches slandering one another were not uncommon for socialists and communists. At least Willi Brandt understood at the Helsinki Spring that the Communists have abandoned certain well-known

ideological positions with respect to Social Democrats -- at least in the question of disarmament.

Boris Ponomarev justified the Soviet Union's desire -- and also the new strategy of the CPSU -- to cooperate with the socialist parties of the West in the following manner:

"We are examining the issues realistically. Ideological differences do exist between Communists and Social Democrats. However, life demands the achievement of a common understanding for the purpose of resolving the most urgent problem of our time, a problem in which all humanity is interested -- the prevention of a new world war and a halt to the arms race".

Now that the work group of the Socialist International has held a discussion lasting more than an hour with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev -- an hour is a lot of time for Brezhnev -- as well as a more than 4-hour discussion with Boris Ponomarev, it can be said that this embryo of cooperation between Communists and Social Democrats is only a beginning, but is obviously worthy of survival.

A High Level World Trip

When Kalevi Sorsa sat across from General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at the negotiating table in the Kremlin on 1 October 1979, he was on his fourth stop of a world trip.

After the meeting held in Helsinki issues began to develop as follows. On 26 October 1978 Chairman Kalevi Sorsa of the Socialist International's disarmament group wrote letters to President Jimmy Carter, President Leonid Brezhnev, UN General Secretary Kurt Waldheim, and Ranasinghe Premadasa, prime minister of Sri Lanka and representative of the nonaligned countries.

In his letters Kalevi Sorsa inquired into the possibility of discussing questions of disarmament with the work group. All of them answered in the affirmative. With the group Sorsa has now met with Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale, Leonid Brezhnev and his top aides, Kurt Waldheim, and representatives of the nonaligned nations.

"The problems of disarmament have now been mapped out within the framework of the Socialist International. The mechanisms for promoting disarmament seem even to be too many. It is now a question of whether we have the political will. I represent a cautious optimism and I can see that a political movement can affect these issues," states Kalevi Sorsa.

As a result of these summit meetings the group is now compiling a recommendation to the 42 member parties of the Socialist International for the purpose of achieving real results in disarmament.

This paper should be approved next February in Vienna where leaders of the member parties have been invited by Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.

Before departing on his trip to Moscow Kalevi Sorsa visited Willie Brandt, chairman of the Socialist International, to negotiate the issues to be brought up in Moscow.

[Caption to Photo] Leonid Brezhnev, who was in a good mood, was at that time making preparations for a foreign trip, the 30th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic in East Berlin. In his speech in Berlin he announced that the Soviet Union will withdraw 20,000 Soviet troops and 1,000 tanks from the country. He also proclaimed that if NATO places American-made Euro-missiles in West Europe, the Warsaw Pact will take counter-measures.

In his speech to Sorsa's group in Moscow the General Secretary considered "the speculation of imperialist propaganda with respect to the so-called 'Soviet threat' " to be nonsense.

"Those who are proposing plans to make Western Europe into a starting area for American weapons aimed against the Soviet Union need it as a smokescreen for starting up the arms race," stated the General Secretary.

An Hour in the Kremlin

What then did occur during the more than 1-hour discussion in the Kremlin?

Leonid Brezhnev gave a detailed explanation of the Soviet Union's views on disarmament. He considered the 1970's to be a time when we succeeded in isolating supporters of the Cold War.

He praised the CSCE document as a compilation of regulations for peaceful coexistence, whose significance extends beyond the countries of Europe.

"The conditions were created for a group of important steps for limiting the arms race. Above all, the SALT-I and SALT-II agreements. The first agreement was temporary and limited. SALT-II will go much farther."

Leonid Brezhnev stated that this agreement not only places quantitative and qualitative limits on strategic armaments, but that -- which is, perhaps, even more important -- it opens up prospects for further progress on this path.

Those listening to the thorough presentation of the General Secretary took note of the following points:

"The enemies of detente and disarmament have not put down their weapons and if they are not opposed, they can cast a shadow over everything beneficial that has already been accomplished."

"Those who have experienced the war cannot forget its lessons. We must do everything possible so that the coming generations will know only peace, cooperation, and mutual understanding."

"But weapons of vast destruction are being developed daily. The threat of their continued spreading has become a reality. If anyone should use such weapons, it will become a catastrophe for mankind."

Leonid Brezhnev urged that we make the transition from disarmament talks to concrete acts and assured us that the Soviet Union intends to work in this direction.

Willie Brandt's Greetings

Kalevi Sorsa first thanked his hosts for their hospitality and extended Willie Brandt's personal greetings and best wishes to Leonid Brezhnev.

"We are at a fork in the road: the decisions which we make in the near future will determine the development of the whole international atmosphere. We will either have before us vast successes in the area of disarmament or the coming years will represent a new era of danger in the arms race," stated Kalevi Sorsa.

We are being threatened by the danger of losing the fruits of a decade of detente. We believe in the effectiveness of the struggle being waged on behalf of disarmament and peace, which is enjoying the support of the people's masses," stated Kalevi Sorsa to the Soviet hosts on behalf of the group.

During this discussion the guests saw General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev spontaneously raise his hand and blurt out: "We are of the same opinion as you..."

Sorsa continued: "During our meeting with the US President, representatives of nonaligned nations, and UN General Secretary we decisively encouraged them to support detente and disarmament.

"We would like to present the same invitation here in Moscow. Knowing your long-time faith in a policy of peace we are convinced that we will receive from you a most positive response."

People all over the world have heard these speeches for a long time already. People have become doubtful and cynical since the United States as well as the Soviet Union have repeatedly admitted the absurdity of the arms race, but still continue to engage in it.

Cynicism Is a Danger

On the return trip from Moscow Kalevi Sorsa admits that cynicism is the worst enemy of this kind of work. However, he states that he is cautiously optimistic.

He considers the statement by Leonid Brezhnev that the Soviet Union is ready to discuss the so-called Euro-weapons in connection with SALT-III as the new item of his trip to Moscow. The group noted a readiness to negotiate in the Kremlin and in the negotiations conducted at Moscow's Foreign Policy Institute.

Kalevi Sorsa has now completed his world trip as chairman of the group. The Socialist International created the work group after the disarmament meeting in Helsinki since the issue was seen as important and it appeared that "Communists and the bourgeoisie are agreeing on issues above the heads of Social Democrats and socialists".

"I myself am of the opinion that there is no justification for continuing the work of the disarmament group at this level any further. A large number of facts is now at the disposal of the Socialist International. A continuation of this matter should be transferred to a political level and placed on the agenda of the International," considers Kalevi Sorsa.

The Socialist International is a discussion forum, which can only make recommendations to the member parties from various countries. And even though the Finns are ready to proceed without prejudice, the English or the French, for example, are perhaps not ready to do this.

Within the Socialist International itself differences of opinion exist with respect to the matter of proceeding further in the question of disarmament and also with respect to the budding cooperation between the socialist parties of the West and the CPSU.

Kalevi Sorsa has now been traveling in the name of the international organization, but he also believes that small countries can also act as representatives of disarmament.

"Perhaps we Finns have played a small role as a kind of teacher. By this I mean that Finns have learned to think about relations between the East and the West in a more impartial manner than others. We have been able to reveal the sincere but incorrect thinking of people even in this work," states Kalevi Sorsa.

According to him many respected and objective people become emotional when dealing with Soviets.

"Then one can see an unfamiliarity and a nervousness in people in whom one would not have expected such behavior.

"Small countries can also present new concepts to the superpowers. When negotiators have repeated the same points over and over for years, for example, with respect to SALT, the thinking process becomes so stagnant that they are no longer able to see beyond it. So I have been told."

According to Kalevi Sorsa it is frequently easier for outsiders to make new initiatives for promoting disarmament since one does not become so easily involved in questions of prestige.

A New Tactic

In recent years the Soviet Union has decisively cultivated relations with the Social Democratic parties of the West. CPSU contacts with Social Democrats have been almost nonexistent for more than 60 years.

The CPSU's attitude has been like the movement of waves; at times the Social Democrats have been approved, at times they have been rejected as traitors to the class struggle.

Now Leonid Brezhnev assures us that "the CPSU will in the future maintain contacts regarding issues with the Socialists and the Social Democrats".

And the most alarming issue of the world today is the accelerating arms race. It is a concrete question which the Soviets are prepared to resolve with everyone, including member parties of the Socialist International.

It should be noted that the participation of the CPSU at the disarmament meeting of the Socialist International in Helsinki was made possible by Finnish Social Democrats. Willie Brandt himself stated this:

"The Finnish Social Democratic Party -- in discussing this matter with us -- made it possible to present the Soviet point of view."

A discussion of disarmament without the superpowers is certainly a waste of time. For this reason the Finns considered it important that the International -- in bringing up the matter of disarmament -- was able to invite representatives of the United States as well as the Soviet Union to these discussions.

If some member parties of the International look at the Finnish Social Democratic Party with distrust, the party is, however, given respect in the organization for the reason that the Finns have more experience with respect to relations with the Soviet Union than many other countries.

From the point of view of Chairman Kalevi Sorsa and his party it is significant that Finns have been able to initiate cooperation between the International and the CPSU.

Time will show how this cooperation and Kalevi Sorsa's world trip will line up with reality. The superpowers have the opportunity to make the transition from words to deeds already in the near future when the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, on the one hand, and the United States and NATO-countries, on the other hand, decide whether to accumulate

even more weapons by planning and building new so-called Euro-weapons or the medium-range nuclear missiles.

NATO will be making a decision on these missiles in December. It considers that the Soviet Union already has approximately 100 of these missiles, but it itself has nothing to correspond with it. It is a question of the dreaded SS-20 missile to be constructed on moving ships.

10576

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STATE TELEVISION BLOCKS SHOWING OF FOREIGN POLICY SERIES

Helsinki SUOMEN KIVALEHTI in Finnish 12 Oct 79 pp 105-106

[Article: "BBC's Bill Treharne Jones: Whom We Really Wanted To Interview"]

[Text] The British producer of the Finnish portion of the TV series "Neighbors of the Bear" answers Finnfact's Matti Kohva as well as those who in his judgment have obscured the truth about various phases of the program.

Even though Finnfact's Matti Kohva emphasizes "long-time experience in the area of television", his recent article to your newspaper makes it very clear how little he knows about producing timely programs. Those troublesome and somehow bureaucratic procedures which he describes can be used for producing long films and documentaries by people who have months and even years to spend on the making of a program. However, they are seldom used in topical films in Western countries.

I do not have any reason to apologize for the fact that Mr. Kohva is complaining about the lack of a synopsis or a manuscript. In a normal situation when contact is made for the first time, we describe the general goals of the film, points which we want to film, and the subject matter on which we would like to obtain interviews -- and all of this is done orally either by telephone or in an unofficial discussion.

If at the conclusion of this discussion, we are requested to present a written application, we will do this. Neither Mr. Kohva nor his friend in the Foreign Ministry did this.

In your neighboring country, Norway, the interviews held with the defense minister, General Sverre Hamren, as well as Prime Minister Knut Frydenlund came about without any paperwork. The only individual in Norway who requested an application in advance was the Soviet Consul in Barentsburg (Svalbard) and even he did not want a synopsis or a manuscript!

The general unwillingness to surrender such precious synopses or manuscripts to Kohva is, of course, a result of the fact that a large portion of a topical program is of a research nature. Those who want to have detailed synopses in their possession to serve their own interests are thus able to

frustrate and if need be even exclude a line of questioning that may not please them already weeks before the filming even commences.

The Subject Was Sensitive

As far as Finland was concerned we were not doing any kind of a research report in the literal sense of the word. We did, however, examine some rather sensitive issues, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union in particular, a subject which officials -- according to our own experience -- were exceptionally unwilling to discuss in public except under the protection of anonymity.

This leads me to a wise question, which officials did we really want to interview. Since Mr. Kohva as well as the press section of your Foreign Ministry have given misleading statements about this, allow me to present my own information:

On 28 May YLE's London correspondent told Alec Aalto, chief of the press section of the Foreign Ministry, in private that the film will be made. On 12 June, the day after we arrived in Finland, we made contact with the press section and met Mr. Bergqvist, we asked to obtain interviews with President Kekkonen, Prime Minister Koivisto, Foreign Minister Vayrynen, and General Paju. We knew that we would not be able to obtain all the interviews and, in fact, we would have been satisfied with only two of them -- a hope which was not dashed by Bergqvist.

On the following day a phone call came from the Foreign Ministry informing us that an interview with the President would not be possible since he was tired after his trip to Germany. "We are still wondering whether the President was even informed of our request."

The planned interview with General Paju was cancelled in less than 30 hours before it was to have taken place on the basis that the general did not have time for a television interview and so on.

After three and a half weeks we left your country without having obtained one single interview from an official of the Finnish Government. Was the reason some kind of a mix-up, misunderstanding, or was it something more profound, an inconceivable circumstance?

I would be interested in knowing the answer. When I expressed my disappointment to Mr. Aalto near the end of our visit, he stated that interviews with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were at the very beginning extremely improbable. If this was the case, I wondered why we were given hope by the press section at the very beginning?

Was the Film Ruined?

But disappointments aside. Did the absence of decisionmakers before the cameras thus ruin the film? Normally this would have happened since we

believe that in order for a discussion on politics to be authoritative it should always include comments from those people who make policy. Fortunately, we were able to interview Max Jakobson, who as a former political decisionmaker was more than capable of explaining and defending Finland's official policy.

As far as other sections of the film are concerned, an exceptional impression was made on me by the information section of the Army. They were able to arrange military exercises for our film in an exceptionally rapid, efficient, and friendly manner.

Finnfacts also provided quality work on our behalf although not always as complete as Mr. Kohva would have liked us to believe. Kohva, as his article reveals, was primarily concerned that we not produce a sensational or negative report. Finland is not, to use his own words, "any kind of a banana republic".

At a press review of the Norwegian section of the film in London not one single Norwegian correspondent was present; a massive phalanx of Finnish newspaper correspondents showed up for the press showing of the Finnish section of the film. This fact together with Kohva's strange attitude makes me think that Finland's fundamental system of priorities is extremely sensitive to comments on foreign policy with respect to their relations with their superpower neighbor.

Vayrynen's Statement Is Incomprehensible to Me

Having learned about this sensitivity and, on the other hand, knowing about the extensive lack of knowledge in the West about Finland's position, I would have imagined that your officials would have demonstrated an exceptionally keen interest in the most favorable possible publicity about their country in the West.

In this sense I consider Vayrynen's statement that he did not see any special reason to give an interview as incomprehensible. Actions with respect to relations play a decisive role in foreign policy, especially in a country like yours, which has been segregated from Western spheres and which is repeatedly misunderstood. Our film was hardly anymore negative than it was sensational even though YLE, apparently, interpreted it to be so in deciding not to present it in Finland.

I am confounded by this decision since the overwhelming majority of those Finnish journalists who saw the film in London considered it to be generally equitable and accurate in its most important parts even though they were of different opinions concerning several individual points.

TV 1 Director Sakari Kiuru has been heard to say that the film is "malicious" and is suitable for presentation in the British Isles. I would hope that he would elaborate on his remarks. I would guess that the decision is a consequence of the attacks which the Soviet press has made against the series.

My Own Comments

In conclusion some of my own considerations for what they are worth. In the first place I had not previously stopped to consider how sensitive Finland is to Soviet pressure. However, your leader seemed to have been able to maintain complete freedom of action and unbelievably kept your independence intact 35 years ago.

But a few issues still trouble me. Finland's success in this matter seems to be very closely connected with the personal role played by Paasikivi first and then Kekkonen. Has their skill become public property?

Would average presidents also be able to deal with Moscow, especially when they would be dependent on other politicians and the Foreign Ministry? The other point of concern is the friendship agreement. Although I have long been familiar with the equilibrium in the Nordic area and how it functions, the existence of the friendship agreement was completely unknown to me until I began to work on this film.

Even though your leaders have so far successfully been able to ward off Soviet attempts to use it as a form of pressure on Finland, I have my doubts that Finland would be able to oppose a Soviet interpretation of this agreement during an actual crisis.

My last point of concern is of a more general nature. I was amazed at how willingly the Finns use Soviet jargon in describing relations with Russia. It is a different matter to talk about how well Finland has recovered from the ruins of 1944 or about its good neighbor relations than it is to describe Russia as a friend. Surely friendship requires a certain parity and a similarity of positions.

But, however, except for the 800-kilometer border and the stormy history between Russia and Finland there is very little in common. Therefore, I was outrightly amazed at how frequently Finns, especially those who are too young to remember the war, describe the Soviet Union as a friend.

A certain man in his mid-40's even proposed in all seriousness that we should change the title of our series from "Neighbors of the Bear" to "Neighbors of a Friend"! I find such remarks to be rather confusing.

I do not intend to propose that Finland should wage a diplomatic campaign for the return of Viipuri and Petsamo! Far from that; your peace treaty at the conclusion of the war was in many respects very generous. I would only argue that a certain pessimism and vigilance are necessary.

Without a doubt such concern is expressed in the older generation, which calls the Russians friends but considers itself to be fortunate. My concern is directed at those who have been brought up since the war.

Perhaps they, in contradistinction to their parents, truly believe the Soviet Union to be a friend. Such a position ill prepares them for the possibility that Moscow may some day, indeed, lean on Finland. The present agreement, won by Paasikivi and Kekkonen, was not achieved by naive, but realistic, and stubborn bargaining.

GOVERNMENT PREVENTS SWEDISH TV FROM SHOWING FILM

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Oct 79 p 3

[Article: "Swedish TV Broadcast Stopped in Aland Islands, Proposed Film Prohibited in Finland"]

[Text] Finnish officials blocked the broadcast of Swedish television in the Aland Islands when on Saturday night it presented the movie "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich". The Swedish EXPRESSEN newspaper reported the story on Sunday.

The presentation of the film was prohibited in Finland by both the motion picture review board and the motion picture committee in 1972 and finally by the highest court of administration. It was said that the film could endanger our country's relations with foreign countries.

"We did not broadcast the film since it is prohibited in Finland," stated Helge Solgen, YLE program director in Maarianhamina.

The film has been shown on Swedish television three times, the first time in 1972. The link-up to the Aland Islands was cut off each time it was shown.

State Radio Program Director Pekka Silvola did not learn of the incident in advance. He thinks that the decision was made by a local programming committee.

"I do not believe that any orders were sent from State Radio for cutting off the broadcast. We do not attempt to follow what the residents of the Aland Islands watch on Swedish television. It is their own business."

The film is a dramatization of the first novel by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who was sent into exile by the Soviet Union and subsequently settled in the United States. The work describing life in a concentration camp during Stalin's reign was the only novel by the writer published in the Soviet Union. The work, which was published in 1962, was translated into Finnish a year later.

The joint English-Norwegian film was directed by Finnish-born Casper Wrede in 1970.

PAPER COMMENTS ON 'SELF-CENSORSHIP' OF TV SERIES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Oct 79 p 2

[Editorial: "On Silence"]

[Text] The program entitled "Neighbors of the Bear", which was produced by the BBC, will not be seen on Finnish television although there would have been plenty of viewers judging from the commotion it caused. The directors of State Radio, who have seen the program, do not want to present it since in their opinion it "is affected" and "contains a malevolent attitude".

The arguments seem to be specious. The management of State Radio seems to consider "dissident opinions" concerning Finland's position and foreign policy to be unnecessary if not outright dangerous.

The attempt to prevent opinions that differ from those held by Finns with respect to Finland's position has become a custom in places even other than the State Radio. And this attempt is not only directed against the "malevolent positions" of the Western press, but is also demonstrated by silence with respect to Soviet concepts of Finland's foreign policy when they differ from Finnish concepts.

Sometimes it is wise to speak out and sometimes it is even wiser to remain silent, but neither should be exaggerated. It is not worse commenting on all the "affected" and "malevolent" reactions concerning Finland's foreign policy. But if the trust of foreign countries in Finland's policy of neutrality is a condition for its success, an inability to answer demonstrations of distrust confuses Finns and can create the impression that our attempt at neutrality has failed.

Those on the outside, however, consider silence to be a sign of uncertainty. A government believing in its policy is in general prepared to defend it -- and the "more affected" criticism, the easier the defense.

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PERSPECTIVES ON FRENCH INTERVENTIONIST POLICY IN AFRICA

Policy Errors, Problems

Paris LE FIGARO in French 3 Oct 79 pp 1, 6

[Article by Paul-Marie de la Gorce]

[Text] One would have thought that the downfall of former Emperor Bokassa would have been the subject of unanimous satisfaction and that French participation in the affair would have earned for the president of the republic and the government a general indulgence for having somewhat jostled the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of another country.

Exactly the opposite took place. Judging by the violence and furor of the criticisms, one could have believed that everyone would have preferred the maintenance in power of the former emperor; and one could even ask himself whether the French authorities are not telling one another, in their inner sanctum, that they would have been left more tranquil had they done nothing. Let us set aside the events of the last few days and those which will not fail to follow. What we can expect from the Central African affair is that it will be the opportunity for serious reflection on French policy in Africa.

Many mistakes are made, more or less in good faith, in criticism of what this policy was and of its interventions in the former French colonies. Thus a royalist newsman wrote a few days ago that Paris had brought about the downfall of David Dacko in 1965 because he was drawing too close to China. General de Gaulle was so displeased with what happened that he ordered an investigation of possible foreign instigations in the coup d'etat (it was in reality a purely internal affair) and he intervened so that David Dacko's life was saved. It must be remembered that in the cascade of crises which took place in the new states, France never intervened, with one possible exception, that of Gabon. And this wise reserve did not prevent the preservation of most of its influence and positions.

However, this time, in Central Africa, there was evidently a French intervention. At the risk of clashing with those who out of principle condemn, and not without reason, foreign intervention, one could think that the latter was useful and justified. There were enough Central Americans wishing the downfall of the empire so that the operation seemed a response to an appeal for help, even though, in practice, it had been arranged in advance. Hypocrisy, of course, but a minor hypocrisy which the goal rendered acceptable and pardonable. We are all the more at ease in saying so because we severely criticized the previous French interventions in Chad and the Saharan conflict. The fact that the latter took place after a too long period of excessive familiarity and too close relations between Paris and the former emperor is obvious: however, this is not an argument against the action taken to overthrow him. When one has taken the wrong road, there is only one thing to do: change roads. And not go too far down the road. In short, there is no serious reason for not being pleased over Bokassa's downfall and approving what was done to bring it about.

That being remembered, and apparently we forget too soon, it is clear that a series of problems has resulted therefrom. And above all the French or other interventions in the internal situation of independent states are not always acceptable. We should not be surprised that the African governments are sensitive to such interventions and demonstrate their disapproval and their uneasiness. Too occupied with applauding the overthrow of Idi Amin Dada, which, however, required weeks of fighting and caused great massacres, European public opinion did not realize that the intervention of Tanzania against the Ugandan dictator gave rise to a deep malaise in Africa. The reactions are all the more clear cut when it is a question, as in Central Africa, of an action taken by a European country which is the former colonizer.

Such is the reality. Two conclusions at least should be drawn from it. The first is simple: French intervention in Bangui should come to an end. We can help the Central African state to get back on its feet and function normally; however, in no way should there be meddling in personal or party fights. Not even the appearance of such. It is at this price alone that good relations will be maintained with the Central Africans and that the latter will be grateful for the part played by the French in the downfall of their former emperor.

However, it is also necessary that the Bangui affair not in any way appear to fall within the framework of a general policy of intervention. The danger is precisely that on this score the precedents of Chad and the Western Sahara are brought up and that in this one sees proof of systematic interventionism. The lessons that we may draw therefrom are, all the same, clear. In 1977-1978, vast operations were conducted to check the elements led by Goukouni Oueddei, who had, moreover, freed Mne Claustre and to the profit of the government of Col Felix Maloum. The result is that the latter collapsed, that the present government is properly headed by Goukouni

Oueddei who is fiercely opposed to Libya's encroachments while he had been accused of being the screen for a Libyan invasion and that he is even demanding that the French contingent remain on site for a time.

As for the Western Sahara where France has given the impression of unilaterally supporting Morocco and Mauritania, we have seen the latter change its policy because of its inability to bear the costs of the war.

We cannot imagine better examples of the errors of a certain interventionism. Doubtless the French government has modified its own attitude in these two affairs to get back to more prudence and lucidity.

Doubtless the French government also protests that it does not wish to play the game of "gendarmes" of Africa. We will not question the sincerity of the authorities; however, in politics, one must be careful about appearances: they are a part of reality.

The fact remains that French policy in the future must avoid any similar error and not give rise to any suspicion. That supposes a new approach to cooperation with Africa. We must put an end as soon as possible to direct budgetary aid which gives the impression that we are supporting one man or one team that we are permitting them to do what they want when we obviously cannot control their action. Too many blunders and too many scandals have resulted therefrom--some worse than public opinion imagines--and the blots therefrom fall on France. This practice, which was justified when it was a matter of consolidating the young, independent countries, must, therefore, cease. That will not be accomplished without difficulties: the African chiefs of staff are often attached to it; and it is true that some of the French-speaking African countries are among the poorest and would have some trouble operating without aid. However, this must be done, even at the price of a somewhat rough transition. It will remain then to concentrate and strengthen the efforts in the indisputable sectors of cooperation: education, health, productive investments.

This review of French policy should at least give rise to the agreement of all those who do not wish to see the international authority of France compromised.

Political, Military Risks

Paris LE FIGARO in French 8 Oct 79 p 4

[Article by Jean-Marc Kalfleche]

[Text] The Bangui affair poses some true and some false problems. True problems: the increase in French interventions in Africa during the past few years; the unspeakable political shambles which followed a successful military operation; the lack of structural adaptation which it seems to reveal at the highest level, finally, the strange paradox which maintains

that the more France commits itself the less it trains personnel specialized in the affairs of the black continent.

For from shaping itself around these subjects, the debate is being drawn into ridiculous polemics. Eyewash is being engaged in and those very persons who had approved or justified operation Carlotta in Angola are not afraid of exhuming the pitiable fable of the "Cubans from the West."

We are beginning to approach true problems posed by the intervention in Central Africa and elsewhere when we see the government incapable of responding clearly, for all kinds of "diplomatic" reasons, to this sensible question: "If it was necessary to eliminate Bokassa, which is a good thing, why did you not do it sooner?"

Certain explanations come quite naturally to mind. They are called safaris, divers complaisances (even though the largesses from the French treasury were much smaller than one imagined, if one compares the aid to the French treasury were much smaller than one imagined, if one compares the aid to the empire in 1978, 107 million francs). Clever persons go further and speak, for example, of uranium, without knowing that the conspiracy did not intend to exploit the recognized deposit in the Central African Republic but on the contrary to allow it to lie idle in the swamps. Nothing in all that is very serious.

The important point--Paris will never say this officially--is that it is not for France a question of having a policy in Central Africa, Chad, Mauritania or Zaïre but of having an overall policy vis-a-vis what was formerly called the "community" which today rather largely extends beyond the borders of our former colonial empire.

A Community View

The three presidents of the Fifth Republic feared that this "community" would become a restricting institution. But all three had to reckon with its implicit existence. The initiatives in Chad (under de Gaulle and Giscard), Mauritania and Zaïre responded more to the view that our African partners had of their interests and their destiny than to a specifically French idea of what should be done in Ndjamena, the Shaba or the Sahara.

The Bokassa case was much more difficult to handle. It was not a question of bringing a man to power (M'Ba's case in 1964) nor of protecting the recognized borders of a "sister" republic but, for the first time, of overturning an established power and, no matter what was said about it, legal in international law. Could it be done without a large consensus within the community? No. Could this consensus be obtained before the scandal brought out by Amnesty International in April? No again and Paris, which had been seeking it discretely since January, had to wait to mid August to get the green light. What is more, one could believe

that Valery Giscard d'Estaing had promised his principal partners of Central Africa that everything would be done so that Bokassa's ouster would not produce a chaotic situation from which Libya, perhaps, but the Eastern bloc most assuredly would have immediately profited.

Can France maintain a major political influence in the southern part of the Sahara by feigning to be unaware of their undertakings and by refraining from any form of military intervention? Certainly not and if France was to declare itself neutral in this region, then the total redeployment of its policy of cooperation would in effect be required, for it would become absurd to favor an Africa totally committed to disorder, therefore, to stagnation and economic regression. However, from the moment one does not exclude the possibility of intervention, everything must be done to keep from having to do so.

Military personnel are the first to wish this. They complain of the inadequacy of the credence given civil cooperation and of the inadequacy itself linked to the small number of employees in our embassies, as well as of supply shortages, ageing and the often extravagant utilization of specialized personnel. The USSR has a military policy in Africa; however, it also has the University of Lumumba where it trains thousands of linguists. This results because of these things there are errors which take years to set right; we have seen it in Chad and will perhaps see it in Mauritania and elsewhere.

When questions are asked about the obscurity of French policy, one of our diplomats customarily replies while laughing: "Our policy is the simplest in the world to understand. Since Alesia it has been based on three great Gallic principles: total improvisation, tragic lack of means and complete confusing of responsibilities." [portion of text missing]

Communists View Apartheid Involvement

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 9 Oct 79 p 12

[Article by Martine Nouaille]

[Text] FIGARO-MAGAZINE, the weekend supplement of FIGARO, which since its creation has specialized in an apology for the "new right," yesterday was before the 17th Criminal Court in Paris because of a defamation suit filed by the MRAP [Movement Against Racism, Anti-Semitism and for Peace]. The basis of the hearing: apartheid in South Africa.

At the root of this matter was what the editor of the Hersant newspaper, Robert Laconte, called: "a strange document": a poster prepared by the MRAP which in 10 sentences sums up several salient characteristics of the apartheid policy practiced by the masters of South Africa. "By decision of the Minister of Justice of South Africa," the poster read, "a black is prohibited from living in a city other than that of his place of work.

A white does not have the right to teach his black servant how to read, etc. Any offender will incur a fine, imprisonment or a whipping."

In December 1978, the magazine of Channel 2, QUESTION DE TEMPS, showed this poster during a program on Manibia.

The program did not have the good fortune of pleasing FIGARO-MAGAZINE which judged the content biased. "The masterpiece of this bad faith," the editor wrote, "was a poster which summed up the so-called prohibitions of the Minister of Justice of South Africa."

Bad faith? To show that apartheid is, alas, even more cruel than the poster intimates, the MRAP and its attorney, Mr Jacoby, had summoned several witnesses of their choosing: Dominique Lagarde, journalist for DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE, who conducted research in South Africa for a long time. "It happens that two spouses do not have the right to live in the same city," she reported.

For Mr. Fisher, director of research at the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], a specialist in South African legislation, "The poster gives the reality of legislation on apartheid in South Africa." One black student of that country recalled that there was no mandatory schooling for blacks. Finally, the president of the court received a letter from Nobel Prize winner, Sean MacBride, high commissioner for Manibia in the UN, which emphasizes that the MRAP, in the preparation of its poster, drew its inspiration directly from a United Nations brochure published in 1976 under the signature of a former South African senator.

The worst racist has a thousand arguments to show you that he is not one. Irritated by the reaction of the MRAP, rather annoyed by the support given them by the South African embassy which in many letters it, too, attempted to "show the bad faith of the MRAP," the editors of FIGARO and FIGARO-MAGAZINE had asked their attorney not to plead the substance [fond] of the case. No, simply, they maintained, resorting to semantics, the suit was without basis as Robert Lacontre's article criticized a television program and not the MRAP!

Judgment, 15 November

8143

CSO: 3100

PCF DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS PUBLISHED, EXPLAINED

Paris FRANCE NOUVELLE in French 13 Oct 79 pp 13-15

[Article by Gerard Streiff: "The PCF Disarmament Proposals"]

[Text] The escalation in the arms race can be checked today. Moreover, modest initial steps have been taken in that direction. France could play a primary role. It is to that end that the PCF has presented a series of initiatives on disarmament.

In the area of disarmament, as in any other, it cannot be a matter of good will alone. There too, popular pressure is decisive.

To that end, the PCF fully intends to develop the requisite struggles, as shown by the 23d congress, which included that requirement among the four priority axes of international policy that the communists are setting for themselves. Already in May 1978, the PCF--and it was the only one of all French parties to do so--looking toward the special UN session on disarmament, prepared a precise, detailed memorandum defining the objectives and methods of a French disarmament policy.

Twenty Proposals

Let us recall the orientations of those proposals, which retain a singular currency.

1. France should sign the agreements and treaties on the limitation or banning of certain armaments, notably the treaties banning nuclear arms testing (in the atmosphere, in outer space or at sea), and the nonproliferation of nuclear armaments.
2. France should participate in the current negotiations on a treaty banning underground nuclear testing.
3. France should participate in the negotiations on a treaty banning chemical weapons.

4. The presentation of constructive proposals at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, while at the same time seeing to it that the chairmanship and organization of that conference will no longer lie within the purview of just the United States and the Soviet Union. The new agency formed at Geneva by the UN is no longer under the control of that dual chairmanship.

5. France should participate in the Vienna conference on the reduction of forces and armaments in central Europe, in order to contribute to an agreement permitting the effective, balanced and controlled reduction of all forces and armaments--particularly foreign ones, initially--stationed in that zone, and doing so under conditions of security for all. The Giscard government is today promoting the idea of a new European conference on conventional weapons. But what credit can be given to that proposal when the government stands aloof from the Vienna conference? And when to this day it has not had a good word to say for the new Soviet proposals formulated during the anniversary of the GDR?

6. Helping implement the recommendations of the special UN session of May 1978, and in particular reminding the Giscard government that it made a commitment to popularize that question during International Disarmament Week.

7. France should endorse the American-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear warfare, and call for the adherence of the other nuclear powers.

8. France should participate in the SALT III negotiations on strategic arms limitation, for the dual purpose of France's being assured of its safety and being active in the field of disarmament.

9. There should be a treaty banning the research, development and production of all new mass destruction weapons.

10. There should be a uniform reduction of the military budgets of the permanent member nations of the Security Council as well as of the other states with considerable economic and military potential, in the spirit of the resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1973.

11. There should be negotiations and support for all proposals aimed at the freezing or balanced reduction of forces, armaments and military budgets, as well as for the creation of denuclearized zones or zones without foreign military bases, in predetermined regions of the globe.

12. There should be negotiations and support for all initiatives aimed particularly at making the Mediterranean a denuclearized zone, without foreign bases, and one in which the naval fleets of the United States and the Soviet Union stationed in that region would be limited--for the purpose of their ultimate withdrawal.

13. Reinforce the controlled regulation of the exporting of nuclear material for peaceful uses, to keep it from being put to military use.

14. The scrupulous, systematic application of the measures provided for in the final act of the Helsinki conference in order to strengthen mutual trust in the military domain (advance notification of maneuvers, exchanges of observers, etc.).

15. The inclusion as soon as possible of all the problems of military detente in the negotiations on European security. The next conference, in Madrid in the autumn of 1980, can be a suitable framework to that end. Moreover, the idea has just been put forth of having a new conference--like that of Helsinki--that would be devoted to military detente in Europe.

16. International planning to determine the means for exercising effective monitoring corresponding to each measure aimed at limiting or reducing armaments.

17. Strict regulation, under the control of the Parliament, of [French] arms sales abroad.

18. France should immediately stop all sales of arms and other war materiel to colonialist, racist and fascist governments, and an international decision of a similar nature should be adopted.

19. Negotiation on exports of conventional weapons in order to bring them under international regulation.

20. Implementation of the idea of establishing, within the UN a fund to aid developing countries, with the fund to be made up by part of the financial resources freed through the reduction of military budgets. (The principle of that fund was approved by the special session of the UN in June 1978.)

No one doubts that those proposals constitute the axes of a great realistic and ambitious French disarmament policy, axes that at the same time are objectives of struggle. This determination of the communists to grapple with the question of disarmament will astonish no one. Being a workers' party, the PCF has never spared its efforts, throughout its long experience, in the fight against war and the arms race, and for peace and disarmament.

This fight is today being waged in a complex setting. Due to detente, mobilizing the people is incomparably less spectacular than it was in the dark hours of the Cold War--and that is understandable.

I must add that the struggle for disarmament these past few years has no doubt not escaped certain negative phenomena linked to the experience of the common program: inadequate development of struggles, a tendency to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, the delegation of authority to staffs (all the more so since the subject could lend itself to that), the illusion regarding the Socialist Party's commitment in this matter.

At the same time, the fierce struggle of ideas being waged by the bourgeoisie to shore up its policy, a struggle that is not entirely ineffective, must naturally be taken into account.

I shall cite three illustrations in particular.

In this period of detente, there is an indecent, continuous pounding away aimed at crediting the idea that the world is basically dangerous, this being yet another way of calling on the world to engage in the arms race, and more precisely of getting the "European defense" projects common to the Giscard government and the Socialist Party back in the saddle again.

The scope and violence of that campaign are such that a recent poll could claim that the moroseness of our citizens was leading them to expect a new world war in 10 years!

At the same time, the Giscard government does not hesitate to use our people's devotion to national independence to its own advantage in order to combat the idea of disarmament.

It is in the name of French security that the government is justifying its not ratifying the treaties and agreements. It is in the name of the struggle against blocs that it shuns the so-called SALT negotiations and boycotts the Vienna conference.

Lastly, the government, taking turns with the Socialist Party, does not miss an opportunity to denigrate every current effort toward disarmament and downgrade the accomplishments and thereby nourish discouragement and disillusionment.

In short, everything is being done to nourish the idea that disarmament is decidedly a very noble utopia (it should be noted in passing that the very word "disarmament" [as it is being used] is not designed to clarify matters). At a time when the first victory is succeeding in putting a stop to escalation, a prelude to the beginning of deescalation, disarmament appears in effect like a very distant goal!

Plain Speaking

Under these conditions, we must speak plainly.

That means depicting the world exactly as it is today. Of course, peaceful coexistence is advancing in a complex way, but it is indeed making progress. Never before in history have international relations had so many favorable conditions for finally beginning a military detente between countries.

That means stressing in particular that our commitment on behalf of disarmament in no way contradicts our determination to see France's complete security assured under all circumstances. The right to security for all is manifestly a prerequisite.

At the same time, the long march toward disarmament will hardly have a chance to advance if the present military balances in international relations are again called into question. In other words, every limiting measure accompanied by effective control must affect the plateaus of the balance of forces as equitably as possible. I must add that in this regard we reject any alignment of our country with any bloc whatsoever. It is indeed clear that the United States and the USSR have a special responsibility, considering their own military weight, France cannot leave it to others to settle this question. No one doubts that an active France would be an important new element in giving impetus to current negotiations.

Lastly, that means that it can indeed be calculated that the goal of disarmament can only be attained at the end of a complex process. In other words, every measure, no matter how minimal, is to be taken into account. Every tribune, every forum where the question of disarmament is debated must be used. Every initiative, modest yet realistic, must be encouraged. Every gain that can induce others to be made must be put to use. In short, every advancement that loosens the dangerous spirit of resignation is a positive action. That accounts for our precise proposals, calling for concrete, realistic measures. Certainly the road is difficult, but therein lies the only realistic step. Nothing would be more demobilizing than to entertain the idea of all or nothing at all with regard to disarmament.

5346

CSO: 3100

DETAILS OF PCF RECRUITMENT DRIVE IN ESSONE

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 25 Sep 79 p 5

[Article by Roger Faivre]

[Text] The PC's 3-month plan for Essone: 2 special measures to get 1,500 new members by 20 December. Bring in 1,500 new members, get a card into every member's hands, and wind up 1979 with 1,000 more communists than there were at the end of 1978: those are the goals of the Essone communists' 3-month plan.

Last Thursday there were a lot of communists in front of the Massy-Ville employment office. This was not the first time the leaders from the local Party section had come to talk to the unemployed and try to sign them up in the PCF. This time, though, the new members would be able to meet their cell secretary without waiting, and to talk over what it would mean to them to join the Party, right then and there.

"At the same time," explained Claude Chailloux, the federation secretary for organization, "we want to take a step toward a more widespread move among communists to strengthen the Party, to advance the idea that recruiting is not a job for the experts, and that every cell can beef up its forces."

On this Thursday morning, 30 jobless people, 13 of them women, joined the Party. The cell secretaries on hand even delivered 31 cards, because they met a young recruit from the HUMANITE festival.

Before that festival, local communists would doubtless have scoffed at the notion of getting 1,500 new members by 20 December -- as many as in the first 9 months of the year -- as

utterly unrealistic. And yet, in only 2 days, at La Corneuve, the Essonne sections had welcomed 605 new members. That made everybody stop and think.

"A man or a woman who joins our battles, who signs a Party petition, buys a pamphlet, or reads L'HUMANITE is somebody who supports our Party. Why not ask him to join?" asks Claude Chailloux.

That is what a handful of communists on hand last week in front of the prefect's office did when they marched down to demonstrate in protest against the difficulties involved in getting the children back into school. Without that exhortation, four new communists would still be outside the Party.

In the same way, department store workers on strike against Sunday openings joined the Party last weekend: signing up were two employees from the Athis-Mons Euromarche, and two more from the Grigny GEM store. All because the communists who were demonstrating with them "stopped and thought," and set about inviting and persuading them to join.

"We want to get all communists involved in this same response we got right after the festival," says Claude Chailloux, "and so we shall be watching to see to it that every cell devotes some discussion time to the central committee documents. The cell, remember, is all its members, including those who may not have attended the cell meeting but whom comrades may run into later on."

The 3-month plan developed by this Federation calls for more "cell initiative" in recruiting, in making sure all members get their cards, and in improving participation in political activity by all communists.

For example, delivery of the Party card to each member will be an occasion to remind him to subscribe to 3 months of HUMANITE, if he is not yet a regular reader.

This move to bring in the rank and file in no way diminishes the responsibilities of leaders at every echelon. Quite the contrary. The effort to give each cell its own efficient staff, capable of coordinating the contributions -- be they great or small -- of each member, will continue.

Several cells will be helped to pay calls on every family in the larger towns, with an eye to casting the recruiting nets far and wide. The way will be paved for the door-to-door canvassers by a letter from the cell to local residents.

Recruiting days in plants and business establishments are being planned with the idea of soliciting workers to join as they enter or leave the workplace, and in the shops and offices as well.

In several sections where there are quite a lot of Party cards to deliver, measures have been taken with the cells to straighten out that situation.

Getting 1,500 new members before the end of the year is going to mean getting an average of more than 100 a week. Progress in the 3-month plan will be monitored on a regular basis at section and Federation meetings.

Yvelines Federation: Communists will assemble on Thursday 27 September at 2030 in the Fontenay-le-Fleury city hall to hear Paul Laurent. Francois Hilsun will preside.

PS-CFDT Convergence

Francois Mitterand and Edmond Maire met yesterday at Socialist Party headquarters.

At the close of their meeting, after underscoring the "fraternal relations" between the French Democratic Federation of Labor (CFDT), Edmond Maire spoke of "convergence," which he said should be demonstrated "on the scene over the next few weeks."

0182

CS0: 3100

MEMBERSHIP, FINANCES OF PCF'S CORNEUVE SECTION

Paris EST & OUEST in French 1-30 Sep 70 pp 5-10

[Text] In response to our article on PCF membership (EST & OUEST, June 1970), Mrs Annie Kriegel writes that in her view the figure of 225,000 members our arithmetic led us to seems far too low.

We beg her pardon, and that of our readers, if somewhat hasty editing led them to believe that we were quoting that figure as an approximation of what we believe PCF membership to be. To be quite frank about it, we don't know how many there are. All we were aiming at in that brief note was to show that the numerical data provided by the Party leadership are not very helpful.

Readers will recollect that, as Armand Guillemot was reporting to the congress on the Party's finances, he said that dues paid came to 64 million (only part of which, 15,105,547 francs in 1970, was paid in to the central committee). Retaining the same number of members for 1970, or, by Mr Marchais' figures, 702,000, we get an average annual dues payment of around 92 francs.

Well, then, still according to the same report, dues payments should come to 1 percent of each member's annual income. That would mean that, on the average, the annual earnings of a communist worker would be 92,000 francs, or less than half the SMIC.

If, on the other hand, we assume that the average annual earnings within the PC are slightly above the SMIC -- make it 24,000 francs, just for instance -- we would get about 225,000 dues-paying Party members.

This assumption, which we do not deny we advanced purely for the sake of argument, is flawed on at least one count. It assumes

that PC members regularly pay their dues. As we shall see, that is by no means the case.

Limits to Communist Militantism

One of the notions currently fashionable in newsrooms, literary circles, and throughout the political class in general, is the idea of the incomparable quality of communists as loyal and active Party members. There is no end to admiration of their tireless devotion, their abnegation, their total selflessness for the good of the Party, or their total commitment to the Party and to serving simply as instruments for doing its bidding.

Are all these qualities or attitudes so admirable? And do they not add up to a fanatic, who is assuredly, among all the types human nature can produce, one of the most, if not the most loathsome? No doubt they are the stuff of which martyrs are made: they are also the stuff of which hangmen are made. We can rest assured that the Party can find among its ranks whatever it may need in case of victory to arrest suspects, guard the prisons and the camps, and handle "interrogations" and executions. The best in circumstances of this kind are unquestionably the worst. What evil glee they would feel as they sacrificed their sensitivity -- not to mention their personal affections and their honor -- to the Party! Beneath the face of the citizen peddling HUMANITE you can already descry the features of a gulag guard.

And yet, even yet, these very communist militants who would carry their attachment to the Party as far as we have just seen do not all show any burning zeal for paying their full dues: not by a long shot. The Party's titling demands are as unwelcome to communists as the income tax is to taxpayers. Didn't we use to say -- back in the days when there was something like patriotism in France -- that Frenchmen were far readier to pay their dues in blood than to fork over money to the tax-collector?

Dues Hard To Collect

The documents shown below bear witness to this reluctance to pay on the part of the Communist Party's "taxpayers."

I am talking about the financial reports filed at the section conference held on 20 and 21 April 1979 by the section of La Corneuve-Centre, which is part of the Seine-Saint-Denis Federation of the French Communist Party.

The first table shows the status of all 32 cells which make up the section. Party cards "issued" and stamps "issued are cards and dues stamps actually delivered to members, but for which

TABLE I
CELL STATUS
1978

CELLS	Cards Delivered	Stamps Delivered	Average Rate for Stamps	OWING
S.N.I.A.S.				
Fabien	19	163	33,37	754,25
M. Cachin	12	25	26,00	+ 337,50
D. Fery	13	160	19,90	1.688,75
F. Clavand	16	165	23,76	1.411,25
F.C.B.				
M. Cachin	17	91	21,48	--
Politzer	23	149	23,62	--
J. Grimaud	8	55	15,54	--
Le Guennec	4	33	22,12	+ 121,75
Fanny Dewerpe	34	207	24,78	+ 57,25
Romain Rolland	47	287	25,45	134,25
Y. Adam	17	170	15,00	697,50
Pierre Courtade	3	44	27,27	540,00
Houdremont	12	25	12,00	118,00
Duclos	6	6	13,33	505,00
Anne Godeau	6	8	20,00	155,25
Langevin (C.E.T.)	4	24	31,25	--
Henri Wallon	4	49	39,38	--
Paul Eluard	5	12	60,00	1.274,00
Henri Barbusse	16	64	14,84	+ 51,25
Joliot Curie	44	256	8,57	390,50
M. Thorez	32	192	12,57	103,50
Vercors	23	83	16,44	671,25
Gabriel Peri	50	220	13,09	473,00
Lemarchand	18	106	10,08	751,75
E. Porte	35	343	13,64	--
L. Henaff	5	24	15,00	--
B. Frachon	9	36	18,47	940,50
Ho-Chi-Minh	4	26	21,53	--
A. Cabral	9	6	21,66	138,50
F. Billoux	11	16	15,00	--
J. Kanapa	5	12	45,00	330,00
P. Semard	3	--	--	--
	514	2.997	16,14	+ 567,25
				-11.617,25

either the recipients did not pay on the spot (putting off the evil day) or the cell failed to forward to the section. Hence the "debits." Some cells apparently paid in advance: they are shown in the "debit" column with a plus sign after them in col. 5 of Table I.

We see a total of 2,997 stamps issued for 514 cards also "issued": half of them show less than 6 stamps, or less than half the dues which amount to 12 stamps (precisely 5.83 are below 6). Of course, members who joined in the course of the year pay only from the date of their admission, and that lowers the average, particularly since there are quite a lot of them (around 20 percent of total membership, it would seem; we shall see about that later on).

The differences from one cell to another are enormous. For some the average actually tops 12 stamps: D. Fery (from SNIAS), Pierre Courtade, and Henri Wallon. True, the first two are behind in their payment and owe the section for some of the stamps they have issued -- say around half of them.

Of the 32 cells, 14 average 6 or more stamps. Another eight pay less than 3 stamps on the average, or a quarter of the annual dues (not counting the price of the Party card).

We shall see in Table II that these cells can be arranged in sets: neighborhood cells (7), and work-place cells (25), which themselves can be broken down into five groups. These are the averages:

Neighborhood cells.....	5.8
Workplace cells.....	6.4
including:	
SNIAS.....	8.5
Babcock Fives-Caille.....	6.3
Community.....	6.5
Miscellaneous businesses.....	3.3
Teachers.....	6.4

On the average, they run around six. The cells in "miscellaneous businesses" are the only ones to distinguish themselves by their ridiculously low average. Quite probably these members feel lonesome, cut off from the rest, and a lot of them give only lip service to the Party.

Average Price of a Stamp

The average price of a monthly dues stamp, too, can vary considerably from one cell to another.

TABLE II
CARD DELIVERIES COMPARED

CELLS	1977	1978	1979
S.N.I.A.S. [totals]	52	60	52
Fabien	13	19	15
Fery	13	13	11
Cachin	26	12	9
Clavaud (new cell)	--	16	17
BABCOCK [totals]	41	52	37
Cachin	13	17	--
Politzer	17	23	16
Grimau	6	8	21
Leguennec	5	4	--
COMMUNITY [totals]	87	98	77
F. Dewerpe	33	34	24
B. Rolland	37	47	39
Y. Adam	17	17	14
MISCELLANEOUS FIRMS [totals]	97	67	32
P. Semard	5	3	--
A. Gaudau [PTT Central] (new cell)	--	6	4
Organo-Technique	5	9	5
B. Frachon (Z.I.) (new cell)	12	9	8
D. Fery (Almea)	--	11	4
P. Courtade	13	--	--
J. Houdremont (Mecano)	4	3	4
E. Fleury (PTT)	51	18	1
E. Henaff (Noel)	4	5	5
Primistere	3	3	1
TEACHERS [totals]	21	19	26
Ho-Chi-Minh (Villard)	4	4	2
Langevin (CET)	3	4	2
Wallon (CES)	4	5	7
Eluard (CES)	10	5	6
Kanapa (new cell)	--	1	9
TOTAL FIRMS	298	296	224
LOCAL [totals]	176	218	191
E. Porte	35	35	33
E. Lemarchand	13	18	14
H. Barbusse	16	16	5
J. Curie	37	44	56
M. Thorez	20	32	28
Vercors	17	23	14
G. Peri	38	50	41
TOTAL LOCAL	176	218	191
TOTAL SECTION	464	514	415

Two firms have gone out of business: MECANO and ALMECA.

At F.C.B., layoffs entailed the loss of a sizable number of communists.

The highest rate going is charged in the Paul-Eluard cell, which operates in a CES and charges 60 francs. It has only five members, however, and all five of them together have paid for only 12 stamps. Besides, it owes the section 1,247 francs, which is more than the cost of the 12 stamps issued. There is a mystery here. Is the debt carried over from last year? Is there an error in the arithmetic on the table?

The lowest average, 5.57, belongs to the Loliot-Curie cell. It is a neighborhood cell. It probably includes among its 44 dues-paying members, who take a total of 256 stamps, or 5.8 per person (which is close to the overall average), people like housewives, retired people, and maybe some who are unemployed.

The overall average is 10.14 francs.

Even if you allow for the fact that the section certainly includes 15 percent of members without any income or with very low ones (housewives, students, unemployed, pensioners), it is still an incredibly low average.

When we combine the average number of dues stamps paid for per member and the average price paid for such stamps, we get dues (not counting the Party card price) of 94 francs per year, on the average.

That is a long way from the 1 percent of income required by Party regulations.

One can't help noticing that these 94 francs are very close to the 92 francs cited as the average dues if, in 1979, the Party collected 64 million francs from 702,000 members. (NOTE: Another table, which we do not reproduce here, shows that as of 31 March the cells in the La Corneuve-Centre section had issued 415 cards and 1,065 stamps, at an average rate of 15.38 francs per stamp. That is less than they charged in 1978 [10.14], in spite of inflation. On the other hand, the average number of stamps per card [2.5 percent] seems quite high because the figures cover only the first quarter. We should bear in mind, however, that it is fairly easy to get payment for the first month's stamp: it is stuck onto the annual card when the card is delivered. The hard part is getting the stamps for the following months stuck onto the card and paid for.)

Membership Decline

A second table shows the number of cards "issued" by cells in 1977, 1978, and 1979; for 1979, as of 31 March, or perhaps even (at the section level it is possible to keep track of cards issued on a day-by-day basis) as of 12 April. Another document

TABLE III
SOCIO-OCCUPATIONAL MAKEUP

COVERING 20 CELLS AND 337 MEMBERS
(number of stubs returned)
228 MEN
109 WOMEN

Nationality:

307 French
30 Foreign

Ages:

Under 25	:	29
25 to 30	:	63
30 to 35	:	40
35 to 45	:	78
45 to 60	:	99
Over 60	:	25

Date Joined:

Pre-war	:	10
Wartime	:	4
1944 to 1947	:	15
1948 to 1958	:	20
1959 to 1967	:	66
1968 to 1971	:	41
1972 to 1977	:	110
1978 to 1979	:	66

Occupations:

Unskilled laborers	:	139
Private sector:	80	
Public sector :	59	
Clerical workers	:	104
Private sector:	49	
Public sector :	55	
Engineers, research workers	:	3
Middle management	:	2
Technicians	:	15
Tradesmen, merchants	:	5
Teachers	:	19
Students	:	5
Retired persons	:	8
At home (not employed)	:	19
Unemployed	:	14

from the file shows that there were 42 new members enrolled in 1979 as of 12 April, as compared with 100 for the whole of 1978.

We find that, from 1977 to 1978 the membership (or rather the number of cards issued) grew by more than 10 percent, up from 464 to 514. No doubt this can be attributed to the prospects for a left victory. There is a big disparity between 1979 (415 cards) and 1978 (514 cards), but the figures for 1979 stop with 12 April.

We see, however, that even if the section gains as many new members as it did in 1978 (100), since it had already rounded up 42 by 12 April, it would not find its 1978 strength. To do that, it would have to get 141 new members over the year. If it did manage to get them, more than a quarter of its members (27 percent) would be new recruits.

The Sieve-Party

Here we can verify a constant phenomenon in the Party, one that expresses a formula dating back to at least the mid-Twenties: the Communist Party is a seive party.

Every year it loses a major share of last year's members, many of whom went no further than to join one of its cells.

There were 100 new members out of 514 in 1978: only 414 of those had taken out their Party cards in 1977. In 1977, there were 464 members. Of those, 50 failed to renew their cards in 1978 (a little over 10 percent).

Similarly, as of 12 April 1979, only 373 of the 1978 members had renewed their cards, since out of the 415 cards issued, 42 went to new members. The "leakage" was 141, or more than 27 percent. That's a huge loss. It's more than the number of new members in all of 1978! It may be that some of the laggards renewed their cards after 12 April, but there can't have been many of them.

[If this were the proper place, we should like to show that, no matter what one might think at first blush, the fact that it leaks like a "seive" does not weaken the Communist Party, but is, on the contrary, one source of its strength. Its method consists in casting its recruiting nets far and wide to catch people and test them: hence the leaks, or at least some of them. And besides, all these new people will work for a while with all the zeal of converts, blindly obeying the Party's directives. Once they begin to see things clearly, they'll drop out, after having devoted 3 or 4 years of youthful fervor to the Party. Were they to stick with the Party, knowing what they know and not liking it, they would force the Party to change.]

Social Makeup

In compliance with instructions from the Party leadership, the section proceeded to analyze its social and vocational makeup (by sending out an ad hoc questionnaire). At the time the file was drawn up for the section conference, only 20 out of 32 cells numbering a total of 337 members (out of 514) had replied.

The proportion of unskilled workers, 139 out of 337, or 41 percent, is relatively low for a department like Seine-Saint-Denis and for a Party that claims to be a working-class party.

HUMANITE-DIMANCHE CIRCULATION

Another document gives the total consignments ("takes") of HUMANITE-DIMANCHE and the indebtedness of the cells for this item.

For us, it is a fairly enigmatic document, because we don't know whether the "takes" cited for four different months represent the total "takes" for the month (which is likely), or the weekly average.

In any case, here are the figures:

Jan 1978	411
Jun ----	402
Jan 1979	361
Apr ----	331

Not exactly an upward trend.

The Section Budget

We shall conclude with the section's accounts.

We shan't haggle over the value of the stock: cards and stamps that have not been issued are worth no more than so much scrap paper.

The most remarkable detail is that the section gets most of its money (almost two thirds) not from dues, but from miscellaneous activities (subscriptions and sales of lily-of-the-valley on May Day). Party members would rather give the Party their work than their money, particularly when the work in question looks more like a holiday party.

TABLE IV

SUMMARY OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES FOR 1978

RECEIPTS		EXPENDITURES	
Dues	44,952.70	Dues	34,950.00
Subscription	50,761.45	Subscription	45,005.50
HUMANITE Festival	7,725.00	Party schools	4,333.60
14 July	666.75	Pamphlets, journals	8,832.31
Gifts	1,539.70	HUMANITE	3,214.35
Invoices, lily-of-		Posters	3,043.15
the-valley	10,849.60	Wages & salaries	3,759.50
Miscellaneous	5.00	Office expenses,	
		postage, phones	1,627.65
		Subscriptions	90.00
		Rent	2,884.00
		Invoices, lily-of-	
		the-valley	10,849.60
		Brochures	150.00
		Taxes	655.00
		Miscellaneous	662.69
		TOTAL.....	120,057.35
		Cash on hand as of 1 January 1978:	5,542.07 Fr
		Cash on hand as of 31 December 78:	5,542.07
			122,400.20+
			120,057.35-
			7,984.92 Fr
		BALANCE	
CREDITS	CREDITS	DEBITS	DEBITS
Due from cells	11,757.50	Due to Federation	1,772.50
Value of stocks,		Leaflets & journals	4,141.66
cards, stamps	6,676.00		
Cash on hand	7,984.92		
		Total.....	5,914.16
		Total.....	26,418.12

6182

CS01 3100

COMMENTARY ON PCF MEMBERSHIP, FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Paris EST & OUEST in French 1-30 Jun 79 pp 17-18

[Article by c.h.]

[Text] Mr Marchais has made it official: as of the end of 1978 the French Communist Party had 702,000 members organized into 28,000 cells, more than 10,000 of them work-place cells, and he has set a goal for membership recruiting: "We can and we must reach 1 million members within the next few years" (HUMANITE, 10 May 1979, p 10).

It is all but impossible to find out for certain exactly how many members the PCF actually has, but some things Armand Guillemot said when he reported on the Party's books to the congress, seem to counsel skepticism.

"For 1978 and for the Party as a whole (central committee, federations, sections, and cells), we can estimate that the total resources will rise to well above the present 160 million francs, of which 40 percent comes from dues, more than 25 percent from rebates from our elected representatives to all assemblies -- national, departemental, and local, and the balance from nationwide contributions." (HUMANITE 14 May 79).

Forty percent of 160 millions comes to 64 million francs. That was for 1978 or, if Mr Marchais is telling the truth, for 702,000 members. That would make the average dues payment around 92 francs per year.

Back now to our reading:

"Payments for dues increased by 38 percent over 3 years, reflecting both the growth in membership and the wisdom of the 1974 decision to remove the ceilings on dues and adopt a sliding scale setting dues -- except for the rank and file -- /at 1 percent of income."

If average dues payments, or 92 francs, represent 1 percent of income, that would put average income for dues-paying Party members at 9,200 francs per year, which is far below the Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage (SMIC), which right now is in excess of 22,000 francs.

Truly, the PCF recruits members only among the needy, unless most of its members are cheating.

True, there is another possibility: maybe that number of 702,000 is obtained only by means of a multiplying coefficient.

We are certainly shooting well below the mark if we assume that the average annual salary of CP members is on the order of 24,000, or just a tad below the SMIC. That would bring the average dues to 240 francs per year.

If you divide 64 million by 240, you come out with 225,000 members.

Is that perhaps the real membership of the PCF?

6182

CS0: 3100

DISCUSSION ANALYZES NEORION AGREEMENT

TOURIST (1954/55) in Greek 73 Oct 79 pp 49, 50, 54

Article by Solon Grigoriadis

Text The Neorion (Shipyard) of Syros came to the forefront suddenly because of the agreement it signed for the repair of Soviet nonmilitary naval units. It became the target of criticism both from abroad as well as from inside the country. Turkish Foreign Minister Oktun poured oil again on the fire and added his voice to the protests of the State Department, arguing that the agreement disturbs the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean "as it has been formulated by the treaties of Lausanne (1923), Montreux (1936) and Paris (1946)." In Greece, certain political leaders and parliament deputies denounced the agreement as unconstitutional and as a dangerous favor to the Soviet Union, while the government protested that the agreement is a simple commercial transaction. But what is the real situation with regard to this controversial Neorion agreement? Does it disturb the balance of power and Greece's relations with the United States, NATO and the EEC?

On Saturday, 20 October, the newspaper ELEVTEROTIPIA announced under a banner headline: "This is the Neorion Agreement" and published its text which was officially verified, and which reads as follows in its main points.

The Protocol

The protocol on the discussions between representatives of the Soviet Navy and the Soviet agency Sudimport on the one side and the management of the Greek Company "Shipyard Neorion Syros Ltd." on the other, concerning the arrangement for the repair of supply ships of the Soviet Navy and of Soviet merchant ships in the shipyards of Syros reads as follows:

Following negotiations, the two sides agreed in principle on the following: The "Shipyard Neorion Syros Ltd" will carry out repairs on an "ad hoc" basis and during repairs will resupply vessels of the Soviet Navy and Soviet merchant ships on a commercial basis. While the ships are undergoing repairs the captains of the ships will purchase supplies for replenishing their stock.

The arrival of the aforementioned ships to the shipyard for repairs, for resupplying their stock and for the rest and recreation of their crews, will have to be arranged at least 5 to 7 days in advance at the request of the Soviet side. The messages for the arrival of the ships will be sent by TELEX directly to the shipyard.

The Soviet side will send at its expense three to four representatives with their families to supervise the repairs and solve questions of a commercial or technical nature relating to ships undergoing repairs.

The shipyard management does not object to the direct radio communication between ships under repair and their command. The radio communications will be subject to prior notification of the Greek authorities regarding the schedule of communication.

For and on behalf of the
Neorion, Syros Shipyard Ltd
Syros, 6 September 1979

The following day, the same newspaper published three "explanatory clauses" of the Agreement which were signed on 9 September, 3 days after the signing of the Agreement. These three clauses, which have not been officially denied, are as follows, according to the newspaper:

1. The supply ships of the Soviet Navy must not carry weapons or ammunition because of the risk of explosion or fire which may damage the Neorion installations.
2. The repair of the Soviet ships will be carried out "if possible" only (under this clause the Greek government may refuse to allow the repair of [Soviet] ships by claiming technical difficulties).
3. The Greek side shall determine how many Soviet citizens will be allowed to stay in Syros during the repair of the ships.

Denial in One Word

How did the text of the Agreement fall into the hands of the newspaper?

Democratic Center Union [EDIK] leader I. Zigidis in statements to the press and to the Chamber of Deputies accused the government of, after keeping the Agreement unconstitutionally and unlawfully secret from the people and the Chamber of Deputies, leaking the story to the newspaper. But ELAVNEROTYPIA's editor Sp. Karataferis who brought the text to light explained his scoop in these words:

"Ever since 6 September when the historic Agreement was signed I have searched for the text but found all the doors closed. I went to Syros, I visited 'Kointa' (the first Soviet ship that came to Neorion). I met

the Russian officials, I flew to Naples and Brussels to the headquarters of NATO, I asked the appropriate Greek ministers for it, I went back to Syros....

"For 40 days while searching for the Agreement, I met--openly and secretly--more than 50 persons: Greeks, Soviets, Americans, British, Swedes, Italians. Nothing. Finally, miles away from Athens, the historic Agreement fell into my hands."

I. Zigdis, however, in subsequent statements on 21 October insisted that "while Foreign Minister Rallis arrogantly refused until yesterday to inform the Greek people and the Chamber of Deputies and also the members of the Alliance (NATO) in whose military branch it wishes to return, he suddenly yesterday afternoon, on the eve of the premier's departure for Western Europe, made public the text of the Agreement with the Soviets by leaking it to an afternoon newspaper! This action shows disrespect for the people and the Chamber of Deputies, and it is also improper toward its foreign friends."

Zigdis, of course, did not question the reporter's alleged odyssey in getting hold of the text. But we may assume that he refers to the last sentence: "Finally, miles away from Athens, the historic Agreement fell into my hands." In other words, in the end, the text was offered to him by an unnamed source: the Foreign Ministry.

The newspaper did not deny the allegation of the EDEK leader and attempted only a timid, whisper-like protest with only one word when Zigdis repeated the same allegations the following day. In its Monday, 22 October issue, it published this comment on the new Zigdis statement: "(Zigdis has added): 'The leak of the text to an afternoon newspaper came from Foreign Minister G. Rallis'" (Note by ELEFTHEROTYPIA: Wrong!)

Attack and Counterattack

This one-word, confidential, humble and timid denial was not very convincing. But where is the essential difference between the government and the Agreement's harsh critics?

During the 20 October parliamentary debate, Foreign Minister G. Rallis summarized the government views on the Neorion Agreement as follows:

- a. This is a purely private contract (a private 1st contract) between the company of Neorion Shipyards and the Soviet foreign trade company Sudoisport.
- b. Only unarmed, auxiliary vessels of the Soviet Navy will be repaired.
- c. This is not a case of granting port facilities because port facilities mean an agreement between governments, military activities, exclusive use,

command and control of a specific area, special legal status, etc. But the Neorion Agreement with Sudoimport has none of these conditions.

But EKK leader Zigdis as well as the parliamentary deputies of his party Sandouvas and Venizelos who submitted a question which they changed into interpellation, and National Array [EP] spokesman Sp. Theodokis all leveled the following charges against the government:

1. Before opening up to the Soviet Union in general and allowing the Neorion Agreement in particular, Greece should have discussed these issues with NATO and EEC.
2. The government, by allowing the Agreement, violated the constitution which, in Article 27, specifically states that the transit or stay of foreign military forces is forbidden without a law approved by the Chamber of Deputies. In the case of the Neorion Agreement, the fact that the vessels to be repaired are auxiliary vessels does not mean that they cease to be part of the Soviet Navy, being, in other words, part of a military force. The Neorion Agreement applies to a foreign military force whose stay is subject to Article 27. Therefore, it is a matter of law, and not simply a private law contract.
3. With regard to content of the Agreement: The text specifically states that the protocol was agreed following discussions in which representatives of the Soviet Navy participated. In addition, Coordination Minister K. Mitsotakis had stated in September that the government had "encouraged and supported the Agreement." Therefore, the Agreement was reached under the auspices of two governments--Greek and Soviet--and in essence is an Agreement between two states with the two companies acting as agents. In any event, one of the two companies, Sudoimport, is a state enterprise.
4. The government claims that only ship repairs are involved. The text of the Agreement, however, speaks also of supplying the ships.
5. Moreover, the Agreement refers to "vessels of the Soviet Navy" and not to "auxiliary vessels of the Soviet Navy." This means that armed naval units of the Soviet Navy may also come in for repairs.

The EKK leader, outspoken as ever, has let it be understood that he may take the case to court charging the direct perpetrators and the instigators of the Agreement which he regards as a violation of the penal code.

How Important Is the Neorion to the Soviet Navy?

This growing feud between the government and one section of the opposition has not prevented the implementation of the Agreement. Already Soviet vessels have docked in the Neorion. Two of them have arrived and another three are expected before the end of the year, to the great joy of the company and also of all the inhabitants of Syros [employment rise].

But what is the real significance of opening the Neorion Shipyards to the Soviet Navy? Is there any justification for the reaction of the Turks, the Americans and of certain Greeks? Can the repair of Soviet ships affect the strategic balance in the eastern Mediterranean? Here is how the situation stands:

The Soviet Union as we all know has long been trying to gain free access to the Mediterranean and beyond to the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. But the entry of the Soviet Fleet into the Mediterranean came about only in 1964. It was then that for the first time reconnaissance planes of the U.S. Sixth Fleet discovered a compact group of Soviet naval units lying at anchor southeast of the island of Kythira. The group included the cruiser "Derjinski" surrounded by a number of missile cruisers, destroyers and several auxiliary vessels: floating repair ships, tankers, water supply ships, etc.

It should be noted that until recently the reaction of the Soviet Union to the strategic initiatives of the West was, as a rule, slow. NATO was established in 1949 but the Warsaw pact came in 1955. The Eisenhower Doctrine was enunciated in 1956 but it was only 2 or 3 years later that Moscow began to sign bilateral agreements with the Arab countries. While the U.S. Sixth Fleet was established in February 1966, nearly 18 years passed before the appearance of the Soviet Navy in the same area in 1966.

Nevertheless, since that time its presence has been increasingly visible. The naval units--as well as the auxiliary units--are increasing in number. Its activity is evident. The bear swims in the Mediterranean while the intelligence bureaus of NATO in Naples and of the Sixth Fleet break their necks trying to count how many Soviet vessels are in the Mediterranean at any given moment.

We should note that this group of Soviet ships is erroneously called the "Mediterranean Fleet." The Russian Navy has four fleets (as many as the American). One of these fleets is the Black Sea Fleet which includes--in 1979--75 submarines (many nuclear) and 70 principal rocket-equipped surface vessels. One section of this fleet is the Mediterranean Flotilla which is very strong. But it has its Achilles heel. It does not have one single base in the Mediterranean since Sadat in Egypt turned around and kicked the Russians out of his country, while at the same time closing Port Said to the Soviet ships. Since the time the Soviet Flotilla entered the Mediterranean it has been in a precarious position--in spite of its strength--because it had no bases. It tried to solve the problem with the so-called floating bases, that is, permanent anchorages in well selected spots. These anchorages operate legally from the point of view of international law because they are located outside territorial waters. In the open seas everything is permissible except piracy and the exploitation of another country's continental shelf.

The Soviet Navy has more than six such anchorages. Two of these are in the Greek region. One is southeast of Kythira and the other northeast

of Crete (in Kavo Sidero). The Soviet ships are resupplied in those floating bases by supply ships, but they also undergo repairs in floating repair ships. Nevertheless the lack of land bases is felt, not only because the Soviet Flotilla has no air cover but also because the anchorages can provide only for limited repairs while dry docking is impossible. The Soviet Navy has no port facilities in the various countries; only in Latakia, Syria, and lately, as it appears, in Tripoli, Libya. But the repair facilities of these two ports have very limited capabilities and low technical level. Moreover, Latakia and Tripoli are too far from the two aforementioned Soviet anchorages near Kythira and Crete.

Syros: Very Close...

But a fleet needs many repairs and a great deal of dry docking for its ships. On the average, one fifth of its force is constantly immobilized for these reasons and this ratio increases radically in time of war or exceptional activity. The Soviet Flotilla of the Mediterranean has no alternative but to send its ships to the Black Sea shipyards. This is why they sail back and forth so often through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. This is a handicap which inhibits the movements, the preparedness and the efficiency of the flotilla. But now, here is the Neorion of Syros like a *deus ex machina*. Syros is in an exceptional location for the Soviet Flotilla. More specifically:

- a. The distance between the Soviet anchorage in Kythira and Syros is one sixth of the distance to Sebastopol and one fifth of the distance to Tripoli, Libya.
- b. The distance between the Crete anchorage and Syros is one sixth of the distance to Sebastopol and one fifth of the distance to Latakia.

This is why the Soviets are so interested in the Neorion and what the effect of Syros may be in meeting the needs of the Soviet Flotilla. Syros will provide a speedier and better process for the repair and maintenance of its ships. Of course, the Neorion Agreement, since it applies only to auxiliary vessels, limits the extent of its services but it is nonetheless significant because the auxiliary vessels are indispensable to the flotilla. It will be even more serious if it were to be extended to military vessels, as Zigdis fears. For the time being there is no such prospect and therefore one cannot speak of a change in the strategic balance of the Mediterranean--unless the prediction of someone who is not a member of EDIK or KP comes true: "Until now the West held up the specter of the 'Northern Danger' to keep us obedient allies in their fold. Now Karamanlis is going to wave his own specter to the West. There are going to be repeated revisions of the Neorion Agreement, so don't be surprised if someday you see the carrier 'Kiev' being repaired in Syros..."

'AKROPOLIS' REPORTS NOTES TO LONDON, BELGRADE, ON MACEDONIAN ISSUE

AT141045 Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 13 Nov 79 pp 1, 9 AT

[Text] The Greek Government lodged notes with London and Belgrade over unacceptable activity developed by Skoplje and the Yugoslav Government in Britain over the alleged "Macedonian issue." According to reports from London, which are described as accurate, Skoplje has unleashed a broad propaganda campaign, naturally with Belgrade's support, on the "Macedonian issue." This is primarily directed against Bulgaria which is accused of a "systematic policy of terror and Bulgarization of the Macedonian minority within its frontiers." It also speaks of "Bulgarian claims against Yugoslavia."

In continuation Skoplje turns against Greece which, according to this near-hysterical propaganda, "not only continues its systematic denationalization of the Macedonian ethnic minority living in northern Greece territories, in Macedonia and the Aegean, but also in an effort to justify this process fully denies existence of the Macedonian nation."

Within the framework of this propaganda campaign the men of Belgrade and Skoplje have gone as far as to circulate a map on which the "ethnographic and geographic boundaries of Macedonia go far beyond the frontiers with Greece and Bulgaria." It must be noted that existence of such a map is revealed for the first time.

Following all these provocations the Greek Government undertook a series of action which include:

1. A note by the Greek ambassador to London, Stathis Lagakos, to the Foreign Office because the British Government allows such an anti-Greek campaign to be conducted in Britain and this, under such a false front.
2. A note by the Greek ambassador to Belgrade to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry.

It is, in conclusion, stressed that the Greek Government awaits further development of the issue before it defines its final position.

PASOK CHAIRMAN'S IRAKLEION SPEECH ANALYZED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 21-22 Oct 79 pp 4, 15

[Article by Stamos Zoulas]

[Text] For the first time since the fall of the dictatorship it was the government that gave a more acute tone to the political feud between the majority and minority by replying to A. Papandreou's speech in Irakleion. The event is not entirely without political significance for two primary reasons: First, because it took place only 3 days after the Karamanlis-Papandreou meeting which gave the impression that the disagreements between the government and the opposition were becoming less acute. And second, because the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) chairman's speech was more interesting for the things he avoided mentioning than for the things he said.

This judgment is not based on general criteria but it evolves from a comparison of the Irakleion speech to previous public appearances of the PASOK chairman which could not have been regarded by any stretch of the imagination as mild in tone or argumentation.

More specifically, in his Irakleion speech Papandreou clearly appeared to tone down his views on foreign policy and to shift the weight of his speech to the domestic situation, giving priority to the economic problems the government is facing.

It is indicative that in 24 typewritten pages [Papandreou] devoted only six pages to foreign policy and this not merely to criticize the way the government is handling foreign policy but also to reaffirm his party's support of the government's "opening to the East" and its attitude toward NATO. The only possible new element in his speech may be his demand for the government to withdraw "definitely and irrevocably" the application for the country's return to the military branch of NATO and to leave NATO completely.

By contrast, on the question of the EEC his erstwhile adamant objections were presented mostly in the form of "misgivings" while he avoided repeating his call for a referendum to reverse this historic decision of our country [to join the EEC].

Criticism and Assurances

Even in the sector of economic policy which absorbed the main part of Papandreu's critical comments covering five sixths of his speech, Papandreu spent a good deal of time repeating PASOK's pre-electoral promises and mainly giving reassuring promises as to the extent and depth of "socializations" [nationalization of industries] to be undertaken by his party when it comes to power. It must be noted that most of the sectors he mentioned (banks, mass transit, public utilities, etc.) have already been largely nationalized. In the same spirit, the PASOK leader found it expedient to praise private initiative which, he assured, "shall function without hindrance" under PASOK. Finally, it must be mentioned that Papandreu in his Irakleion speech avoided any call for speeding up an electoral confrontation.

In view of the foregoing evidence, one may wonder why the government reacted so vehemently to the Irakleion speech, claiming that the PASOK chairman "exceeded his worst excesses in groundless polemics, demagogic irresponsibility and contradictory demands."

The Government's Wrath

Speculation on the reasons which dictated the government's attitude centers on two arguments:

First: With the premier's visit to the Soviet Union and with the latest developments on the question of NATO and Greek-American relations, a significant change is also taking place in the domestic situation, a fact which allows the government to pass into a counter-offensive.

Second: The government sees a PASOK effort to expand not only into the political center but also into the conservative area. [The government] wants to push back this effort early, focusing on PASOK's views which separate it ideologically and politically from the more conservative masses of voters.

The KKE(Interior) Attitude

More analytically, with regard to the first supposition, there is no doubt that the visit to Moscow and the government's bold attitude on the question of NATO have neutralized a considerable part of the Left's argumentation about "the one-sided foreign policy," "the dependence of the Right" on the Western decision centers, etc., etc. Particularly as concerns KKE, many believe that the visit to Moscow is equal in significance to the party's legalization 5 years ago. In other words, the Greek-Soviet rapprochement creates for the Extreme Left party an overall climate of tolerance or even acceptance by the wider conservative strata as far as the reason for its existence is concerned. KKE must know that only the present premier or at least today's majority has the power to grant it

such a "certificate" of legitimacy. (Naturally this argument does not refer to KKE's party existence which emanates from the part of popular will it represents, but to the party's improved position in the political arena by reducing the reaction produced by its presence.) In this sense one may well speculate that KKE regards as being in its interest to keep during this period a certain tranquility in the country to allow Karamanlis to complete the opening to the East unhindered.

In a recent statement by KKE's Politbureau the party states that "it will support every action designed to utilize the great prospects opening up through the development of Greece's relations with the socialist countries." It further calls Karamanlis' visit to Moscow "a milestone in our country's international relations."

Objectives of PASOK

By contrast, PASOK does not expect partisan gains from the Greek-Soviet rapprochement, nor from the government's attitude toward NATO. Moreover, these two issues make it necessary for the major opposition party to readjust its tactics against the government. This is a change dictated also by the effort to expand the party's popular following particularly toward the area of the Center where until now PASOK's extreme views on foreign policy have had a negative response. It is certain that this retrenchment is, for this initial phase at least, carried out silently by not mentioning or slightly revising the initial positions.

At the same time, PASOK feels the need to fill the gaps left in the aggressive position in the sector of foreign policy, by intensifying its criticism on the domestic front. It has chosen the area of economic policy in particular where the government is especially sensitive because of the more general dangers inherent in a partisan exploitation of the present crisis. Nevertheless, the intensity PASOK intends to give in its criticism of the government's economic policy is not expected to exceed certain "safety limits" and endanger the silent truce which--according to certain assessments--was agreed upon by Karamanlis and Papandreu last Monday, thus ruling out the possibility of an early election. According to one viewpoint, the anger of the government's reply to the Irakleion speech may have been due to Karamanlis' impression that Papandreu had violated in Irakleion their understanding, however tentative it might have been. However, this partial interpretation notwithstanding, the government's aggressiveness shows up at a time when the majority party has no reason to maintain the climate of political tranquility by keeping up a defensive front--especially at the expense of its partisan interest.

The government having gained considerable ground in the area of foreign policy--according to existing indications--is now launching a counter-offensive against the major minority party on the entire political front. The objective of this policy is to prevent PASOK's expansion into the conservative area by pushing this party to return to its initial extreme ideological-political views. The main weapon in the hands of the government as it wages this battle is the previously enunciated but currently mentioned principles or views which place PASOK in the political area of the Marxist Left.

'KATHIMERINI' REPORTS NEW COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP FOR PASOK

AT151410 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 15 Nov 79 pp 1, 3 AT

[Text] PASOK is preparing for collective leadership by creating a coordinating council which will be exclusively responsible for leading the movement's parliamentary group and will also participate in laying down the movement's policy. Decision for establishment of the coordinating council to be chaired by A. Papandreou, was taken during yesterday's meeting of PASOK's parliamentary group on a proposal submitted by PASOK's parliamentary representative, Deputy I. Alevras. As stated by PASOK's chairman, A. Papandreou, the purpose of these changes is to prepare the party organizationally for the next elections.

A. Papandreou considers it possible that the right wing candidate for president, as he put it, will not concentrate the required majority, in which eventually elections will be declared after May.

Once again, however, Papandreou avoided taking a position on whether his party will or will not support K. Karamanlis as president of the republic. He also avoided taking any position on the question whether G. A. Mangakias and D. Tsatsos will join PASOK. PASOK reports, however, indicate that they are both rather acceptable to PASOK.

Papandreou himself referring to Mangakias and Tsatsos, stated that a decision of the executive office is being sought on the matter.

Members of the Committee [as published]

In reference to organizational changes Papandreou said that PASOK's parliamentary group will be divided into four smaller groups, two for each echelon of the Chamber of Deputies. One deputy, member of PASOK's Central Committee, will be appointed to head each one of the smaller groups. The coordinating council will be made up of A. Papandreou as chairman, the two parliamentary representatives of the movement, I. Alevras and I. Karalambopoulos, the director of the parliamentary group, P. Moralis who will be the only member who is not a deputy, and the four heads of the smaller groups. The latter have not yet been named.

Political observers view these organizational changes as an attempt to outmaneuver the party organizations of PASOK. The fact that yesterday's meeting of the parliamentary group was not attended by members of the executive office, who are not deputies, was particularly stressed. Until now such an absence was very rare.

Economic Affairs and NATO

At the beginning of the meeting PASOK's chairman analyzed, for the benefit of his deputies, the political situation as it now appears in the foreign relations sector as well as the country's economic situation. He referred to measures the movement must undertake when the people entrust it with the country's government. Characteristically Papandreou said:

"The universal people's gathering in Crete, at Iraklion, the large crowd and the strong feeling at the meeting, as well as the messages arriving from the rest of Greece demonstrate that PASOK's government will become a reality very soon."

Referring to the NATO issue Papandreou said that the Rogers proposals demonstrate that we are going from bad to worse and that we have reached the end. He then wondered "why the government still continues to fight."

CSO: 4908

NEW PARTY FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS CONVENED

Athens EPIKAIIRA in Greek 25 Oct 79 pp 48, 54

[Text] Under the shadow of Karamanlis--whose name was mentioned in every report or speech--and the actual leadership of K. Papakonstandinou, the First Regional Congress of the New Democracy Party met in Rio. Represented in the Congress were 10 nomes, that is, the entire Peloponnisos, Aitolokarnania, Zakynthos and Kefallinia. Approximately 500 delegates, 10 ministers, several deputy ministers and several high level administrators took part.

At this Congress the New Democracy officials tried, in accordance with the admonition of their leader, "to make the party viable following the departure of its founder." But the name of Karamanlis dominated every event. The delegates received Papakonstandinou as the venerated Nestor, gave a sympathetic reception to P. Papaligouras and listened carefully to the other speakers. Backstage the younger party members--many of them professional men--questioned the validity of the ministers and the necessity for a broadening of the government. On other matters:

K. Karamanlis: Only the New Democracy

In a message to the Congress, Karamanlis said: "Under the present conditions only the New Democracy can guarantee the country's political stability, social tranquility and progress."

He added, "You must not forget that by organizing our party in a way that will allow the active participation of our members and the expression of our ideological convictions, we will not only satisfy the people's sentiment, but also serve a basic need, the consolidation of our democratic institutions."

K. Papakonstandinou: The Nestor

The vice president received the respect of all delegates. Even the local requests of the Korinthians were submitted to him with deference. In his speech he underlined the responsibilities of the New Democracy as set by

the newly restored democracy in our country "for the consolidation, the protection, and the advancement of democracy." But he also spoke of the difficulties faced by the New Democracy: "The overthrow of democracy and the irresponsible exercise of power during the 7-year [dictatorship] having as a fateful consequence the critical national problems of the summer of 1974, had produced dramatic developments for our country. The international economic situation, having as a suitable background the policies of the [dictatorship], has added several more difficult and serious problems."

K. Stefanopoulos: Theoretician

The "hardliner," outspoken theoretician was especially soft-spoken and wise in his tone and gave his "battle" in the area of civil rights:

"Our opponents, not daring to speak out openly against democracy, create around it a deliberate confusion which eventually leads to a complete reversal [of reality]. They call democrats the open enemies of democracy and deny this title to its real partisans. For this reason, we must remind them that the foundations of the democratic parliamentary system which we uphold include political freedom and democratic institutions. In other words, [they include] above all the basic principle which requires the recognition and guarantee of civil rights. Without respect for the personality of the individual there can be no democracy."

P. Papaligouras: Always EEC

Humble, discreet, wearing his hearing aid but visibly rejuvenated, Papaligouras came to speak on his favorite subject, the European Economic Community:

"Our joining the European communities will give us the ability to exercise an infinitely more dynamic foreign policy than the one we could have if we were by ourselves. Our country's international prestige increases automatically since it is united in a network of arrangements with the nine [EEC] countries. The policy of the New Democracy toward the West European Community has been dictated by reason of geopolitics, economics, history and tradition."

Ath. Kanellopoulos: Finance

With greater ease than the traditional party leaders and without the complication of political origins, the minister of finance spoke at the Congress:

"The Greek economy, just as the world economy, is buffeted today by inflation and the energy crisis which are not political but national problems. Greece is working toward the utilization of domestic sources of energy. The effort to combat inflation requires not confrontation of the social groups but national cooperation. It requires a long-range program, a gradual

deregulation of interest rates and replacement of cost subsidies with the subsidy of specific financing. We must hold down expenditures, control wages and combat the inflationary psychology..."

G. Boutsos: Agriculture

Almost all the demands raised by the delegates were related to the Ministry of Agriculture. Boutsos, in addition to his formal speech, spent an entire afternoon responding to questions. He said:

"The basic targets of our farm policy in the 5-year 1974-78 period were: an increase in farm income, an improvement in living conditions, an increase in productivity to enable Greek agriculture--self-sufficient and modernized--to benefit from the new conditions created by our induction into EEC."

Kh. Stratos: The Administration

He was the main--if not the only--"counterweight" to the Peloponnesian sole domination of the Congress. He attracted great interest among the delegates. His speech was carefully listened to.

"One of the most important improvements necessary for the induction is the modernization of the organizational structure of Public Administration in general and more specifically the expansion of administrative decentralization which is the most basic condition for the success of our regional development policy."

G. Stamatidis: The Closing

He closed the Congress with these words: "Karamanlis has raised himself above the level of a party leader; with his policies, his flexibility and his parliamentarian stature, he has charted a course which will determine our national life for many decades."

G. Misailidis: The "Organizer"

The general secretary of the New Democracy, agile and conciliatory, gave in figures the progress of the party's organization: "Today there are 444 party committees and 105,000 members participated in the party's elections. The party's target is to complete the organizational effort with the setting up of local party cells in every housing settlement, in every village and city bloc..."

D. Tsigonis: The Voice of Youth

"The youth leader of the New Democracy is proud that the Youth Organization of the New Democracy with its autonomous organization has undertaken, side by side with the party, the responsibility of promoting the principles of the New Democracy among the young. Our voice has been heard and has made many young people ponder the issues."

STATISTICS ON ASPROPYRGOS REFINERY REPORTED

Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 23 Oct 79 p 7

[Text] The recent investment of 7,028,000 dollars for modernizing the Aspropyrgos refinery helped increase its daily refining capacity by 11 percent--from 105,000 to 117,000 barrels.

At a press conference yesterday Em. Voulgaris, chairman of the administration council of the state refinery, said that the results of modernizing the refinery's production installations were significant from the point of view of limiting the consumption of masut--a decrease by 1.6 percent or 90 tons--for the production of energy used by the refinery itself and from the point of view of sulfur dioxide content 40 percent of which is exhausted [into the atmosphere].

Voulgaris referred especially to the direct and indirect results of the state refinery modernization and pointed out that:

- a. The job was finished 18 days earlier than scheduled; it was finished, that is, on 23 July instead of on 10 August.
- b. The refinery remained idle 27 days and not 38 days as scheduled. This means an additional income of about 900,000 for the refinery and a supply market of about 150,000 tons of more products from the state refinery.
- c. The drop in the consumption of masut by the refinery itself is 1.6 percent of the processed crude oil instead of the anticipated 1.5 percent, or 90,000 instead of 75,000 tons annually. In other words, the consumption by the refinery itself dropped by 40 percent.
- d. The investment reached an amount of 7,028,000 dollars which includes the cost of the preliminary study and the expenses of our company's personnel involved in the project. In addition, the contractors are entitled, according to the agreement, to a bonus of 450,000 dollars for completing the project earlier than agreed thus saving fuel by a percentage not only greater than that agreed upon but also beyond the amount predicted by the study. The indirect results of the modernization were:

1. An increase in the distillery's daily capacity from 105,000 to 117,000 barrels, or more than 11 percent. This increase resulted from the fact that, following the improvements, the furnaces ceased to be the factor which limited the refinery's capacity and therefore contributed to increased refining even when working at less than full capacity. Thus, the refinery will henceforth be able to process 5.5 million tons of crude oil. Its previous record was 5 million tons in 1978. The tests are being continued and already the refinery's daily output is 120,000 barrels. Some small investments may be needed for a greater increase in the refinery's capacity at a safe level of operation for the equipment.

2. A decrease by 60 percent in the quantity of sulfur dioxide being exhausted into the atmosphere. This decrease reached 40 percent of the sulfur dioxide which was being exhausted before the improvements. This was achieved because the total decrease was in masut with the result that the fuel being used today is mostly gas which does not contain sulfur.

3. The refinery's automation was increased and its overall operation became simpler.

Voulgaris pointed out that with masut prices being what they are today the economic importance of the above results is as follows:

a. Against an investment of 7.5 million dollars by the company, the state is saving, on the basis of today's international prices, an amount more than 12.5 million dollars annually. In other words, the investment will be paid off in a period of about 7 months. The annual amount of 12.5 million dollars is saved of course as exchange.

b. The increase in capacity affords the state the possibility of supplying the needs of the domestic market by at least 500,000 tons more products beyond those presently supplied.

On the other hand, Voulgaris as well as refinery director Bikas said that in the context of the effort to maintain the refinery on competitive levels: a) New storage tanks are being constructed the first of which will be ready next month. The other two will be added the first quarter of 1980. Also, bids have been asked for 12 more storage tanks. b) The work on the 25 storage tanks in the Kalokhori, Salonica is proceeding well. The schedule calls for completion of the Northern Greece Storage and Distribution Center within 1981. c) The contracts will be signed soon for the Pakhi port project where tankers of 500,000 tons in capacity will be accommodated. This will reduce decisively the transportation cost of crude oil as well as the danger of polluting the sea. d) A number of other projects is under study for the modernization of the refinery's installations in order to increase its productivity and for the implementation of the most advanced methods for preventing environmental pollution.

BRIEFS

NATURAL GAS FROM ALGERIA--During yesterday's debate on energy policy, Coordination Minister Mitsotakis hinted "at dramatic oil price increases in 1980" by the National Energy Council. Among the measures which possibly may be adopted will be an increase in the price of electricity for those who consume large quantities. On the other hand, negotiations are being initiated with Algeria for long-term supply of natural gas for the purpose of replacing electricity for cooking and hot water heating. The Algerian natural gas will be channeled to Greece by a pipeline through Sicily, Italy. It will pass the Ionian channel via Kerkyra and will terminate in the Athens area where it will be distributed to gas consumers and industries. It was pointed out that the results of a study by an Italian company for the installation of a pipeline between Italy and Kerkyra are very encouraging. On the other hand, the negotiations with the Soviets on the supply of Soviet gas through Bulgaria are expected to be finalized within the framework of the 1981-1986 Soviet program. [Text] [Athens TA NEA in Greek 24 Oct 79 p 17 7520]

POTENTIAL CANDIDATE FOR DC SECRETARY FORLANI INTERVIEWED

Milan IL GIORNALE NUOVO in Italian 23 Oct 79 p 1

[Interview of Arnaldo Forlani by Francesco Damato: "GIORNALE's Exclusive Interview of One of the Most Authoritative Candidates To Succeed Zaccagnini: Forlani Talks About the New DC Secretary, the Government, and Relations With the Communists"; in Rome, 22 October]

[Text] What is important is not who the new party leader will be but what he will do. It is necessary to get out of the endless circling of factions, which has become the "only instrument of power." The ministerial coalition should include Socialists to be stable and durable. Scudo is allied with other parties in a crusade against the PCI.

Arnaldo Forlani has been mentioned by many people as being one of the strongest and most probable candidates for the secretaryship of the DC [Christian Democratic Party], Zaccagnini's post. Zaccagnini has announced that he does not wish to remain at the helm of the party, even if he is at the top of the list of candidates for the job when the congress is held at the end of January. But does Forlani really want to run for the secretaryship or is he waiting passively? By not forming a new government in the last crisis and by refusing to remain as foreign minister, was he really proposing to dedicate himself more or exclusively to the party? Or were those just polemical gestures against the political conduct of the Christian Democratic secretary?

These questions have been repeatedly asked in the DC, but when they have been addressed directly to him, Forlani has reacted coolly and indifferently. Yet he is not indifferent, because he is one of the protagonists of the debate in progress inside the party. "The problem," Forlani says, "is not the secretary or whether or not to run for the secretaryship. That is not the important thing. What is important is how to choose the secretary. I think this problem should concern all Christian Democrats, not just the possible candidates."

[Question] What does this mean? Is it a way of avoiding questions?

[Answer] No. I don't want to avoid any questions. How to choose the secretary means how to lead the party. This is an aspect of the more general problem that concerns this country, and not just our own: the so-called problem of governability

It is the problem of leadership and the conditions that allow the proper autonomy of leadership, in the democratic sense, of course.

[Question] Is this an allusion to the method of electing the secretary? Some seem to want to return the election to the National Council and take it away from the congress.

[Answer] This issue may also be included. At the previous congress I was in favor of changing the rules to allow the delegates to the congress to elect the secretary. Direct election may give the secretary an initiative and a capability in his leadership that are more detached from the conditions set by the various factions, because it limits their game-playing and influence

In the last few years, the organized blocs have not boiled down to a few main groups but have gotten together with all their defects and wheeling and dealing, and this is due to a lack of initiative and to scepticism. And that is serious, because the crisis is also a crisis of leadership, with the leadership lacking autonomy in fulfilling its duties. This does not concern the secretary alone, it is an observation concerning the whole leadership's level of awareness. From this standpoint, the party has grown old rather than renew itself, as was promised or hoped.

[Question] Maybe it is a consequence of the complexity of the political situation and the difficulty of singling out clear course to follow and, therefore, of the abundance of proposals.

[Answer] I'm afraid that's not it. Basically, the political divisions between us are less marked than they may appear or than people may think they are. For example, it is nonsense to think we are divided into supporters and opponents of confrontation with the Communist Party.

Confrontation is the rule of democracy; it springs from the pluralism of ideas and supposes the possibility of change and reform. It concerns all political forces. Rather, I have always sought more courage and greater initiative from the DC in confrontations with others, both the Communist and the other parties. But to have a tighter and more concrete confrontation with the others, we again need to hold discussions among ourselves, clarify ideas, and define a unified line and proposals on the various issues. This discussion among us is lacking, or it is being held in general terms that are insufficient in any case.

[Question] Some maintain that the policy of so-called national solidarity is to divide the DC blocs. as is the policy of cooperation with the Communist Party. Is this true?

[Answer] Here too we must be sure we understand each other. The words have become ambiguous. In March of last year, we all agreed on a common program, including the Communists, who were actually supporting the Andreotti government from the outside. True, there was confusion and resistance, but they were marginal. We all decided together, in parliamentary groups and in the leadership.

But this atypical majority no longer exists today. The Communists do not want it and have posed the problem in various terms. It is not easy to remake this kind of majority in terms of a government program, and we have to think of other solutions if we don't want to go into the elections all weak and confused. I, too, want national solidarity, that is, the maximum cohesion of society in defense of its institutions. But this has to be done on various levels without setting absolute and unilateral conditions on the formula for governing.

[Question] What might the government solution be?

[Answer] It should come out of the quest for the definition of a serious program. Once this agreement is reached, the formula that is possible should be adopted. I think a government coalition should also include the Socialists to guarantee conditions of stability and durability, but I don't exclude various other solutions: a more limited coalition with broader agreement. Things don't depend on us alone. As for me, even the present government would be all right if we succeeded in putting together resolute support with Republicans and Socialists, even if there had to be some integration.

The confrontation, then, with the Communists, is not, I repeat, conditioned strictly by the type of government possible. I think the parties that have been closer to a common conception of democracy should consider jointly the issue of Eurocommunism and its possible development. In any event, this confrontation must not become the seed of discord between Socialists and Christian Democrats.

[Question] Even if the debate on "national solidarity" can be solved, what is causing the climate of tension that evidently exists within the DC? Whence the tone of crusade that seems to characterize the relations between one bloc and another?

[Answer] Sometimes it is due to stupidity; in general, it is due to the degeneration of the blocs. That's the reason for it.

Let's go back to what we were talking about at first. The blocs have become only instruments of power. Political differences are often invented in order to give a decorous motive to differences of another kind. We are caught up in a contractualistic logic that neutralizes the possibility of leadership.

[Question] Doesn't this system have to be changed?

[Answer] Yes, but we want the concurrence of various groups.

[Question] Many think these groups will converge on Forlani.

[Answer] No, I don't think so. Anyway, I don't consider the personal aspect to be important. If we succeed in achieving a consensus going in the right direction, the rest will be secondary, because we won't lack for good candidates.

[Question] A lot of talk has been going around, even though it is whispered, about the possibility of an agreement between Andreotti, Piccoli, and the so-called "Zaccagnini area" concerning a secretaryship for Piccoli, Zaccagnini's returning to the presidency of the party, and Andreotti's waiting on the steps of the Chigi palace or some other palace. There's also been talk about Andreotti as secretary and Piccoli parked in the Council presidency. Is this talk well founded or not? Did you talk about it some days ago, in that four-way meeting between Andreotti, you, Piccoli, and Bisaglia, which the press referred to and which aroused such a hue and cry?

[Answer] It was nothing to make so much noise about. I also saw other friends. I happen to talk to somebody every day. There's nothing unusual in that.

[Question] How about those agreements? Have they been made or not?

[Answer] It doesn't look like it to me. However, I didn't get into these discussions with anybody. First, I said what I think about internal contractualism. With the friends that I saw at that time, there seems to me to be a common awareness of the complexity of the crisis. There are no simplistic solutions. We need a vast concurrence of wills and commitment.

[Question] What good might come out of the party congress?

[Answer] The congress is still a long way off. The internal confrontations have scarcely begun.

8782

CSO: 3104

CGIL LABOR LEADER ON ECONOMIC, POLITICAL SITUATION

Rome AVANTI in Italian 21-22 Oct 79 pp 1,24

[Interview with CGIL secretary Luciano Lama by Ugo Intini: "Labor Union Is Getting Bad Press"]

[Text] Approval of Craxi's proposal for major reform. Critical review. Right to strike and self-regulation. Economics and inflation. Problems of the future. We spent an hour interviewing Luciano Lama, secretary of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor]. It was very dialectical and frank on both sides--not as if all was going well, though, in the labor union movement and in the political class. Here, in summary, is the conversation.

[Question] Let us first of all talk about the debate that originated from the proposal floated by Craxi for a vast progressive alliance aimed at the construction of a grand reform; a proposal which starts from the observation that things cannot go on the way they are now and that it is necessary courageously to tackle the situation before everything falls apart.

[Answer] Today, 34 years after the Liberation and more than three decades after the Constitution entered into force, there is no doubt that some issues are being rehashed. I say "rehashed" because I am convinced that the basic aspects of the Constitution maintain their validity. But there are points that are being adapted to the current situation. One important point, for example, concerns the problem of worker participation in economic and social life; another involves the social function of property ownership, which is provided for in the Constitution, but which has not been implemented in Italy. I agree that we are moving toward a verification, a reexamination, and also some modification. As a union, we have been paying particular attention to specific problems which we often do not manage to solve. Some of them imply, if not a revision, then at least an interpretation of the Constitution. The pillars on which the republic

was built remain firm; after 30 years we can look back on our past experience and we can see what has to be done in order to take a step forward.

[Question] The union calls for a strategy of economic planning and profound reform in Italian society. But it has a rather shaky and a politically weak administration as a conversation partner. In this way the political crisis entails the risk of also becoming the crisis of the labor union because it makes it more difficult for the union seriously to tackle these problems with a conversation partner able to pull his own weight.

[Answer] We have to make do with what we have. This administration is perhaps the only one possible in the current situation and we must therefore consider it to be a full-fledged administration. Of course, we are aware of its weakness but we cannot redimension the policies of the labor union in proportion to the nature of the political framework within which we find ourselves. We will go forward, trying to tackle the problems, hoping that the political framework will in the future offer us better conditions. There is a relationship between political crises and the situation of the labor union. But I believe that the union will find itself in a much worse condition if it were to make its own choices dependent upon the political framework it faces.

[Question] Concerning relations between the labor unions and the political establishment, let us take a step backwards in the country's history. At the beginning of the sixties, the first center-left administration tried a policy of major reform, above all a policy of serious economic planning, which you today keep asking for so insistently. There is the impression that the labor unions at that time did not manage to seize an opportunity which in practice never came up again. Have you now worked out a critical review of that position?

[Answer] I believe that we have done so. I am convinced that, at that time, we displayed a rather visible degree of unpreparedness in dealing with the problem of economic planning. I also remember that, at the Bologna Congress we adopted an attitude different from what both of the historical parties of the left adopted. There is no doubt however that the labor unions as such at that time were not sufficiently mature on the problems of economic planning. Besides, the person who aimed for that system also made his mistake, considering economic planning as something excessively schematic and all-inclusive. Many people made mistakes and the labor unions made their mistakes.

[Question] Does a labor union feel better in a "partnership" society where conflicts are absorbed and settled by the political establishment, or in a society full of conflict, where a system of weights and counterweights, powers and counterpowers keeps open a dialectic between the social partners and none of them prevails definitely?

[Answer] Certainly, a free and autonomous labor union, such as we are (it seems to me, with concrete results, if you will), is better off in the second type of society rather than in the first one because the first type of society tends to reduce the autonomy of the social partners for the sake of certain principles, regardless of whether they are good or bad. The dialectic of social partners is a part of the pluralism which is indispensable. When you talk of pluralism in Italy, you are talking only about the pluralism of the party but you have to stress not only that. The autonomous organization of the social, cultural forces, of various gatherings manifesting themselves in society, can be sources of novelty and progress.

[Question] With these choices it is becoming increasingly evident that the Italian labor union has nothing in common with the labor unions of the countries of the East.

[Answer] Certainly. In the countries of Eastern Europe, the labor unions are an agency of the government. When those labor unionists tell us that their movement is strong, that it has power, they are not telling us any lie. The fact is that they are an element of the state, not a force expressed directly and autonomously by the workers in the factories. The difference between us and those unions therefore is great, not only today. It will be forever, if I may use that term.

[Question] Let us talk about the international labor union movement. How do you feel among the other labor unions? One of the strongest?

[Answer] The movement constituted by the three confederations considers itself to be strong. But we also consider ourselves to be quite different from the other western labor unions. This is a diversity which has nothing to do with the one I underscored earlier in connection with the countries of the East. But it does exist, for example, with regard to the assertion of autonomy with respect to the parties, which is a very peculiar feature of the Italian labor union movement. In West Germany or in Great Britain, relations with the party of the working class certainly are not relations of dependence and these relations have a certain air of nobility but they are close. In Italy, we have worked out different relationships and this is so not only because we have more than just one worker party in Italy.

[Question] This brings us to relations between the parties and the labor union in Italy. Is there something which the labor unions could reproach the parties for?

[Answer] This is an evolving relationship. There were years when relations, for example, between the CGIL and the worker party, were less clear, free, and independent than they are today. We have taken some very long strides forward. But I believe that the parties are having a certain

degree of difficulty in getting down to the specifics of things. As a labor union movement, we are at the very center of the concrete contradictions and problems of the country; we therefore have a keener sensitivity on that score. It seems to us that people are more willing to discuss grand programs rather than specific instruments for realistically solving concrete problems, one after the other. In this sense, we want to exercise pressure upon the political forces.

[Question] The parties are likewise exerting pressure, for their part, at this point, toward the labor union movements. They want the labor unions to go into the self-regulation of the right to strike because otherwise an irrepressible push in a conservative direction would spring up among public opinion and in parliament.

[Answer] The parties are correct when they ask the labor unions at last to implement a commitment which we undertook some time ago. If we have not yet followed through on it, this is due to real difficulties existing in the movement. But I would like to say that, while we are determined rapidly to approve standards of behavior governing the exercise of the right to strike in public services (and the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] is also in that position), the parties had better not yield to the temptation to arrive at a regulation of the right to strike in the public sector through law. We want to establish standards which would have political meaning within the labor union movement. For example, the streetcar workers in Rome, when it comes to going out on strike, may be called upon to decide the issue within the general council meeting of the United Roman Federation, where we have not only the streetcar workers but all the other worker categories and of course also the users of public service. In this way, you would have, not a ban on strikes, but a control, a filtering action on the part of the categories interested and involved in the particular service. A violation of the norm should imply penalties—but penalties of a political character concerning the union. They should not be penalties of a juridical character implemented by the state or by the individual entrepreneurs. This is also true because in Italy strikes constitute a form of struggle that has a mass character. Restrictive measures with a restrictive character would easily wind up becoming Manzonian cries.

[Question] The tax jungle entails the risk of increasingly becoming a matter of unpopularity and lack of credibility on the part of the leading political class but also the labor unions. Inflation furthermore levels off incomes, cutting the links between the labor unions and the middle classes as well as the technicians, an important link the moment, as you said often, you want to be the representative of the entire world of labor, not just the working class.

[Answer] Among all the bad things that inflation brings with it, there is also the fact that it makes the tax jungle worse. It is not true that very high incomes go down as a result of inflation while low incomes go up.

The effects of the traditional jungle are piled on top of those of inflation. The effects of inflation and the sliding scale apparently reduce the gaps between the nominal salary levels but there are either mechanisms of entrepreneur initiatives or automatic tax provisions which run the opposite direction. The problem exists and it is a big one. We cannot go forward in a situation where relations between the lowest worker pay and the salaries for the most qualified white-collar or technical employee is 1:2. This ratio is absurd and it is so absurd that, in the reality of the pay envelope, it does not exist in fact. This is why we are going to lose the representation of the professionally most highly qualified workers. Among wage earners likewise we must tackle the issue of proportional compensation in keeping with the professional skills of the workers. We did not make that policy and we are not making it now. The egalitarian policy had and still has its social strength and a validity of its own but it cannot intimidate or reduce professional remuneration to the point where it is no longer an incentive but discourages professional skill. This is a very delicate problem but we must realize that, if we keep going this way, we will in the end reduce the overall productivity of the system.

[Question] You certainly believe that the market economy is a necessary element in the economic process. But there are those who will charge you with having introduced elements of rigidity into the system so as to make the free-enterprise system here more formal rather than substantial.

[Answer] If we are talking about the possibility of fixing prices, of having an open international market, of using credit, and if we list the other basic rules of the free-enterprise system, it seems to me that all of those are being complied with. The existence of the sliding scale cannot be charged against anybody because, where you do not have an adequate system of wages in keeping with inflation, there will be others. The other evening, chancellor Schmidt, during the debate we had on TV, explained to us that the German labor unions each year negotiate the wage levels for the next year. We do that every three years and we can do it every three years because we have the automatic mechanism of the sliding scale. When it comes to retirement age, there are automatic mechanisms in Germany, Great Britain, and even in the United States, where even private pensions are indexed. But I must say that there are capitalist countries where price policy is much more controlled than in Italy.

[Question] The socialists have drafted a series of proposals for worker participation in industry management. From the Maidner Plan in Sweden, to the Bullock Plan in Great Britain, to co-management, now implemented in Germany, to self-management in Yugoslavia. You submitted a proposal to the CGIL for the so-called "enterprise plan," a proposal to the effect that a big outfit should simultaneously submit their plan to the labor unions and to the economic planning agency. You are thus moving--but in what direction--in the area of industrial democracy, are you?

[Answer] Yes, through a major contribution by the IRES, we are making an attempt at an Italian solution to the problem of participation. We tried to tie the problem of company policy control in with the problem of economic planning. Co-management is a system in which the workers in West Germany have their say on enterprise management but the link between enterprise policy and national or territorial economic planning policy is not achieved through co-management. We tried to tie those two factors together. The enterprises (the bigger ones) should present their economic and financial plans to the labor unions and to the economic planning agency. If there are points of understanding between the company and the labor union, these points are advocated together by both parties in dealing with the economic planning agencies.

[Question] Let us get back to inflation. Looking at the effort to fight inflation, from whom would you expect the most--an economist of the Friedman School, an economist of the Keynes School, and a bureaucrat of the Soviet GOSPLAN [State Planning Committee]?

[Answer] I will tell you frankly that we think very highly of economists and professors but, meaning no offense, the struggle of escape from the inflationary spiral is something I would not entrust to an economic professor. I would entrust it to responsible political forces, capable not only of drafting a theoretical scheme but mustering the resources and inclinations of the country's economic and social forces. We are at a moment of inflation which, we must not delude ourselves, we can get out of only through drafting policies aimed at cutting through the whole mess. We must move in many areas; productivity, labor market organization, progressive and not traumatic emersion of the submerged economy. Drastic measures and abrupt deflation policies entail the risk of causing more trouble than they would do good. They inflict injuries upon society which remain open for a long time.

[Question] The fact is that the Bank of Italy and the finance minister always, from the sixties until now, intervened, not as progressive liberals or moderates, but as conservative liberals, in other words, as Friedman teaches, always and exclusively using the instrument of the monetary maneuver. They never tried to reduce the demands--as Keynes suggested--also through tax measures.

[Answer] That is true. There are moments when there is a strong urge to act this way, such as when money reserves were reduced to almost nothing and we were a raid of bankruptcy. Today we are not in a similar situation. Today we have considerable reserves which we must not simply store up in the safes of the Bank of Italy but which we must use. Among other things, we are in a country where the people never seem to get enough. That leads to a tight money situation which causes unemployment and that in turn is inevitably followed by a welfare policy. And a billion spent on social welfare has an inflationary effect which is greater than the effect derived from 2 billions spent on investments.

[Question] The forecasts by economists are always very doubtful; nevertheless they all agree that automation during the next several years will cause a tremendous reduction in employment throughout the world. For the first time, computers will reduce not only manual labor but above all a certain type of clerical labor. How does the labor union view the future?

[Answer] Many things are going to have to change, not only in places of employment but in the lives of people. It is true that information science will reduce certain groups of clerical employees but it will also necessitate new types of employees. There are few fields of human activity in which "you beautify life" where job opportunities are created along with types of jobs which today are hardly conceivable. I therefore do not see any immediate threat. I would see them if we were not able to change ourselves in time and to adjust. The substitution, not of intelligence, but of certain intellectual faculties of man, with machines does eliminate jobs (but this almost always involves jobs that the young people of today do not like anyway). The overall result, the mathematical sum of changes, will have a positive sign in the end.

[Question] Economists are worried about employment. Sociologists, with ever greater insistence, bring up a new problem. They maintain that, with the constant rise in the level of education, it will become increasingly difficult to force a segment of the workers to do manual labor, especially repetitive, heavy, and unpleasant work. Today already there is a problem arising from "work rejection" also in a country such as Italy where we do have unemployment. Here it suffices to think of hundreds of thousands of foreign laborers in Italy. There are those who maintain the need --in long-range terms--of ending the clear division between manual and intellectual labor and discarding the principle of division of labor. Are these just phantasies for the labor union?

[Answer] We are in a period of transition. It is true that there is in Italy, today, on the one hand, a manpower supply for which there are no openings whereas, on the other hand, there is a demand that is not being met. The phenomenon is most obvious in the north and in the big cities, and less so in the south. As far as unwanted jobs are concerned, those are becoming less and less because even those jobs are now being replaced by automated processes. The labor union must commit itself to attempt at an organizational reform of certain types of jobs; for example, something was done regarding the operations of the assembly line. But there will be unpleasant work which has to be done and we are going to have to find somebody to do those jobs. You cannot force a person, for his whole life, to do unpleasant work, while ten other persons will never have to do that kind of work. That means that, for example, each of these people is going to have to do that unpleasant job for three years. This approach has already been adopted in some countries, including in some communist countries.

[Question] One last question. If I think of an imaginary diagram of the popularity of the labor union movement in Italy, I am a little bit pessimistic. What about you?

[Answer] There have been moments when our popularity was probably greater than our merits. There were moments when many thought, hoped, or feared (even without saying so) that the fate of the country was, I would not say, completely entrusted to but certainly abundantly placed in the hands of the labor unions. That was a mistaken opinion because none of the forces present in Italy, as I see it, can be or should be decisive. And because the parties are an architrave of national life, they provide guidance, prospects, they produce ideas, according to their fundamental characteristics. Nevertheless I believe that, right now, public opinion views us in a less favorable fashion than we would deserve. And this is almost always the case during difficult times. Today, as a matter of fact, the political parties likewise are judged in a less favorable manner than they would deserve. It is up to us to demonstrate that we deserve a better judgement.

5058

CSO: 3104

SMALL, MEDIUM-SIZED INDUSTRIES MOVING TO THE SOUTH

Milan IL GIORNALE NUOVO in Italian 20 Oct 79 p 16

[Article by Guido Compagna: "Businesses Are Increasing in the Southern Regions: Small and Medium-Sized Industries Are Moving to the South; Difficult Relations With Local Authorities; the Major Obstacles Come From the Regions and the Unions"]

[Text] Naples, 19 October--The bad news of Alfa Sud and Gioia Tauro is not all that is coming out of the South. According to a study by the Regional Federation of Industry in Emilia, small and medium-sized businesses are beginning to move from the North to the South. Meanwhile, signs of "indigenous" business undertakings are appearing in the South. In some areas, the so-called underground economy has actually produced veritable boomlets. The manufacturing of jeans makes some communities on the slopes of mount Vesuvius look like so many small Pratos.

On the occasion of the Levant Fair in Bari, Giancarlo Lizzeri, an authority on industrial policy, documented amply the trend of small and medium-sized private businesses to move to the South, where business is showing rather more vitality than in the past. The phenomenon is demonstrated by the increased consumption of energy, which has been much higher in the South in recent years.

True, it is a bit early for optimism, but the signs are interesting, and they were recently given a positive interpretation by the former minister of Industry, Romano Prodi. Using the Emilian businessmen's survey, Prodi singled out two main motives impelling small and medium-sized industry to move South: the necessity to move near to markets that are more favorable to their products, and, especially, the difficulty of finding labor in the North, since the internal emigration from South to North, which peaked in the 1950's, has almost run its course.

This second reason indeed shows what difficulties are met with in the North as opposed to the favorable conditions found or expected in the South, which determines the choice of businessmen to move there. Another fact confirms this consideration: 34 percent of the industries included in the Emilian businessmen's study did not request the incentives provided by the legislative act favoring investment in the South. The red tape is too burdensome and most often is only a waste of time. Prodi also observes that there is also a variance in the cost of

money, which is completely to the South's advantage, and a lack of information concerning the existence of businesses available for subcontracting.

However, notwithstanding these difficulties, 60 percent of the businesses that have gone south are making plans for expansion. Thus, private enterprise is clearly well-disposed to the South. For this very reason, it is time to remove the obstacles still facing industry in the South in order to take advantage of this favorable opportunity.

As concerns the incentives policy, greater automation is necessary, and by the very fact that procedures are being streamlined, the recent debate on Southern policy reached almost unanimous agreement.

On the other hand, relations between businessmen and local institutions are more complex and difficult. Regions, local government and unions in the South have not always been equal to their tasks. It is true that they have recently been increasingly critical of social assistance as a sign of centralized government, but in fact few have tried to overcome these old methods, and many have attempted to manage these affairs as they always have. Yet, while they are not in a position to supply necessary information to businesses willing to invest, local government representatives want them to give all kinds of information, if only to insist, sometimes patronizingly, on the placement of investment and investment contract conditions, to boot.

The South will risk losing another chance if it does not overcome these old ways or only these old temptations. Here too, we should not succumb to facile optimism. The industries that are coming in from the North and the signs of private enterprise occurring in the South are positive signs, but they do not mean that the South's illness is being cured. The new doctors from the North (the businessmen) may continue the treatment provided they are not hampered by the administrators of the hospital where therapy is being undertaken (regions, local government, and the unions). The latter must give the doctors the necessary instruments and not seek to influence the course of treatment. Everyone's goal ought to be to cure the ailing South.

The South has often been said to need a modern industrial culture. This is an objective that can be reached with everyone's help, provided everybody does his part. In past years, Northern businessmen did not help and turned a deaf ear to Southern pleas. Now that something is coming from the North and times are harder, it is the South's turn to show that it is equal to the occasion.

8782

CSO: 3104

CONTACTS WITH PLO ACTUAL, NOT OFFICIAL

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 6 Nov 79 pp 5, 6

[Text] The Hague, November 6--Foreign Minister Chris van der Klaauw said here yesterday the Netherlands was not shunning actual contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) but would avoid official contacts.

He told the Second Chamber's standing Committee for Foreign Affairs that official contacts were inadvisable as they would endanger 'our good relations with Israel' which are making it possible for Holland to talk with Israel.

Dr Van der Klaauw emphasised that in such actual contacts--'our diplomats are running into PLO people in the Middle East'--it was not a question of negotiations, but of giving information and seeking explanations.

He said such contacts could be useful.

The minister stated that the PLO fulfilled a certain role as 'a mouthpiece.' The PLO was in fact the main mouthpiece of Palestinian desires,

Transformation

The PLO was 'more or less developing' from a terrorist organisation into a more politically-oriented organisation which was seeking political recognition and acceptance as a discussion partner.

The minister reserved judgment on a motion submitted by former Foreign Affairs State Secretary Laurens Brinkhorst (D'66), calling on the Government no longer to shun actual contacts with the PLO aimed at removing anti-Israel provisions from the PLO charter among other things.

Actual contacts with the PLO have hitherto been confined to matters relating to Holland's participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the Euro-Arab dialogue.

The Netherlands has so far referred only to the right of the Palestinians to determine their own future within the framework of a comprehensive peace settlement, but has carefully avoided the words 'right to self-determination.'

Dr Van der Klaauw told the committee last night he agreed with his West German opposite number, Mr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who had spoken in the United Nations' General Assembly of 'the right to self-determination.'

Criticism of Israel

The Netherlands, according to Dr Van der Klaauw, was 'highly critical' of Israel's policy, particularly its settlement policy and its retaliatory activities, and was encouraging Israel to include the 'Palestinian component' in negotiations over the Camp David accords.

The Palestinians were to join negotiations on a comprehensive peace settlement 'as equal partners,' but they (the Palestinians) should accept in advance Israel's right to exist and like Israel they should accept a solution to the Palestinian question.

He felt negotiations could not get under way for as long as the Palestinians did not recognise Israel's right to exist.

The Palestinians themselves should decide on the form of their future state within the framework of the peace talks, but such a state had to be 'viable,' he added.

Observers said the minister's remark was probably linked with doubts expressed by his predecessor, Mr Max van der Stoep, about the viability of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan.

The minister reserved an opinion on a remark by his Belgian opposite number, Mr Henri Simonet, that the statement by the nine EEC countries that 'an end must come to the territorial occupation which Israel has maintained since 1967' also related to East Jerusalem.

The Nine, according to Dr Van der Klaauw, have never recognised the annexation of East Jerusalem after the 1967 Six-Day War, but in a joint declaration made to the United Nations at the end of September the question of Jerusalem was not mentioned separately.

CSO: 3120

CONTRIBUTION TO NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 6 Nov 79 p 10

[Text] The Hague, November 6--The Netherlands is making a constructive contribution to preparations for a new round of the North-South Dialogue on a new international economic order, Foreign Minister Chris van der Klaauw said here last night.

But it will not decide on joining the talks until the so-called 'Committee of the Whole' (a U.N. committee of all member states) has resolved how the conference would be held and what subjects would be discussed, he told the Second Chamber's Foreign Affairs Committee.

The minister rejected criticism by former Development Cooperation Minister Jan Pronk that the Netherlands was adopting a 'reticent' stance towards the conference.

The Government was asked in a widely-backed motion sponsored by Mrs Suzanne Bischoff van Heemskerk (D'66) to adopt a positive stand towards the dialogue and to do its utmost to bring it to a successful conclusion.

The motion was supported by the Christian Democrats, Labour and the Liberal VVD parties.

According to Mr Van der Klaauw the developing countries themselves were not certain yet how the dialogue was to be conducted.

He said that in the view of the Dutch Government it should be held 'close to the U.N. General Assembly' using such specialised organs as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

CSO: 3120

DUTCH-NETHERLANDS ANTILLES LEADERS CONDUCT AID TALKS

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 29 Oct 79 pp 3, 4

[Text] Amsterdam, October 29--Premier Pourier of the Netherlands Antilles and Premier-elect Don Martina flew in here over the weekend for talks with the Dutch Government which has threatened to cut its aid to the Caribbean nation.

Mr Martina was accompanied by Aruban leader Betico Croes when he flew in on Saturday. Mr Pourier arrived on Sunday to a welcome of Antilles Affairs Minister Fons van der Stee and Realm Cabinet Minister E. Maduro.

The three leaders were invited by the Dutch Government for talks on Holland's policy towards their six-island nation.

It follows a letter in which Mr Van der Stee warned the Antillians that the Netherlands might cut back or even halt its financial and technical aid if the Antilles do not change its policy.

Mr Pourier told newsmen at the airport here that change had already been set in motion. His interim Government had given a first impulse and the new Government of Mr Don Martina, which will take office on November 21, would carry it on.

This was clear, among others, by the fact that three of the five Ministers of his interim Cabinet would return in the new Government.

They are Mr Marco de Castro (Finance), Mr Jacques Veeris (Education, Culture and Sports) and Mr Chenco Yarzagaray (Economic Affairs).

The main policy change was that unlike the previous government his interim government and the Don Martina administration regarded development aid as complimentary to the Antilles own efforts.

'The Antilles are a fully-fledged state. We will only seek aid when it is indispensable. We must prevent people from saying: 'Here are those beggars again,' he added.

Mr Pourier went on to say that like all developing countries the Antilles had its balance of payments problems. But he said Mr Van der Stee had promised support during his recent visit.

He saw an improvement in the investment climate as the best solution to his country's problems.

As an example he cited tax exemption for certain companies and a more flexible rental policy.

The infrastructure in the services sector had to be improved and his interim government had already made a start on this.

Mr Pourier will not return in the new government. He said he needed a rest after 17 years of active politics but was not saying farewell to politics.

CSO: 3120

BRIEFS

DUTCH-ISRAEL AID--The Hague, November 6--The Netherlands will expand its contribution next year to joint development activities with Israel in third countries from 6.5 to 7.5 million guilders, a Development Cooperation Ministry spokesman said here today. He said this was agreed by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Dutch Development Cooperation Minister Jan de Koning, who is currently visiting Israel. The spokesman said the aid was specifically meant for developing countries in South America, where Israeli experts are trying to make arid farming land fertile. The Netherlands will contribute financially. Dr De Koning and Mr Begin further agreed to hold a symposium in Israel next year to take stock of the experiences of their joint aid efforts since 1975. The symposium will also see how cooperation between the two countries in this area can best be continued. [Text] [The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 6 Nov 79 p 6]

VIEWS ON USSR ARMS--Amsterdam, November 7--Nearly three out of every four Dutchmen are either convinced or think it likely that the Soviet Union is strengthening the arms it can turn against Western Europe, according to an opinion survey, published here today. The survey, held by the Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion (NIPO), showed that 26 per cent of the people are convinced and that 47 per cent consider it likely. Sixty-two per cent of a representative group of 1,082 people questioned think the Soviet Union is upgrading its nuclear arms aimed at Western Europe. A split-up according to political sympathies reveals few differences. Sixty-one per cent of CDA voters, 62 per cent of the Labour voters, 68 per cent of D'66 voters and 73 per cent of the Liberal VVD voters believe the Soviet Union is improving its nuclear force aimed at Western Europe. [Text] [The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 8 Nov 79 p 6]

CSO: 3120

UDP PRESENTS ELECTORAL PLATFORM

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 30 Oct 79 p 3

[Text] "UDP [Popular Democratic Union] is the only alternative which truly defends the people's interests, which has never been disloyal to their struggles and which is not committed to any unpopular measure." These were the comments with which the UDP leaders presented the electoral platform yesterday for that party, which is running in all the electoral contests on the continent, in the islands and among the emigrants.

Criticizing a vote for the PS [Socialist Party], the Democratic Alliance or the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], UDP summarized its platform in 25 points, preeminent among which are: "repeal of the Barreto Law, suspension of the agreements with the IMF and of the negotiations on membership in the Common Market, enforcement of the Law on Rural Leasing and abolishment of the colony systems, collective bargaining and trade union liberty."

It also upholds the suspension of the commitments assumed with NATO, and expresses opposition to the purchase of nuclear powerplants. It calls for a freeze on housing rents, repeal of the "landlords' law," a ban on evacuation, and a reactivation of the SAAL [expansion unknown] and of the housing cooperatives.

The implementation of the National Health Service and the payment of dues to social security by management and the state are other points in the UDP's electoral platform, which also cites the need to "put an end to the obstacles posed by management to the negotiating of collective contracts, insuring the application thereof in the islands and banning term contracts and collective layoffs," among other things.

Another part of the platform is a guarantee that a UDP will insure women's right to equal pay for equal work, also improving maternity care and creating a system of child care facilities.

For the youth, the UDP upholds the right to the first job, the abolishment of wage discrimination, free school transportation, the elimination of preparatory instruction and of the "numerus clausus" [limited number], as well as an overall improvement in the cost of education.

lastly, the UDP wants the reinstatement of the April military, the release of the antifascist prisoners and "respect for the Constitution, opposition to the violation of its principles and opposition to the imposing of an illegal referendum which is aimed at mutilating it."

The electoral platform was submitted by Major Tome, Manuel Monteiro and Jose Carlos who are, respectively, the individuals heading the ticket for Lisbon, Setubal and Leiria; and also by Luis Costa and Francisco Rosa, from the PCP (R [Reformed]) and the Lisbon Standing Committee. They claimed that the UDP is in a position to form a parliamentary group, and will elect at least five deputies.

2909

CSO: 3101

MDP/CDE PRESENTS ELECTORAL MANIFESTO

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 30 Oct 79 p 3

[Text] The Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission (MDP/CDE) calls for a "peaceful transition toward a socialist democracy," and a "policy which will coordinate the state sector of the economy with the private and cooperative sectors and that of the firms managed by the workers."

This statement of principles is included in the Electoral Manifesto made public yesterday by the MDP-CDE at a press conference, which also advocates Portugal's integration into a new international economic order, deeming respect for democratic legality and balance in the organs of sovereignty essential to political and social stability.

This organization, which will have 40 candidates on the APU [United People's Alliance] tickets, repudiates violent confrontations and increased polarization which "jeopardize the citizens' security and the stability of the democratic institutions;" and it calls for a "spirit of tolerance and understanding for mutual positions as a means of resolving the conflicts and differences among democratic political forces."

Moreover, it is of the opinion that, "The right wing cannot solve any of the major national problems and it is politically and technically incapable of running the country in the framework of the new economic, social and political realities which April created."

Among the general lines of its future parliamentary action, which will be carried out independently with respect to the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], its partner in the APU electoral coalition, the Portuguese Democratic Movement emphasizes "respect for private property concurrently with the social appropriation of the principle means of production," and the "progressive decentralization of authority in all parts of the country."

That group is also concerned about the role of the rank and file popular organizations, an improvement in the quality of life and "combating all of the government's authoritarian repressive methods and the use of violence." Insofar as foreign policy is concerned, the MDP upholds national independence, a battle against all foreign interference and the implementation of a nonalignment policy.

2909

CSO: 3101

PDC HOPES TO AFFECT LEFTIST MAJORITY LOSSES

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 31 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] The electoral manifesto of the PDC [Party of Christian Democracy], made public yesterday at a press conference by its secretary-general, Santos Ferreira, stated that the PDC would participate in the forthcoming elections "with a gamut of anti-Marxist and deeply anti-communist options," and that one of its main objectives was "to preclude a new leftist majority in Parliament."

Claiming to be a party of "Christian inspiration," the PDC proposes, specifically, to "apply the Christian social doctrine, and the policy of social justice, through vanguard action."

The manifesto stresses the fact that the PDC tickets "do not offer candidates who are committed to previous parliamentary maneuvers aimed at bringing about either dubious government coalitions with Marxist-Socialists, or behind-the-scenes agreements with Communists."

Furthermore, the PDC lays the blame for its not being included in the Democratic Alliance "on the parties which comprise it," and, in this regard, it expresses the view that, "by taking in the reformers, the Alliance would make a potential participation by the PDC questionable from the standpoint of political coherence."

The PDC is running in all the electoral contests on the continent, with the exception of that in Coimbra; and it has not submitted slates of candidates in Madeira or the Azores, because it is of the opinion that "it is not necessary to oust any leftist majority there." The PDC tickets were open to "right wing independents" (Manuel Murias, Gilberto Santos e Castro and Antonio Lopes Ribeiro, among others), and "liberal independents" (namely, Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo and Luis Arouca).

Speaking at the press conference, Pinheiro de Azevedo cited his status as "an impartial witness to the revolutionary process," as one of the reasons for his candidacy. Describing the PDC as "the legitimate heir of the idealism of the democratic Christian spirit of the heroes who made Portugal,"

Pinheiro de Azevedo also stated that he had "the qualifications required by logic to replace one of those who have not fulfilled their obligation in Parliament," in view of the necessity for "changing the political group so as not to commit the same mistakes."

At the press conference, it was also announced that the PDC would run in the elections for the local governments in certain districts, namely, Santarem, Lisbon, Braganca, Vila Real, Viseu and Faro.

2909

CSO: 3101

PCP SENDS GREETINGS TO PERUVIAN COUNTERPART

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 31 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] Dear Comrades,

The Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party [PCP] extends a heartfelt and fraternal greeting to the Seventh Congress of the Peruvian Communist Party and, through its delegates, to all the Communists, the working class and the workers of Peru.

The Portuguese Communists have observed with special interest and a spirit of solidarity the struggle waged by their Peruvian comrades in defense of the interests of the working class and the popular masses.

The revolutionary process begun in 1968 and the revolutionary transformations achieved up until 1975 (specifically, the nationalization of key sectors of the economy and agrarian reform) have evoked great interest in Portugal, and have been met with great joy by the working class and the workers in our country.

The Portuguese Communists, intent upon defending the conquests made by the April revolution, are in a good position to assess the importance and significance of the economic and social changes achieved by the Peruvian people, and feel closely allied with the workers' struggle to prevent their destruction.

The PCP expresses to you its active solidarity in the struggle that you are waging in defense of the interests of the working class and the popular masses; against the increased cost of living, unemployment and other consequences of the policy of submitting to the dictates of imperialism, especially of the IMF; against the government policy favoring the right wing parties and the intentions of the internal reactionaries and international imperialists; against the antipopular legislation and the repression of the labor and trade union movement; and on behalf of truly free elections representing the democratic and progressive sentiments of the Peruvian working people.

In Portugal, the Communists are battling on behalf of the conquests made by the revolution of 25 April 1974, against the policy of capitalist, land-owning and imperialist recovery of successive governments and on behalf of a democratic government and policy which will uphold the Constitution and the progress toward socialism that is set forth therein. Despite over 3 years of offensive by the internal reactionary forces and the forces of imperialism, the great conquests made by the Portuguese revolution are still in effect, bravely defended by a powerful movement of the popular masses, in which the working class and the trade union movement united in the CGTP-IN [General Federation of Portuguese Workers/National Intersindical] are the main stronghold, and in which the PCP has played a decisive role. We are confident that, in the forthcoming December elections, the reactionaries will be defeated again and a democratic majority consisting specifically of Communists and Socialists will be elected. To convert this numerical majority into an actual political majority is a fundamental goal in our party's struggle.

Dear Comrades,

The Seventh Congress of the Peruvian Communist Party is taking place at a particularly difficult time, wherein the forces of internal reaction and imperialism are attempting to impose their antinational, antipopular policy, and do not hesitate to resort to repression in order to crush the courageous struggle of the Communists, the working class and the people of Peru. But, it is taking place under conditions wherein the liberation struggle of the peoples of the world is experiencing new success, as demonstrated by the revolution in Nicaragua, and also by the progress of the situation in other Latin American countries in which the fascist and reactionary dictatorships are collapsing when confronted by the struggle of the masses and the force of international solidarity.

The recent campaigns of provocation against socialist Cuba and the plans to install new weapons of mass destruction in NATO countries are examples of the extremely serious threats to the peace, security and independence of peoples posed by the rash policy of certain imperialist circles. Under such circumstances, it has become even more necessary and indispensable to reinforce the united action of all the anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces and, in particular, the unity of the international communist movement, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The PCP will not spare any efforts in the struggle on behalf of these objectives.

Dear Comrades,

The convening of the Seventh Congress of the Peruvian Communist Party is an important event in the lives of Peruvian Communists, and of the working class and workers of Peru. We are certain that it will contribute to new, important success for your party in its efforts to unite the working masses and progressive forces of Peru in the defense of the conquests made in the struggle for democracy, national independence and socialism.

Reaffirming to you the combative solidarity of Portuguese Communists, we express the wish that the bonds of friendship and solidarity that exist between the Portuguese Communist Party and the Peruvian Communist Party will become even more intensified.

Long live the Seventh Congress of the Peruvian Communist Party!

Long live Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism!

The Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party.

2909

CSO: 3101

EANES CRITICIZED FOR ALLEGED CLOSENESS TO PCP

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 6 Oct 79 p 5

[Commentary by Peixe Dias]

[Text] Serious, sober, ponderous and grave--Eanes is doing his job. He is carrying out to the letter the grim testament that Costa Gomes ominously, deliberately, and calculatingly left to him: he is carrying out the strategic plans of the CP, which on the third day strategically and designedly catapulted him to heaven in the third phase--on 25 November--of the placing of puppets that was also maneuvered on 28 September and 11 March. The fruit was not ripe--it was necessary to decapitate an extreme leftwing that was too active and anarchizing, calm the large middle-class bloc that still had a bank balance, and choose someone with no experience or political education but with an image of being "serious and independent"--even if he was unable to breathe without an iron lung--and there for the purpose were the trusted men, the advisers, the counselors, the sacristans, the gray eminences, the Marxist constitution, and the votes of the "leftist majority."

When the Portuguese people now display disillusionment with Eanes and accuse him of not having done his job as promised, they are committing an injustice, or better, they do not understand the obvious ambiguity of the tragic times in which we live: Eanes said he would do his job, but he never explained what sort of job he was committed to doing. The fact is that he was committed to carrying out the Marxizing of Portuguese life as clearly and expressly set forth in the constitution--which, as he promised, he defends tooth and nail, since he has neither the head nor the talent for realizing that it is that constitution "against nature"--an anti-Portuguese constitution in the sense that it does not correspond to the will of the great majority of the Portuguese, has its roots in foreign oil, and is written in the Cyrillic alphabet--that is the essence of our misfortune: a misfortune proven in the difficulties of everyday life, in the erosion of social customs, in triumphant libertinism, in the humiliations to which we are subjected by our foreign creditors, and in the mediocrity of the "original path" that has replaced our historical course. To all of this Ramalho Eanes is faithful: in all of this he is "keeping his promise."

Grave, ponderous, sober, and serious--Eanes has, in short, done his job. He respects the constitution and receives, with the mechanical coldness of a bootleg watch, the representatives of the parties represented in the Assembly of the Republic (that semicircle, that microcosm of our folly, that delayed corpse of our political death). He listens to the advisers from the organization which is, so to speak, the Central Committee, bought at a very high price, of the 1 million unemployed Portuguese living off of odd jobs, relatives, and friends--and the constitution. And he forms governments, dismisses governments, and forms new governments for an unlimited time, for a limited time, or for 100 days. And always with a serious, sober, ponderous, and grave air.

From north to south in this country, but especially in the Castelo Branco District, an immense and tremendous wave of disenchantment and disillusionment is rising from the rank and file (as it is called) to the top--that is, from the people to the president. There is a lesson to be drawn from this, and it is that nobody, regardless of who he is, must ever be given a blank check. The Portuguese people gave Ramalho Eanes a blank check--at a particularly difficult time, to be sure, in which they had no alternative. The candidate had a serious and sober air and he made promises--and today we know what those promises were. But it is in times of great misfortune and in the more difficult hours that the mettle of a man--or of a people--is tested. And let the lesson be learned: it is not enough to be serious and sober, have a grave and ponderous air, and pronounce the word "Portuguese" with emphasis to be president of the republic or even of a state reduced to the status of a Third-World backyard--the state to which they have brought us.

A crisis is no more than a crisis. All we have to do is open our eyes to continue into the future fulfilling the destinies of a nation that is almost a thousand years old and of a people that gave the world new worlds. A people that will awaken from its derangement and know how to be worthy in the future of the glories of its past.

11798

CSO: 3101

PROENCA DE CARVALHO SEES NEED FOR DEFINING POLITICAL MODEL

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 1 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] "I consider it necessary to overcome the shortages first--to meet the basic needs--and then to choose the models of society in which we want to live." (Ramalho Eanes to O COMERCIO DO PORTO.)

What would the president of the republic say if a general were to exhort his troops before the battle in these terms:

"First we must win the battle and then choose the strategy to be used."

In principle, of course, every political action is intended to result in social well-being.

From that standpoint, no difference will be found between the communist and liberal models of society. Both justify themselves with the common objective of meeting the population's basic needs and thus contributing to the happiness of individuals.

What differentiates them is precisely their choice of means for achieving those goals. And it is those means as a whole which, for that matter, characterize all the different "models of society" adopted.

The president of the republic also said in the same interview:

"A hungry man does not want to discuss the model of society. He wants to find a job.

"A citizen without a house does not want to discuss the model of society. He wants a roof put over his head."

Those are irrefutable truths.

The political question consists, however, of deciding how--by what means--maximum employment and housing for all are to be achieved.

A Communist will answer that those objectives will be achieved by the dictatorship of the proletariat, collectivization of the means of production, and economic and social planning.

Socialists, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Liberals, and so on will each give considerably different answers to the same question.

The possibility that the various proposals might be put to a vote and freely discussed, with the citizens being responsible for choosing between them, constitutes precisely one of the main characteristics of pluralist democracy.

The minimum that must be required of political leaders is that they indicate with due clarity which means and processes they intend to use to satisfy social and individual needs.

In post-25 April Portugal, the hybrid economic-social model resulting from the revolutionary disturbances--rather than from the people's will as freely expressed in an uncoerced vote--perhaps bears primary and major responsibility for the boggy situation in which we find ourselves, one in which the basic needs in question are waiting to be met or are even being made worse in some areas.

Hybridism, in which the state resulting from the communist "victories"--nationalizations, excessive interference with economic life, social indiscipline, labor laws incompatible with a minimum of control by businessmen, collectivist agrarian reform, and so on--has thrown its paralyzing tentacles around individual and national activity without, however, achieving the degree of collectivization and planning which characterizes the economy of countries following the communist model.

It is a hybridism which generates insecurity and a loss of motivation in private enterprise, stimulates inefficiency and corruption in the state apparatus and the public business sector, encourages the "wildcat capitalism" of speculators, and thereby promotes unemployment, inflation, dependence on others, and social needs.

The upcoming elections can undoubtedly help to eliminate that hybridism--in other words, it can help to clarify the political will of the voters. It would be an important step if such a clarification occurred. Because of that, those who belittle the significance of the vote, those who use a language of pious vague intentions in speaking to the underprivileged, and those who avoid explaining straight out what their choices are among the various known means--"models of society"--for resolving the difficulties we are experiencing may try to impose personal models for gaining power, but they certainly are not serving democracy and the progress of the nation.

COMMENTARY ATTEMPTS TO ANALYZE NATION'S POLITICAL INTRIGUES

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 20 Oct 79 pp 2, 3

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa: "From Eanes' Reelection-Strategy to the Beginning of the End"]

[Text] 1. The Concerns of Some Members of the Council of the Revolution

Owing to its unexpected nature and the context into which it fits, the brief televised speech made by Vitor Alves, member of the Council of the Revolution, concerning false reports circulated by several news media on the topic of the organs of sovereignty deserves a careful analysis of both its content and the implications that it entails.

In the first place, it expresses in an exemplary fashion the concern of several members of the Council of the Revolution, as well as of the government, over the status of the Portuguese news media. Generally speaking (and even though the statement is made in a veiled manner), they are regarded as being overly polarized toward the right, and aimed in particular against the president of the republic, the Council of the Revolution and the government of Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo.

Secondly, the remarks delivered by Council member Vitor Alves were clearly intended to soft-pedal the matter of the division that exists within the government, in a way which would make it possible to dispel the notion that Finance Minister Sousa Franco holds a political position different from that of the other members of the government, starting with the prime minister herself.

Thirdly, this speech in itself represents the rekindling of a somewhat active role for the Council of the Revolution, or at least some of its members, at a time when the preelectoral atmosphere marked by bipolarization (with emotional qualities) has begun to become very clearly apparent.

2. Restoring Balance to the News Situation

Each of these three dimensions of Council member Vitor Alves' speech has its more or less short-term objective political implications. And we call them

objective implications because we readily admit the question of an accurate understanding (and the dissemination thereof) of the ideas underlying the comments which were televised and broadcast by radio, and were reported by the press.

First of all, the concern voiced about the current news situation, which Prime Minister Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo also expressed in moderate terms during her quasi-interview published today by EXPRESSO, will surely not fail to have its effects.

The case of Francisco Sousa Tavares may not have any connection with this concern, simply because, if it did, it would be "scotched" at the time and in the manner selected by its initiator. But the fact is that we can expect the members of the Council of the Revolution and the government in particular, who view the present status of the news media in our country with such great concern, to move from concern to action. Hence, it behooves us to follow carefully the manner in which Belem, Restelo and Sao Bento will arrive at the most effective, most prompt and most painless way of restoring balance to the nationalized television, radio and press.

It is a combined concern and action that we might describe as compensation to the left for the informational influence of the Portuguese center and right on the private news media.

3. Counting on the Second Pintasilgo Government in January

Secondly, the intention of proving the unity of the government cannot be isolated from the more vital intention, consisting of the possibility of its continuing, in a remodeled form, after the parliamentary elections in December, in the event that the Democratic Alliance does not win an absolute majority.

On the one hand, the prime minister herself, in a quasi-interview printed today, declined to answer directly a question which was asked of her unequivocally, as to whether she would request her release immediately after the general counting of the election results. On the other hand, one can readily discern how the efforts on the part of members of the Council of the Revolution and sectors of it allied with the PS [Socialist Party] will be multiplying to have the latter accept and realize the feasibility of counting on a new Pintasilgo government in January, if the Democratic Alliance's plan for a majority should fail.

In his recent statements, Mario Soares has wavered between "winking" at a new remodeled Pintasilgo government (which would please the aforementioned independent leftist sectors) and proposing an alliance with the PSD [Social Democratic Party] after the elections, if the latter were then willing to abandon the Alliance (with the purpose of dividing and disorienting the Democratic Alliance).

In any event, the goal toward which Council member Vitor Alves' remarks were directed, which quite understandably is that of counting on the continuation of the Pintasilgo government experiment, in an attempt to create a bridge between it and the Socialist Party, is still valid.

It is a combination of concern and action that we might describe as a continuation of a Pintasilgo government, with its parliamentary support reinforced by the Socialist Party and the ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Association] (this perhaps being the reason for Vitor Alves' many kindly references to Sousa Franco).

4. Starting to Plan for Eanes' Reelection

Thirdly, the rekindling of public intervention on the part of some members of the Council of the Revolution means that they feel that they should start now to take action for planning the critical year of 1980.

There is a very obvious logic in the behavior of a certain sector of the Council of the Revolution.

That logic has started with a concern for the results of the next parliamentary elections, a concern that has been expressed in the hope that the Democratic Alliance will not win the elections by an absolute majority; but it has also been expressed in the desire that the restoration of balance to the Portuguese news media will itself foster the objective conditions whereby they would become incorporated into the electoral process and the corresponding results.

The second step in that same logic is the maintenance of the Pintasilgo government with a more intensive association with the Socialist Party.

As a third step, the same political logic demands a steadfast wager on President Ramalho Eanes' running again as a candidate.

5. An International Conference: Prestige Abroad

Now this running again as a candidate is based, in principle, not only on the supposition of the Democratic Alliance's victory in the December elections, but also on the reinforcement of the president's international image and the recovery of his image at home, and a rapprochement with the PS.

Since events do not result from chance, next week in Lisbon, a seminar will be held on "The New International Economic Order," sponsored by the president of the republic and with the decisive intervention of Melo Antunes, member of the Council of the Revolution. It will afford a new type of intervention for President Eanes in the realm of foreign policy, on a subject of particular interest to the Pintasilgo government and to certain members of the Council of the Revolution, gathering together Portuguese experts specializing primarily in the political field, and ranging from the ASDI to the left.

This is another step associated with the president's external intervention accompanied by a delineation of bridges for dialog involving the government and certain political forces; a step wherein the essential significance lies with an organization in which Council member Melo Antunes is preeminent.

6. The 25 November That Could Have Been

Since there are no political events which result from chance, it should not come as a shock to anybody if the task of restoring the president's image at home should also start to materialize during November itself. And the date 25 November would be an optimal occasion for this purpose, except for another "ultimatum" issued yesterday by the Democratic Alliance, to the effect that 25 November should be celebrated in the area of agrarian reform intervention, by paying tribute to the GNR [Republican National Guard]. Eanes has one of two choices: either he does what the Democratic Alliance demands, which would constitute a very uncomfortable situation even if it were in keeping with his previous concealed views, or else he does not do so and misses an opportunity for a speech marked by "right wing coverage," which would be feasible as part of the strategy of "covering all azimuths," carried out by Belem.

7. Message to the PS....

Finally, the message which has been carried by certain news media, widely quoted in Belem (even citing reliable sources to refute matters on which the president was judiciously silent, such as the meeting with Jose Manuel Casqueiro), widely quoted in Restelo and ever heeded on Rua da Emenda, has not failed to be enlightening; a message which emphatically proposes that the PS have "sufficiently clear vision to suggest a rapprochement between the Socialists and Eanes and to take advantage of the attacks which the Alliance is inciting against the president." The same message explains the main reasons for Eanes' virtually certain reelection (namely, his prestige among the armed forces, his prestige abroad and the cooperative attitude of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party]); and it also suggests that the PS attempt "to collect the interest that the administration of a government like that of Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo could provide."

It could not be more clear in its explanation of the Eanes-Pintasilgo government-PS tripolar strategy, which has, essentially, been pursued by the sector of the Council of the Revolution of which Vitor Alves is a member:

Defeat of the Democratic Alliance, with the resultant destruction thereof; a Pintasilgo government backed by the PS and giving the PS the benefits of having executive status without the pertinent costs; and the reelection of Ramalho Eanes with backing from the PS-ASDI and not too much harassment from the PCP.

To tell the truth, it should be said that this is an intelligent strategy, it is a strategy with possibilities and it is the only strategy that could, if the PS is willing, provide a minimally strong and perhaps coherent and stable political base for the reelection of President Eanes and a certain amount of harmony between the president and the government.

It remains to be said that the revision of the Constitution to reinforce the powers of the president of the republic should be inevitable in the overall logic of this strategy. It is the neo-presidentialism of the independent left rising from the ashes of the old presidentialism of the center and right of 1977-78.

The great problems with this strategy lie in the uncertainty of the December election results, in the two thirds majority of deputies present exceeding an absolute majority of deputies actually holding office which the Constitution stipulates on the military level, and in the correlation of forces on the military level....and, most particularly, in the position that the PS assumes in the choice between a yes or no for Eanes: yes or no to a long-term presidentialist proclivity in the current system of government, yes or not to upholding the constitutional majority required for the revision of the Constitution.

An Amazing Case

But let us now look at other members of the Council of the Revolution, and at their political behavior in the recent past and the present.

Let us consider, in particular, one very strange case which deserves a detailed analysis: the case of the promotion of Pires Veloso to a general officer.

For a long time, the essential obstacle hampering this promotion, at first glance, lay in the vote of the Council members who were euphemistically described as "Melo Antunists," and whose strategic behavior we have just assessed.

By a close majority, Pires Veloso was still unpromoted despite the backing from members of the Council of the Revolution who are regarded as more moderate.

Thus far, everything seemed logical. Everything seemed logical because that vote coincided with the occasion on which Pires Veloso's candidacy for president of the republic was announced, albeit informally, and the first preparatory meetings for that purpose were being held.

And, because the civilian political sectors apparently supporting Pires Veloso were centrist and Social Democratic sectors, mainly northern, the reasoning of political observers was relatively simple: On the one hand,

there were the political forces which backed or at least refrained from opposing Pires Veloso, thinking of the present and the future; and, on the other, there loomed the civilian and military political forces which more or less overtly questioned his promotion and, more universally, questioned certain facets of his personality or his activity.

This was a simplistic analysis, like all Manichaeistic analyses; but the fact is that it was a common analysis.

As for President Ramalho Eanes' position, even those who thought quite sincerely that Eanes by no means esteemed Pires Veloso (and even viewed him with strong reservations), even they admitted that the president would always be clever enough not to lend his vote in the Council of the Revolution the significance of eliminating a potential contender in 1980. This held true for all those who did not think that Ramalho Eanes would dissociate himself in such a vote from political reasons, and make merely a judgment of a military nature.

9. The Explanation of Two Surprises in the Pires Veloso Case

The surprise came about quite recently, and it was twofold: On the one hand, there were Council members who had previously voted against Pires Veloso's promotion, and who appeared willing to vote in favor of that promotion now. On the other hand, there were Council members who were considered to belong to the moderate sector and who opposed Pires Veloso's promotion.

More concretely, it was reported prominently that Pires Veloso's promotion received opposition from Gen Pedro Cardoso, the army chief of staff, at a time when, if a vote had been taken on it, there would quite likely have been positive results, owing to the change in the vote of a Council member who had previously opposed it.

In such political realities, nothing happens by chance; and hence observers have wondered what could explain these two positions on the part of members of the Council of the Revolution.

As usual, there are those who may claim peremptorily that there is no political reason underlying the discreet attitudes, particularly that of the CEME [army chief of staff], but only military reasons, beginning with the officer's profile and his suitability for the requirements of a general's rank. But let us try to go a little further....

As for the eventual shift on the part of the Council members who were opponents in the past and who now back the promotion, it would come as no surprise if the prevailing idea might be not to create another victim, or scapegoat for political campaigns during an election period, and to bind Pires Veloso to a non-active position, which would quite likely limit his option for running as a candidate in the 1980 presidential elections.

However, Gen Pedro Cardoso's position seems more interesting, apart from the aforementioned motives of a military nature.

Simultaneously with this attitude, there have been indications that the enthusiasm expressed at one time by certain centrist and Social Democratic sectors for backing a Pires Veloso candidacy has been rapidly declining.

Here and there, some isolated sectors still remain steadfast in their support for the same idea; but it would appear to have gone out of style among sizable circles on Rua Buenos Aires and Largo das Caldas.

10. A Candidate Who Stopped Agreeing

It is possible that all of this is nothing but mere coincidence. It may be mere coincidence that Pires Veloso has observed major support in the civilian area disappearing; while at the same time seeing his promotion refused by the military political sector that is considered most moderate.

It is possible that there is no political intention behind Gen Pedro Cardoso's position, either at present or in the near future.

It is also possible that Gen Pedro Cardoso has no future military ambitions beyond the important post as army chief of staff that he currently holds, and that he does not have any specific ambition to become chief of staff of the armed forces or for becoming one of the most prominent military backers of another candidate for the presidency of the republic, namely, Gen Ramalho Eanes.

It is possible that all of this is true; it is even quite possible that it is.

It is up to the political observer only to begin verifying the minor incident of the initiation of the rapid decline in the notion of Pires Veloso's candidacy among civilian or military political sectors that could potentially have nurtured it.

This means, in other words, that a vacuum is being created (intentionally?) in the presidential alternative to Gen Ramalho Eanes, a challenge which might therefore be halted at the right time, with an increased shock effect.

Meanwhile, there is only the outline of a strategy on the part of certain members of the Council of the Revolution, a strategy whereby the main objective is the reelection of Gen Ramalho Eanes (primarily a guarantee of his own politico-military position). Thus far, the strategy of other members of the Council of the Revolution has been less evident, but the assumption that they, too, are about to assume positions for 1980 is beginning to become apparent.

Time will tell the purpose of the strategy for the reelection of Ramalho Eanes, and also the precise aim of the strategy opposing him, the features of which are not yet clearly visible. Then we shall know whether it was for the purpose of not providing premature targets.

Thus far, one thing is certain: The assumption that Pires Veloso might become a strong candidate for the presidency of the republic has declined substantially during the past 2 months.

In long-distance races there is always that risk for runners specializing in speed: Their strength fails them when they least expect it, and the backing that they consider most certain seeks other destinations.

2909

CSO: 3101

VICE-CHIEF OF AIR FORCE AGAINST MILITARY AMNESTY LAW

Lisbon 9 DIA in Portuguese 26 Oct 79 p 13

[Text] "How can the Armed Forces include among their members individuals who do not accept the principles underlying their organization, and who distort their function, destroy them from within and make them inoperative, and hence unnecessary, because of being unable to carry out their mission which is the reason for their existence?" This is the misgiving expressed by Gen Brochado Miranda, vice-chief of staff of the Air Force, in the latest edition of the magazine MAIS ALTO, the organ of that branch of the Armed Forces.

According to Brochado Miranda, the passage by the Assembly of the Republic of the amnesty law proposed by the PS [Socialist Party] and backed by the PC [Communist Party] has interfered in the "disciplinary and statutory domain" of the Armed Forces, hampering their "cohesion," and "jeopardizing, at the outset, the assurance that the military authorities will obey the civilian authorities under all circumstances."

In the opinion of that general officer, "if the Armed Forces are, in fact, to be a force the time and place of whose implementation are subject exclusively to the decision of the democratically elected organs of sovereignty," it is "necessary that they maintain the power to organize themselves in accordance with the principles which will guarantee them the necessary features" for carrying out their mission.

Brochado Miranda claims that the fact that the Armed Forces are subject to the civilian authorities does not mean that they have been divested of their organizational authority, or of the authority to organize themselves internally. It is in their own organization that "their reason for being a force lies." But, to make the organization of the Armed Forces possible, it is necessary to impose "restrictions on the rights of their members," declared Brochado Miranda, who gave a reminder of the stipulations contained in the Constitution. As members of the Armed Forces, "the military must be subject to their principles and organizations, which obviously transcend and limit them."

Brochado Miranda adds that, in this way, although they are "subordinate to the civilian authorities," the Armed Forces must always possess "the

authority to organize themselves internally, and to establish and observe rules of conduct which preclude any significant deviations." Hence the relevance of Brochado Miranda's question: How can military men who do not accept the principles of their organization be members of the Armed Forces?

2909

CSO: 3101

NEW DEPOSIT OF COPPER, ZINC FOUND

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 30 Oct 79 p 6

[Text] Large pyrite deposits, the copper and zinc content of which exceeds in percentage that of the deposits in the Aljustrel complex, have been discovered in the Neves Corvo area, a site near Castro Verde. According to the Bureau de Recherches Geologiques et Minières [Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration] (BRGM), a French entity that has estimated the amount of valuable metals present, consisting mainly of copper and zinc, at over 2 million tons, this is "one of the principal discoveries made in this area in Europe since the war."

The deposits are located at a depth of between 400 and 500 meters, and their discovery has culminated with success an intensive effort on the part of technicians working for a Portuguese-French consortium which has exclusive prospecting and exploration rights in the area.

Portuguese specialists (including the general director of mines and geological services) consider the discovery of new deposits at the same depths to be quite likely. This optimism is based on the experience gained from the activity in Neves Corvo and, in particular, on the new data gathered during the research work that has been under way for over a decade in several other areas.

If the expectations of the experts are confirmed, Portugal might become one of the leading copper, lead and zinc producers in Europe; because it now holds, with Spain, over 50 percent of the European reserves. Meanwhile, our country would now appear to have won a major victory which will not fail to affect the process of joining the European Economic Community, since the Common Market has a shortage of copper and zinc. Reports reaching us also indicate that the Neves Corvo "case" was discussed during Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Portugal, and was taken up again during President Ramalho Eanes' trip to France.

The Neves Corvo deposits are especially rich in zinc in one area, and in copper in another, showing average amounts that are regarded as "unusual": 6 percent per ton for each of the metals; whereas in the Aljustrel mines, though they are far larger in size, the metal content does not exceed 2.5 percent in the case of zinc, and 1 percent in that of copper.

However, the exploration of Neves Corvo will entail investments amounting to many millions of contos, in view of the depth at which the deposits are located; and, of course, the state will be responsible for the main task of utilizing and assessing this resource which has now been discovered, and all the more so because it is the state itself which owns the Santiago Mining Company, as well as the Aljustrel mines, as a result of the nationalization of the CUF [United Manufacturers' Company].

The creation of the Alentejo Mining and Metallurgy Company at the last Council of Ministers' session is certainly a useful expedient for the implementation of a policy which will afford the utilization of our mining resources during the course of the work that is to be done by the Committee for Integrated Utilization of Pyrites.

2909

CSO: 3101

BRIEFS

TRADE DELEGATION IN PRC--Absolutely satisfactory results in the still exploratory framework of these visits was the conclusion expressed on the second visit to the PRC by a delegation of representatives of Portuguese exporting firms, organized by the Portuguese-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry with the backing of the secretariat of state for foreign trade and the export promotions board. The delegation returned yesterday to the Portuguese capital. The delegation was received in Beijing by the Chinese Council for International Trade and during 3 days held talks with members of that council as well as with members of the main Chinese foreign trade corporations, namely those of textiles, machinery, mineral and metal products, chemical and food products, and so forth, as well as with authorities of the Ministry of Industry and Equipment. At the end of the talks the Portuguese delegation was the guest of honor at a banquet given by the Chinese Council for Foreign Trade, and also met with the Portuguese ambassador to Beijing. As a result of these talks contracts for a certain number of exchanges were signed, and it was agreed that three Chinese trade missions will visit Portugal. These missions are visiting Europe in 1980, the first in April, the second in October, and the third at a date still to be agreed. [Text] [LD161430 Lisbon Radio in Portuguese to Timor, Macao and Australia 1030 GMT 16 Nov 79 LD]

NATURAL GAS FIND--There are indicators of gas pockets in the estuary of the Mino River. The first traces were discovered in 1975, and a seismic test was carried out last year by Western Geophysical. A Portuguese delegation, however, has made direct contact with Standard Oil of the United States since, as Portugal claims, the major part of the pocket is situated in Portuguese waters. The Portuguese Government had also previously contacted Hispanoil, but no agreement had been reached. A Dutch firm will supply technical assistance to the drilling platforms in addition to positioning material. [Excerpt] [Madrid THE SPANISH ECONOMIC NEWS SERVICE in English 6 Nov 79 p 5]

BRIEFS

SOVIET SHIP CALLS--In 1978, 3,090 calls by Soviet ships, with a total of 21.1 m grt, were registered by Spanish ports with increases of 11 percent and 9 percent respectively over 1977. At present, the Soviet flag runs second among foreign flags calling at Spanish ports. Ports with the most traffic are Las Palmas, Santa Cruz, Huelva and Algeciras. The total volume of goods loaded or discharged by Soviet ships amounted to 15.7 mt. [Excerpt] [Madrid THE SPANISH ECONOMIC NEWS SERVICE in English 6 Nov 79 pp 4, 5]

CSO: 3120

COUNTRY SECTION

1980 BUDGET: DEBTS, PROJECTED EXPENSES DETAILED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 30 Oct 79 p 19

[Article by U. M.]

[Text] Bern, 26 October.—With some reservations concerning short-term politico-economic requirements, the Federal Council firmly adheres to its aim of a balanced federal budget in the not too distant future. The message accompanying the budget estimates of the Confederation for 1980 states that although these efforts of the Federal Council suffered a considerable setback by the rejection of the last two finance bills, the restoration of a balanced federal budget still presents a task which in significance exceeds all other concerns. "Sound federal finances are the fundamental preconditions for a prosperous development of our country and thus also for the preservation of its vitality."

Federal Debts Reach 16.3 Billion

Since 1971 the finances of the Confederation have been continuously in the red. The deficits, initially of 250 to 300 million magnitudes, quickly climbed into the billions, and the debts of the Confederation have increased from 5.7 to 16.3 billion francs within 10 years. As urgently as action would seem to be demanded by these figures, and especially also after the negative vote of 20 May, the budget estimates for 1980 still do not yet contain measures of immediate effectiveness. The Federal Council claims that thoroughgoing structural dislocations cannot be rectified within a short period of time and within the framework of one budget.

Expenditures Tightened

Within the framework of all the possibilities of budgeting procedure, there was therefore first of all a tightening of expenditures. Compared with 1979 budget estimates, the increase in expenditure still amounts to around 120 million, or not quite 1 percent. A consolidation of federal expenditure to the level of the 1979 budget estimates, which was attempted after rejection of the 1978 finance reform, could, however, not be achieved. As

a consequence of the ninth revision of the AHV [old-age and surviving dependants insurance], the federal subsidy to the AHV for 1980 was raised from 11 to 13 percent, which entailed an additional expenditure of 215 million. The general cost of living adjustment for AHV and IV [invalidity insurance] pensions provided an extra burden of 97 million. While especially earmarked revenue from alcohol and tobacco taxes were still sufficient to cover the costs until the beginning of the 1970s, the AHV and IV today require contributions from general federal funds of 1.604 billion, or 66 percent of all federal payments.

Effects of Parliamentary Resolutions

Agriculture too requires considerable extra expenditure; with an allocation of 1.528 billion, its expenditure exceeds last year's budget by 136 million, or 9.3 percent. Subsidies for farm management and expansion of the family allowances system, which parliament passed, will burden the federal budget with an almost 100 million of extra expenditure. Measures for an improved control of meat and egg production will also have a considerable impact. The federal government will have to remit to the cantons about 75 million more than last year as their share of the defense tax revenue, as a consequence of the 2-year taxing cycle that is to bring a so called "rich-yield" defense tax year in 1980. The 1980 budget is furthermore to be debited with a supplemental 73 million that is to cover the deficit of the Swiss National Railways. Expenditure for public transportation again rose by 3.3 percent, while stagnating for street transportation and even falling off by 3.4 percent for air traffic.

The 1980 budget maintains the ban on hiring new personnel, which is in force since 1975. Without approval by the federal courts the complement of 32,698 employees, which was allowed for 1979, must not be exceeded. Expenditure for personnel, budgeted at 1.733 billion, is still above the preceding year's by 77 million due to adjustments for higher cost of living.

Armed Forces and Subsidies

As to military expenditure—budgeted at a total of 3.5 billion—these show an annual increase, discounting inflation, of 5.3 percent over the last 5 years. Compared with the budget estimates for 1979, increases are about 117 million in investments and about 45 million in running expenses. The message accompanying the budget estimates for 1980 points out that even a small country cannot escape the effects of an increasingly sophisticated and improved technological development of war materials, so that shifts in the program become necessary to keep expenditure within these modest rates of increase. To what extent these rates could be corrected later, or whether they must lead to cuts in the army's structure as at present visualized for 1980, cannot be predicted at this moment.

At a figure of 5.6 billion, subsidies occupy 32.2 percent of all budgeted expenditures, and this share is—measured against the total budget

expenditure—below the figures in the preceding two budgets, although not due to an actual reduction. (On the contrary, subsidies are also up by 170 million compared with the preceding year. However, other groups of expenditure have increased much more.

Optimistic Expectations

Optimism is expressed in the estimates for revenue. With a total of 16.045 billion, the estimated increase of 5.9 percent is clearly above the 5 percent assumed as the growth rate of the gross national product. The 644 million budgeted in excess of the 1979 revenue will mainly originate from such items as defense tax (+250 million), turnover tax (+250 million) and additional charges on animal feed (+100 million). All other revenue sources will hardly yield any appreciable increases. Import duty is budgeted at about 10 million less than in the previous year. Trade with EFTA countries is today to a great extent duty-free, and the tariff reductions decided at the so-called Tokyo Round of GATT will most likely result in a further loss in revenue of 10 to 15 million. Revenue from motor fuel taxes is estimated at 950 million and from the customs surcharge on motor fuels at 1.26 billion.

Safeguarding Past Achievements

The federal budget estimate for 1980—ending in a deficit of 1.297 billion; 17.342 billion expenditure and 16.045 billion revenue—is the first budget in the new legislative period, 1979-1983. However, the estimates could not be adjusted to the new government guidelines. For this reason the Federal Council gave primary consideration to the safeguarding of past achievements. The rejection of the new federal finance reform has not only rendered the 1978 concept of financial planning obsolete—a concept that was based on increased revenue from the added-value tax—but has also unquestionably moved the possibility of a balanced budget in the early 1980s much further away.

Recovery—But How?

In its message accompanying the 1980 budget estimate, the Federal Council made it clear that reductions in expenditure will not be sufficient anymore to compensate the deficit. Only a lasting easing of the financial burdens, and that particularly in the area of transfers to which almost two-thirds of all expenditures can be attributed, can bring about a recovery of budgetary stability. The catchword in this connection is still: "redistribution of tasks between the Confederation and the cantons." Preparatory work in this direction has already reached a fairly advanced stage. Unrelated to these endeavors there will have to be further cuts in several other items of expenditure.

On the ~~income~~ side the primary task is now to create the preconditions for the ~~time~~ that the present finance laws will expire at the end of 1982,

to be able to safeguard at least the major sources of today's revenue, namely the turnover tax and the defense tax. Although additional sources of revenue are being explored (heavy traffic tax and freeway toll) they will probably be far from sufficient to achieve a stabilization of the federal budget. The message says, quoting verbally: "These problems force the Federal Council and Parliament to face decisions which are very difficult in substance as well as in their political implications."

8453

CSO: 3103

ERBAKAN LAYS DOWN CONDITIONS FOR SUPPORT OF JP GOVERNMENT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 24 Oct 79 pp 1,11

[Text] Ankara: President Koruturk, accepting separately yesterday at the Cankaya Residence the General Chairmen of both the NSP and the NAP, discussed the problem of the government with them... NSP Chairman Erbakan, who following the talks stated that his party might support from outside a government formed by the JP without setting forth any preconditions, said that this support would extend for at least a year.

NSP General Chairman Erbakan, whom Koruturk accepted first, told journalists after his 45-minute audience that the President and he had discussed the government which the JP will form and said that the support which his party would provide would be "dependent upon the cart not turning over." Erbakan said that "At this point, the duty of providing insurance falls upon me... At a certain point, if we come face to face with great perils, if a patriotic duty devolves upon us, then naturally we will perform our duty."

Points Stressed by Erbakan

Erbakan stressed these points in particular:

-- "Our views on the establishment of the government are clear. They are based on these three principles:

- 1) "In the 1979 elections, the voters clearly showed a certain tendency. The new government must be established along the lines of this tendency.
- 2) "The NSP will provide support from outside the government, so that the JP may act with complete freedom in its operations.
- 3) "During the period ahead, the NSP will aid in serving the nation and will engage in constructive activities.

-- "There is no time to be lost. It is necessary that the JP be charged with forming a government as soon as possible, and that the JP form the government and begin operation immediately.

-- "The JP represents the usurious, capitalistic, exploitative, liberal mentality. We are going to do whatever we can so that this mentality is applied in its natural form. That is, the JP should carry out the same policies as it would if it had won a great election. We think it beneficial that this philosophy be applied."

"Period of Support May Last a Year"

Answering journalists' questions, Erbakan said that "Essentially, we are imposing no preconditions on the JP with regard to forming a government. The support that we will offer will continue as long as this philosophy is clearly observed. This will mean for at least a year."

Responding to a question as to whether or not a protocol would be signed, Erbakan said that this would become clear later, according to the attitude adopted by the JP while forming a government. Erbakan stressed that his party will support only a government formed by the JP, and that there is no possibility of such an arrangement with the RPP.

Turkes' Statement

NAP General Chairman Turkes, as well, told journalists after his meeting with the President that he had informed President Kocuturk of the views which had emerged on the topic of the various possible government formulas according to decisions made in the party's General Executive Council. Turkes stated that he considered the establishment of a national coalition useful in order to fight inflation and unemployment, prevent an increase in anarchy, and oppose the threats coming from various directions. In addition, he said that his party might also support a government established under the leadership of a non-partisan Prime Minister.

Turkes said that, in the present framework, the formation of a government around the JP, which had emerged from the elections as the successful party, is a requirement of the rules of democracy, and reported that his party would maintain its stance along the lines of unconditionally supporting such an endeavor from outside the government. As for the duration of this support, Turkes said that "We have no decision as yet. We will observe their performance in office."

The NAP General Chairman said that a new public will had emerged in the elections and, maintaining that the present numerical makeup of the Assembly reflects the will shown in the 1977 elections, called for an early election to be held at once. Turkes stated that an election could be held after the 1980 budget passes out from the Assembly.

9173
CSO: 4907

NSP CHAIRMAN ERBAKAN TO CALL ON KHOMEYNI

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 28 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] National Salvation Party (NSP) Chairman Necmettin Erbakan has been invited to Iran. It has been learned that Erbakan responded favourably to the invitation and that following the holidays he will go to Iran to talk with the Ayatollah Khomeyni. While there have been differing opinions as to the identity of the person who sent the invitation to Prof Erbakan, NSP officials have reported that the invitation bore the signature of the Ayatollah himself.

In a statement to our paper some time ago, Erbakan indicated that it would be useful to talk with Iran's revolutionary leader Khomeyni and expressed his desire to do so. The leader of the National Salvation Party is a member of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic thought. Khomeyni, on the other hand, is a member of the Ja'fari sect; a branch of Shiism. The Ja'fari sect is the Shi group closest to Sunni Islam.

Sources we spoke to stated that Khomeyni does not place too much importance on sectarian differences but rather stresses "Islamic solidarity." NSP administrators call Erbakan's going to Iran for discussions with Khomeyni a great contribution to the rapprochement policy toward Islamic nations.

CSO: 4907

TCP SAID TARGETING TURK-IS AFFILIATED UNIONS

Istanbul HERGUN in Turkish 5 Nov 79 p 8

[Text] Istanbul--The Moscow allied Turkish Communist Party, while continuing its efforts to unite certain Turk-Is unions with DISK and to unite workers around a "National Democratic Front" in line with a decision that was made some time ago, has caused important set-backs for the Turkish worker according to certain Turk-Is administrators. As is known, DISK is a dissident offshoot of Turk-Is. In the same manner, various member unions of Turk-Is have from time to time joined DISK as a result of Turkish Communist Party intrigue. Worker groups report that the Turkish Communist Party establishes a rapport with Turk-Is administrators under the slogan "Let us unite!" and then after an appropriate period of time seizes control of a union by taking over its administration. They point to the most recent charade being perpetrated upon Saglik-Is (Health Workers Union) as an example of this type of intrigue.

According to information we have received, unions under the sway of the Turkish Communist Party will submit a joint candidate at the Social Security Organization Executive Board elections which are to be held by the end of December. The following organizations are amongs: those groups which have agreed to act upon this issue: the Social Workers Union, the Turkish Physicians Union, the Comprehensive Civil Servants' Unity and Mutual Solidarity Association, the Comprehensive Health Personnel Unity and Solidarity Association, the Universal Technical Workers Union, the Revolutionary Health Workers Union, the Turkish Office and Clerical Employees Union, the Comprehensive Hospital Workers Union and the Petroleum Workers Union. In opposition to the "united action" decision by certain pro-Moscow unions and associations, the administrators of the Turk-Is affiliated Health Workers Union have called for action which will spoil the Turkish Communist Party's games. They have stressed the need for urgent action on this matter and have commented on the need for a clear understanding that DISK and the Turkish Communist Party are the enemies of Turk-Is.

CSO: 4907

ECEVIT ASKS PLO FOR INCREASED SUPPORT OF TFSC CAUSE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 26 Oct 79 p 8

[Text] Ankara: Prime Minister Ecevit has conveyed his greetings to PLO leader Yasser Arafat through WAPA, the Palestine News Agency, saying that Turkey desires "the realization of the Palestinians' right to establish their own national state."

Ecevit stated that Turkey's policy toward Palestine will not change no matter what government may come to power in Turkey. Touching upon the matter of Cyprus as well, Ecevit said that "We would like to see the PLO support the Turks of Cyprus to a greater degree."

In an answer to a question on how Turkey's U.S. bases would be utilized in the event of an Arab-Israeli war, the Prime Minister said that "There can be no question of these installations being used against our friends in the region."

9173

CSO: 4907

BRIEFS

PROGRESSIVE YOUTH ORGANIZATION BANNED--The Istanbul martial law and 1st Army Command has banned throughout the country, the functioning of the Progressive Youth Organization, which has its headquarters in Istanbul, on the grounds that it is acting in a way damaging to public order and general security. Both martial law and general judicial authorities have started investigations about the officials of the organization. [Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 6 Nov 79 TA]

LIBYA IRRIGATION PROJECT--The state Hydraulic Affairs Directorate will conduct a project in Libya in connection with the irrigation of desert land. According to information from the foreign ministry, the project, will cost \$10 million, envisages the drilling of deep water wells in the arid areas of the country. It was announced that in addition to this project, other Middle Eastern countries have also applied to the state Hydraulic Affairs Directorate for the drilling of deep water wells. [Text] [TA120718 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 11 Nov 79]

NUT EXPORTS--The Black Sea Region Nut Exporters Union has announced that deals have been concluded for the export of 36,767 tons of 1979 harvest nuts to various countries. This will secure \$114,971,210. Of the total of 36,767 tons, 7,282 tons have already been shipped to the relevant countries from Black Sea ports. Officials say that the 1978 harvest exports continue and that foreign exchange worth 5.276 billion Turkish liras has been received in return for the 92,971 tons of 1978 harvest nuts already exported. [Text] [TA110748 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 2000 GMT 10 Nov 79 TA]

700 KILOS DYNAMITE SEIZED--Three persons have been taken into custody in connection with an incident in which 700 kilos of dynamite were taken from a car during a traffic check conducted in Mardin. During the course of traffic checks in the city yesterday by Elhisek Directorate traffic teams, 700 kilos of dynamite were found in an automobile bearing the license plate number 23 AT 171. The driver of the vehicle, Seyfi Kilic, and 2 other persons who were found in the car, Mehmet Etim and Kamil Ertan, have been taken into custody. Authorities are continuing their investigation of the incident. [Text] [Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 23 Oct 79 pp 1, 11]

AUTHORITIES DETAIN ILLEGALS--Adana, 12 Nov (AA)--Forty-eight members of an illegal organization, calling itself "The Revolutionary Way," and affiliated with the illegal People's Liberation Party Front Marxist-Leninist Propaganda Union, were taken into custody by martial law authorities in Adana. A communique from the martial law commander for the region said the detainees included two policemen, one of whom hid a pistol he received from a member of the organization, and another who warned two members they were wanted in connection with a secret police investigation. The communique said evidence against the organization was handed over to the military prosecutor, along with charges of having attempted to abrogate the constitution, to establish the domination of one social class over another and to destroy the economic and social order. [Text] [TA121910 Ankara ANTOLIA in English 1820 GMT 12 Nov 79 TA]

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